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Foreword 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 2017 the Centre for European Studies (CES) of Faculty of Law and 
Political Sciences of the Széchenyi István University launched the 
conference series ‘EU Business Law Forum’ with the aim to establish a 
regular event, which reflects on topical issues of EU business law and 
explores the related contemporary challenges in their legal, political, 
economic and social reality.  
The 2nd EU Business Law Forum “EU Business Law through the lens 
of Digital Revolution” held between 13–14 June 2019, was devoted to 
discuss the implications of the current technological revolution on the 
business environment in the European Union, particularly on the EU 
business law regulation. The Forum identified the recent challenges that 
the EU business actors are facing as a result of the digitalization and 
posed the question, whether – analogically to the concept of ‘Industry 
4.0’ – a process of a ‘Law 4.0’ is expected to become tangible in the EU 
business law regulation, responding adequately the challenges arising 
from the new disruptive technologies.  
This book offers an insight into the main focus areas of the 
conference. The first chapter (I. Artificial Intelligence: legal implications) 
reflects on the growing importance of using artificial intelligence and the 
role of the legal regulation. The articles pose questions form general as 
well as specific perspectives and illustrates the legal problems of the 
artificial intelligence by varieties of topics, from the public procurements 
to the supply chains. The second chapter collects the papers that are 
focusing on the new instruments of exchange (II. Cryptocurrencies). The 
chapter lays down the conceptual basis of cryptocurrencies and 
examines the legal and regulatory challenges arising from the current 
use and the probable future prevalence of the virtual currencies. The 
third chapter of the book pays attention to emerging fields of regulations 
 
(III. Business and digitalization). The papers examine the adoption of 
technological innovations in higher education, e-commerce related 
aspects of computer games, legal challenges of smart contracts and 
autonomous vehicles.  
The Forum was a part of the ‘Jean Monnet Module on EU Business 
Law’ (EUBLAW) project funded by the European Commission’s Erasmus+ 
Programme in the Period of 2016 – 2019, and this year, the CES 
organized the event in cooperation with the SmartLaw Research Group. 
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I. Artificial Intelligence: legal 
implications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Knight Rider’s Brothers Coming Soon – What About Their 
Legal Situation?

 
 
 
Gábor Kertész*  
 
 
Abstract: Nowadays, we are confronted more and more times with the issues of 
artificial intelligence and (partly or completely) self-driving vehicles. How does this 
technical development change our daily lives? What can "Law" do with these? In the 
analysis I am looking for the answer how these technical novelties can fit into the 
structure and logic of the legal system. During this process I use examples of history 
and legal history, other social sciences and modern business logic as well. 
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1.  Introduction 
In the 1990s, television channels broadcasted the Knight Rider 
action film in a huge number of countries around the world, in which one 
of the main characters was a self-driving car. That time it existed only at 
the level of dreams and on the design tables of engineers, today it is 
reality in some parts of the world.  
1.1. A bit of „layman philosphy” 
Our long-standing expectation towards machines to work perfectly, 
flawlessly. In the contrary our recurring experience is that "nothing is 
perfect" "what may go wrong will go wrong" and we have to admit that a 
thing without any errors has never been made by a non-perfect person. 
From this point of view, we can ask how many % of the errors are 
accepted in practice naming the thing "perfect" or rather appropriate. 
The concept of damage appears already in the earliest legal systems. 
The concept clarified in the old Roman law is still perfectly applicable 
today, according to which the damage has two parts: the real damage 
 
 
* College professor, International Business School (Budapest). 
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(dannum emergens) and the loss of profit (lucrum cessans). Based on 
these, it is a question of argumentation to determine whose (active or 
passive) behavior caused the damage and who bears responsibility for 
the damage. It is usually a judicial procedural task not to allow the 
evidence procedure to sink into the infinite marsh of the principle of 
conditio sine qua non. 
2. Historical examples 
2.1. Legal instruments nowadays that come from legal history 
These legal instruments of responsibility have been created in the 
history of law during the technical development to solve the current 
problem. Man first tamed / domesticated animals that typically followed 
his instructions, but sometimes did not or not well executed the 
instruction and caused damage. The issue of liability for such damages 
caused by animals has been established long ago, and its structure has 
not changed since the first civilizations, and our act uses their logic still 
today.1 Also, since the earliest settled civilizations where built 
environment has been built, the question of damage caused by objects 
falling from buildings2 is known. Although the material and design of our 
buildings have undergone many changes over the past millennia, the 
handling of damages by objects falling from the buildings has not 
changed much over the past two thousand years. The next form of 
responsibility was developed due to another historical step that was the 
industrial revolution. The concept and liability of dangerous operations3 
is approached by the structure that was formed at that time, although 
nowadays many of these types of "operations" operate on a daily basis, 
and only the detailed rules for the new types are added to the centuries-
old structure. The last type of liability (although it can still be argued that 
this is not yet clear, but still in the process of being developed) is product 
liability4, where the link is created between the manufacturer and the 
 
1 Liability for the damages caused by animals Ptk. 6.:562-563. §. Here and 
thereafter, I refer to certain provisions of the Hungarian Civil Code (Ptk.), which has the 
same content in civil law in all the legal systems of the world. 
2 Liablity for building damages Ptk. 6.:560-561. §. 
3 Liability for dangerous operations Ptk. 6.:535-539. §. 
4 Product liability Ptk. 6.:550-559. §. 
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end user of the product by omitting the intermediate elements of the 
causal chain.  
As a continental lawyer I looked for similar cases for autonomous, 
self-driving vehicles.  One of the “precedents” - using several multiple 
quotation marks - is the case of animal damages5. In this case an animal 
with independent autonomous animal intelligence causes damage and it 
is a partial question if the owner “led” the animal, or is made itself 
independent or uncontrollable. The other case that could be a 
“precedent” is the liability of the legal entity, where the legal person that 
caused the damage, will be liable for the damage and the legal entity will 
be obliged by the court to pay the compensation for the damage. 
With legal logic and expert arguments on a case-by-case basis, it is 
possible to determine in which proportion and percentage the potential 
responsible people (responsible groups) listed and analyzed above are 
responsible for the damage. The traditional market logic provides 
insurance as a solution to a potential threat, where we can atomize the 
actual damage between the members of the risk community. 
Another possible answer of business logic is to burden the damage to 
the one who caused it. Here the legal logic says today that to oblige a 
damage-causing truly self-driving vehicle to indemnify the damage, it 
should be a legal entity. Not going into the solutions of ancient - not 
Roman - and medieval rights that have passed the ownership of the 
damage-causing animal, or the harmed received temporary use on the 
animal, in case of self-driving cars the similar solution is possible, as it is 
a fact that the damage-causing thing has a value for use and it is able to 
produce it regularly. 
2.2. Philip IV. (the Fair) 
The next example is about a minor change made by the legislator 
that made a huge change in the historical perspective and that 
fundamentally influences national identity. Philip the Fair, king of France 
ordered in 1308 that in a case between non-barons, the court 
established at that time and permanently operating at the Royal Palace 
in Paris should make a final decision either in direct action or in appeal 
against a provincial judgment. This court used the local language around 
 
5 Ptk. 6:562.563. § 
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Paris and its code of conduct made it clear to accept only contracts and 
actions written in the language of the court6. From the early Middle Ages 
in today's France, the provinces with individual feudal autonomy spoke 
their own local language7. As a result of this law, in just a few decades, 
the language of the court became known as a written language in every 
corner of the Kingdom of France, which we now know as a French 
language, as it was in everyone's interest to write all the contracts in that 
language. Nowadays, French is an important element of French national 
identity. 
This is a good example of the fact that standardization of the rules for 
the use of certain elements of Artificial Intelligence (e.g. self-driving cars) 
will be significant for all members of society and will have a social 
organizing and forming effect in the long run. 
3. Who can be liable if Knight Rider makes an accident? 
Let us shortly list the different human beings who have any 
connection with Knight Rider’s birth. 
3.1. Possible liable people 
3.1.1. Driver 
This is the only member of the coming list, where - according to the 
current Hungarian legal environment - only one natural person can be a 
subject. Until now, the liability of the driver was an evidence in the case 
of damages caused by man-, animal- or machine powered vehicles. 
Nowadays there are vehicles that are not driven by humans, but are 
driven by the intelligent / autonomous vehicle itself in self-driving, 
however in the Union they drive only on test fields, not in real traffic. 
After a broad social debate involving the whole human civilization, it can 
be agreed if the natural people in self-driving vehicles should, and if so 
at what level, control the proper / accident-free operation of the vehicle. 
Currently, although we have already met a few legal cases, where the 
 
6 Pál Horváth, István Kajtár, Lászlóné Nagy, T. Mihály Révész, István Stipta and 
János Zlinszky, Általános jogtörténet I. (Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó 1994) 64. 
7 This was the language of the certain Gaul tribe from which the people of the 
province originate. 
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responsibility of the driver has been established on the basis of 
traditional logic, neither the public opinion nor the legislator has 
conducted this increasingly necessary debate yet. If the decision is 
made, it can be translated then into a known form of liability. According 
to the current Hungarian rules, if the vehicle is in motion, one person 
must be in the driving position continuously8. The Hungarian practice 
has not yet faced a case when the vehicle was self-driven with an empty 
driver seat causing an accident / damage. However, with the 
development of technology the question has to be answered soon 
whether the person who switches the vehicle into self-driving mode is a 
driver according to the Road Traffic Code? Does this person stay a driver 
after leaving the vehicle, which continues the way in self-driving mode? 
With traditional legal deduction the question can be replied in a 
conventional way. In this case, the question is modified to the following: 
does it worth to invest in the development / acquisition of such a 
vehicle, if my responsibility for a self-driving vehicle is the same as if I 
were actually driving it? Or how worthy it is for me if I have possibility to 
do other activity(s) besides controlling the vehicle during sitting in the 
driver's seat? 
3.1.2. Owner 
The Road Traffic Code basically lays down rules for the traffic 
participants: the driver and the passenger, and the owner appears only 
once in the text9, but in the meantime the owner is recorded separately 
in the traffic license. We have been treating it for thousands of years as 
an evidence that the owner is responsible for the damage caused by his 
property.10 It is important to recall here for a moment the analogy that 
the tutelary is responsible for the damage caused by the unpunishable 
person.11 
 
 
 
 
8 Road Traffic Code (KRESZ) 4. §. 
9 Road Traffic Code (KRESZ) 59. § (3) subpar. 
10 See e.g. footnote no 2, 3, 4. 
11 Liability for damages caused by unpunishable person Ptk. 6:544-547. §. 
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3.1.3. Retailer, Wholesaler, Importer 
At this point, we arrived at to the actors of the sales chain, calling the 
person12 - in practice typically a legal person - a retailer who sold the 
vehicle to the owner; the other players are working on the basis of 
traditional trade contracts, their responsibilities are governed by the 
contracts, the relevant customs and the practice of the judiciary and 
arbitration court. 
3.1.4. Tester team 
Here, on the one hand, it is the task and responsibility of the team to 
perform all the necessary tests thoroughly and professionally and on the 
other hand to ensure that all relevant tests are performed. Although this 
team typically consists of engineers, they have to keep in mind that they 
have to test the vehicle in every theoretically possible situation and 
check how it behaves in each case. It is often told about us as lawyers 
that we are writing novel-length contracts as 'graphomans' in which we 
try to get prepared for every single theoretically imaginable risk factor. 
The test team has a similar task to examine how the vehicle responds in 
a self-driven mode to the variety of all theoretically possible situations. 
For the test team only the collective responsibility can be imagined, 
since the outstanding and indispensable contribution of a team member 
is theoretically conceivable, but apart from such extreme situations, the 
contribution of all members of the team is equally important for the 
proper performance of the test and the evaluation of the result. Although 
they are not members of the testing team, but the decision-makers of 
the enterprise also have a responsibility here, as the management 
decides based on the results of the tests, with engineer, lawyer and 
economist support if the vehicle is ready to be put on the market / in 
traffic or further development is needed. 
3.1.5. Software-developer team 
This team develops the software (system) that ensures the vehicle's 
self-driving ability. Nowadays, developers generally “teach” the systems 
 
12 I examine only the sales of new vehicles. The sales of used vehicles is out of 
scope of the examination. 
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in a way that it faces decision-making situations continuously, and it 
achieves a better percentage of success due to this “learning”. The 
other, nowadays in minority applied solution is to program the "right / 
good / desirable" solution and the system has to avoid the rest. The 
responsibility of the developers is unavoidable for both methods. In the 
first method the responsibility originates in the examples that were the 
base for teaching the system. It can happen that even though the 
sample consists of a large number of elements, there can be cases that 
are out of the model and the machine will not recognize them and it will 
not be able to handle them well. In the second method, the more 
detailed description of the good solution is important, so that the 
machine can handle the situation that actually arises, even if it is new, 
but similar to a learned rule. At this point, the question of the need for 
ethics arises. If in a given situation only bad decisions can be made and 
non-decision is also a bad decision, which wrong decision should be 
made by the Artificial Intelligence that was taught and built in the 
system? 
A comprehensive research project was launched in 2016 with 40 
million people worldwide, related to the artificial intelligence-driven cars 
being developed nowadays. Researchers were looking for an answer to 
what people say: if there is no way to avoid an accident, who should hit 
the car? The answers outline a world-wide view of what we are protecting 
more and what less. The results of the research have been published 
only half a year ago13. The article first states that it cannot be considered 
worldwide statistically representative because of the limited possibilities 
of sampling, but the data collected show that children are more likely to 
be saved than adults, but this is only a global average statistical result, 
because the range of bad decisions differ from country to country and 
even more from culture to culture. The results of the world average are 
not the same as the results of the regions and metropolises that are the 
most multicultural according to sociologists. So according to the data, 
people in different cultures of the world set different order of 
importance, or approach the question from the other side, a different 
order is set in the list of other people and objects to be sacrificed. So, if 
 
13 Edmond Awad, Sohan Dsouza, Richard Kim, Jonathan Schulz, Joseph Henrich, 
Azim Shariff, Jean-François Bonnefon and Iyad Rahwan, ’The Moral Machine 
experiment’ (Nature, 24 October 2018). 
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there are such significant sequencing differences in case of people from 
different parts or different cultures of the world, in which order to protect 
the different values in an emergency, then Artificial Intelligence will also 
not be able to decide according to a generally accepted sequence, 
although such situations relatively  often occur during traffic. 
In this case, the question arises which culture’s prioritization will be 
the base for the self-driving vehicles choice, i.e. which sequence was 
programmed/taught by the programming team. Here, group dynamics 
and hierarchical relationships within the group as well within the 
organization can also influence the sequence they teach, along with the 
cultural patterns of the team members and other individuals involved. 
I.e. if the development team is culturally homogeneous and whether the 
final decision-making management has the same, homogeneous cultural 
background. For most of these companies, we cannot say yes to this 
question with a calm heart. This results in the following: there is a 
significant likelihood that the sequence of priority will be determined 
differently by not only the vehicle types produced by the different 
manufacturers, but also by the same brand and type of self-driving cars, 
if they are produced in different plants of the world far away from each 
other, if Artificial Intelligence is made independently in the plant, rather 
than installing a centrally-produced system in vehicles manufactured in 
all factories around the world. The issue is about the choice of victim14 in 
an inevitable situation of a self-driven vehicle programmed under the 
rules of other cultures. In my opinion this issue can be settled 
satisfactorily through an agreement resulting from a consultancy with 
the presence of the whole world, or if the producers mutate the vehicles 
into the different cultural regions where they are sold. It is not primarily a 
business law issue, but a fundamental rights issue if it is allowed to the 
owner/driver to download versions of other cultures; either because he 
disagrees with the culture of his place of residence and feels another his 
own, or because he is planning to go to the territory of this culture - 
though the latter can be automatically solved by the service that if the 
vehicle crosses the "cultural boundary" according to its GPS coordinates, 
the system downloads the version that is valid in that area. 
 
14  E.g. the choices were different when the vehicle hits the old person or the child 
in order to save the other one – see same as footnote no 13. 
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3.1.6. Planner team 
This is a team consisting of mostly engineers who design the 
"hardware" of the vehicle. In addition to the fault possibilities of 
conventional vehicle design, only one new risk factor appears here. It is 
a well-known experience in conventional vehicle driving that there are 
"dead spaces" in case of all vehicles depending on the vehicle’s size, 
which are not visible to the driver. Their magnitude cannot be completely 
removed, only reduced with the rear-view mirror system. In case of self-
driving vehicles, however, the expectation is that the machine should 
see everything in real time, simultaneously and drive itself accordingly. 
That's why the design team here, beyond the usual design 
responsibilities of traditional vehicle design, has to meet „only” one new 
requirement. On the vehicle the environment sensors must be 
positioned so that they can continuously see all objects in real time 
within the current speed braking distance that would presents a risk of 
accident in case of going without change. (Of course, the danger of a 
new object that might come out of the cover of another object is 
excluded here.) If the design really reduced the size of "dead spaces" for 
self-guiding sensors to 0%, the design team does not have any more 
responsibilities than the ones coming from traditional design 
responsibilities. The current traffic situation was detected by the sensors 
that transmitted it to the software, which made the decision in self-
driving mode, which is the result of the work of the development team15. 
3.1.7. Controller team 
Modern states usually have a body that controls various activities 
carried out by economic actors. The depth of control that this body 
performs varies from body to body and from country to country. If a 
causal link can be established between the authorization procedure of 
the authority and the damage caused, the determination of damage 
caused by administrative law may arise if it was not possible to avert the 
damage by ordinary legal remedy or in administrative juridical action16. 
The theoretical possibility of this in the examined issue arises only if 
 
15 See footnotes no 13 and 14. 
16 Ptk. 6: 548. §. 
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such an error originating in the type of the self-driving vehicle, which has 
not been recognized either by the licensing authority or the 
manufacturer's designer, software developer and test team previously. 
3.1.8. Legislator  
Legal acts created by the legislator are applied by legal entities and 
by the executive and judiciary branches. And it is a century-old, if not a 
millennium-old fact, for which we can find more and more examples 
nowadays that it is possible to legislate only such situations that already 
occurred, or they could be predicted with significant possibility. The new 
life situations that have arisen after the legislation have typically 
appeared as a legal loophole in continental law systems, and in the 
Anglo-Saxon systems precedents are sought. From a legal point of view, 
the “legislator's silence” - if no law was created on the certain situation - 
cannot be interpreted as a damaging fault. However, economic actors 
can perceive it as a damaging fault according to the logic of the 
economy, of the business and if the market. The question that arises 
here is whether the legislator has created the legal system so that it is 
able to deal with the problem of damage caused by a self-driving vehicle, 
and whether this solution is appropriate for society (for voters?). 
3.2. How can Knight Rider be liable? 
According to the basic division in law, there are legal subjects and 
legal objects. There are no third and temporary categories. We neglect to 
discuss the historical development of the general, unconditional and 
equal legal subject people have. We only mention the last step in the 
development of legal entities, the second group of legal subjects known 
today: "The legal personality of a legal person extends to all rights and 
obligations that, by their very nature, may not only be related to a human 
being"17, i.e. the legal personality of the legal person is not bound to a 
purpose, but it is general. It is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a matter of 
legislation which listed actors and in which extent are made liable for the 
damages caused by the self-driving vehicle. It is already the task of 
 
17 Ptk. 3:1. § (2) subpar. 
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political science to examine political programs, political marketing, and 
legal lobbying of the interested companies. 
Taking the two premises into consideration that the self-driving 
vehicle is capable of making autonomous decisions - respecting the 
rules of social cohabitation - and is capable to generate financial value 
continuously, the business logic raises the question in a right way why 
this vehicle cannot be an actor in business life on its own? As besides 
people - nowadays mainly in the international business community, 
instead of people – it is worldwide an accepted evidence by everyone 
and everywhere that ”legal constructions” named legal entities have 
legal subject, independent from the fact that no one has seen a legal 
entity, only a person representing it, its logo, or its headquarters. 
However, the self-driving vehicle is a tangible physical reality. 
Since the concept of a legal person appeared in legal history till the 
present, there is clear evidence that non-human private entities 
ultimately have a human owner. Nowadays, a new concept has emerged 
on the periphery of the legal subjects, which is the "actual beneficial 
owner" who increases its assets with the values produced by the 
examined legal entity, or has the right to dispose of these assets either 
directly or through mandatory instructions given to the participants in the 
chain18. Not going into details in the psychological, corporate, and social 
sociological question of what group dynamics each company (regardless 
of its legal form) has; we can say that the purpose of the company (the 
legal entity in question) is to live / operate further. As an analogy to this 
approach, we can assume that the autonomous, self-driving vehicles are 
also aimed for further operation; however, this hypothesis gives the 
software development, testing, and control teams an important task. The 
mentioned research looked for a reply about who the vehicle would 
rather hit19. For a human driver, it is an existing option, for which there 
are some famous examples, that the person sacrifices his own life, and 
with this, saving many. With the sensors of the vehicle's seats, on the 
base of the weight of each passenger, the vehicle “knows”20 how many 
 
18 About the concepts „beneficial owner” and „actual beneficial owner” see the 
different conventions about avoiding double taxation and 7. point of 7. App of the 
Hungarian citizens income tax act. 
19 Awad et al. (n 13) 
20 Not going into details about the results of Awad et. al. (n 13), according to which 
the general cultural reply to this in Europe is that the driver puts suitcases on each seat 
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adults and how many children are traveling in it, and even through the 
implementation of this data and the decision of the software 
development team it can save endangered people in a “self-sacrificing 
way” with a "death manoeuvre" sacrificing itself and its passengers. 
4. Let me introduce Knight Rider 
In case of Artificial Intelligence built into the self-driving vehicle from 
the legal aspect of responsibility it is important to refer to the “deep 
learning”21 technique used to “teach” these vehicles. With this "learning 
technique" the Artificial Intelligence does not "try through" all possible 
combinations during problem solving, but after the first recognized (or 
thought to be recognized) model mark, it searches for the next one and 
then goes on step by step and defines the created pattern as a test 
result. It is up to the development team to decide how strictly and with 
how much data they teach the vehicle, or in which extent they let it learn 
independently. After a certain level of knowledge the system can "learn" 
and acquire relevant knowledge and information without the help of 
human or other Artificial Intelligence, to improve its operational 
efficiency22. At this level of learning we can already say that Artificial 
Intelligence is a "black box", because it is not possible to derive and 
reconstruct all details required for the judgment of a certain important 
decision it made. Because the example(s) used to make the decision in 
question was not “taught” by man, but the vehicle has made a decision 
on the base of the examples taught and examples it created and solved 
alone with mechanical logic, and this may result in causing damage. 
During the deep learning self-study after the thoroughly taught 
knowledge of the Artificial Intelligence, no one can be made logically or 
legally responsible for "teaching" the example that causes the damage in 
 
with a weight equal to a child’s weight and fastens the seatbelts. With this the Artificial 
Intelligence counts with one adult and more children and its own safety on the one 
hand, and takes into consideration the safety of the person/people involved in a 
possible accident on the other hand. 
21 Y. Bengio, A. Courville and P. Vincent, ’Representation Learning: A Review and 
New Perspectives’ (2013) 35 (8) IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine 
Intelligence 1798–1828 
22 Yoshua Bengio, Yann LeCun and Geoffrey Hinton, ‘Deep Learning’ (2015) (521) 
Nature 436–444. 
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the certain case, so the owner of the self-driving vehicle will be 
responsible for the damage even if the owner was not in the vehicle. 
In the previous section we dealt with a lot of potential responsible 
entities. There are many hypothetical emergencies similar to the 
example, cited in footnote 22 above, the solution of which raises a moral 
and ethical issue if not a self-driving vehicle, but a human being is 
involved in the certain situation. Therefore, in my opinion, the software 
development team must work closely with lawyers and ethics 
professionals so that autonomous self-driving vehicle will be able to 
provide answers that correspond to the legal and general ethical 
principle of the certain culture in case of emergencies. Accepting and 
acknowledging the fact that different cultures on Earth differently set the 
sequence of importance of the values to be protected, it seems logical to 
harmonize these sequences by convening an international meeting with 
politicians, ethics and legal professionals, which results in the code of 
ethics that is to be programmed in all vehicles capable for self-driving as 
a ROM23 memory. Such a "moral code" burned in all self-driving vehicles 
at world level raises the question of the autonomy and "free will" of all 
people, since the computer code of ethics, written on the base of 
international consensus, will depart from the moral opinions of individual 
people, as it is the consensual opinion of the ethical opinions currently 
existing in the world. It is no longer a matter of law, but of politics, how or 
how to transform the general moral code of mankind in the ranking of 
values to be protected by applying social engineering. This would 
undoubtedly raise fundamental rights issues in all states, as it raises the 
possible risk of personal and / or community identity transformation. 
There are such examples in history; they are often referred to as a 
deterrent. 
Till now we have seen some important historical examples how a 
legal object become a legal entity (not going into the evident solution in 
continental law as to exemplifying with “old Romans”, the way of 
creating a legal entity with the regulation of “emancipation”). Looking at 
the legal history - and the history of mankind – and searching for the 
 
23 ROM: Read-Only Memory. It is part of the memory of an electronic system the 
contents of which are read-only, non-erasable and non-rewritable. Data are physically 
recorded so that they are "remembered" even when disconnected from power, and 
physical erasure of data results in physical damage of the device. 
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answer to the question why a legal subject has been transferred to legal 
entities, we can find three different answers, three reasons. The first is 
the "pro bono" reason, which was typically the owner's own sovereign 
decision, and after it became widespread, it was made by law general24. 
The second is a typically a violent step, coming from the one-sided 
decision of the certain object, when it takes out itself from the real 
power of the owner. In history these are called "slavery insurrection". 
Their goal - becoming a legal entity – was reached in a negligible 
percentage in a global historical context, but the economy of the given 
society or of a narrower community was affected in all cases negatively, 
but to varying degrees. While the previous two reasons are human, the 
third reason is economic. 
 5. A potential interest for Knight Rider’s legal identity 
In a group of legal entities – today we call them capital owners today 
– appeared the need to separate their entrepreneurial and private 
assets. The main reason for this was to avoid that in case of bankruptcy 
of the company the owner's personal property would be lost, too. This is 
how through the complete separation of business assets from private 
assets, a new legal subject type was created: the legal entity that has an 
owner, but its legal subjectness is separate25, and its existence has a 
purpose26. In this context, it is important to remember that the legal 
entity must have a purpose according to law, not only in the Hungarian 
legal system, which obligation can be fulfilled by the recording of an 
activity according to TEÁOR (Hungarian statistic register of economic 
activities) in the founding document. But the legal capacity of the legal 
entity covers all rights, legal protection and obligations that are due to 
their character inherently bound to human people27. 
Nowadays, the new issue, the new challenge is providing a reason for 
giving legal subjectness to the self-driving vehicle, which can be 
obviously only an economic reason. Based on current trends, these 
 
24 Not going into details about the social-psychological and sociological 
consequences of the change of the legal term „instrument vocale” to „servilis persona” 
in the early Middle Ages. 
25 See: Actio Pauliana in the Roman Law. 
26 Ptk. 3:5. § c) point I. turn. 
27 Ptk. 3:1.§ (2) – (3) subpar. 
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vehicles, especially because of the control software, will be so expensive 
that they can expect top or premium pricing. This excludes the wide 
range of private ownership of vehicles, which is general in today's culture 
everywhere. In legal practice "shared use rights28" is a known legal 
institution. If we convert this existing legal institution so that the subject 
of it (on which it is possible to gain shared use rights) is a self-driving 
vehicle, for which the usage fee can be paid to a particular bank 
account, and from the balance of this account the vehicle’s fuel and 
service costs, is compulsory insurance and the compensation of the 
possible caused damages can be paid, we come to a “target asset”. The 
concept of “target assets” has been known in legal literature for a long 
time, without examining the types of public target assets and private law 
is more familiar with the concept in connection with foundations. The 
essence of this has not changed since the creation of the concept: the 
assets of the foundation can be used only for the permanent purpose29 
defined in the founding record. And it can be a "permanent purpose" that 
the self-driving vehicle should work. The provision of the above-
mentioned bank account and its handling can be provided by a 
computer algorithm nowadays. Such an algorithm can be installed in the 
vehicle without any problems, so the self-driving vehicle can "dispose" of 
the shared use by using this algorithm, or from other point of view it can 
cover its costs of operation and maintenance and any possible damages 
from these revenues coming from the charges of passengers for 
transport services. 
From this point on, however, as there is a target asset30 with 
significant value, we can determine as a permanent goal the 
maintenance of the continuous operation of the vehicle and the 
compensation of the damages caused. To achieve these goals, there is 
an algorithm that does not require direct human help to operate the 
target asset. The decision to classify this complex legal object as a legal 
entity can be made after a broad social debate. The question from the 
business side appears if it is finally worthy being the owner and thus 
being responsible for any possible damages the self-driving vehicle as an 
 
28 In the Anglo-Saxon legal literature it is known under the concept „timeshare” or 
„vacation ownership”. 
29 Ptk. 3:378.§ 3:382. § 3: 384. §. 
30 In accounting terms the self-driving car is tangible asset, and the bank account it 
controls/handels is a current asset. 
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object causes? If the answer is yes, the liability options known in the 
legal system can be used to manage disputes, and jurists have only "law 
enforcement" responsibilities. If the answer is no, then jurists should 
collaborate with other social scientists, engineers and mainly software 
development programmers in order to find the right answer. 
6. Conclusion 
I investigated self-driving vehicles – for a more plastic presentation 
with the use of the title of an old film series about a knight, Knight Rider 
– to find out, which scenario would be realistic: will it become a robber 
knight, a Grail Knight, or a simple ordinary knight? During our 
investigation we have found that there is a good chance that after the 
"page" training, the society will have the self-driving car as an efficient, 
labor-intensive "gear" in the system. However, to become a Grail Knight, 
the training must be developed globally, but any mistake during the 
development of this system can result in making it a robber knight. From 
the example of Philip the Fair, we have seen that changing central laws 
to simplify bureaucracy can, in the long run, strengthen community 
identity as a side effect. In the case of self-driving cars, we see that 
sooner or later, it will be necessary to establish uniform rules all around 
the world so that in emergency situations there will be no random 
choices between values and lives. Today, we cannot yet say how such a 
quasi-ethical system that should be programmed into self-driving cars for 
such emergency situations will effect the ethical rules of people and of 
different societies. 
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Abstract: A special attention of competition authorities has lately been attracted by one 
particular type of collusive practice – bid rigging. No wonder, it has a significant effect 
on both proper functioning of competition and proper outcome of the procurement 
procedure. Instead of competing, undertakings collude among each other; and instead 
of the best bid, the public procurement procedure is won by a bid coming out of 
collusion. Within such state of matters, this paper aims to elaborate on the role of 
artificial intelligence in bid rigging. It is claimed that artificial intelligence is often used 
by undertakings which may lead to difficulties in identification and prosecution of 
infringements of Article 101 TFEU. What are the particular issues brought by the use of 
artificial intelligence? Are there any positive effects, or does it make the whole 
enforcement more onerous? These are the questions to be discussed by this paper. 
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1.  Introduction 
Technology has a tremendous impact on a way how business is done. 
Human beings are being replaced by algorithms and artificial 
intelligence. This may lead to higher efficiency and, consequently, to 
lower prices for products and services. On the other hand, it creates a 
space for easier commitment of prohibited activities.  
One of these prohibited activities is discussed in this paper. 
Horizontal agreements represent the infringement of competition law 
which is, arguably, punished the most. There are good reasons for that. 
Cartels jeopardise the very essence of the competition, the fact that 
competitors compete. This leads to poorer quality of the products and 
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services, often accompanied by an increase of prices. On the top of that, 
cartelist usually hide well the existence of the cartel, which complicates 
the enforcement to a great extent. 
In particular, this paper zooms in on horizontal agreements in 
tendering procedures. Bid rigging is even more deplorable as it ruins the 
efficient spending of public money. Therefore, not only buyers of the 
products produced by cartelists suffer from poorer quality and higher 
price, but all taxpayers suffer, as spending of tax they pay is not used in 
accordance with the “value for money” principle. 
This paper aims to identify which issues are brought by use of 
algorithms and artificial intelligence in relation to bid rigging. In 
particular, the paper zooms in on methods of competition law 
enforcement using new technologies, especially regarding public 
procurement. Apart from that, the employment of algorithms is analysed 
from the perspective of how it can mitigate collusive behaviour.  
In order to discuss these issues, the paper is organised as follows. In 
the beginning, bid rigging as a form of horizontal agreement is briefly 
presented from substantive and procedural point of view. Subsequently, 
the employment of algorithms and artificial intelligence is discussed; 
firstly, as an assistant for investigation of cartels and, secondly, as an 
assistant for collusion. Concluding remarks are presented in the 
conclusion. 
2.  Bid rigging 
Article 101 para. 1 TFEU prohibits agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices which may affect trade between Member States and which 
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the internal market. Pursuant to this wording, there is 
a difference between agreements and concerted practices. Agreements 
are understood as a concurrence of wills between at least two parties. 
The form of the agreement is irrelevant so long as it constitutes the 
faithful expression of the parties’ intention.
1
 
There are cases where the agreement is not reached by the parties, 
but the situation on the market is not natural. Concerted practices 
 
1 Judgment of 6 January 2004, BAI and Commission v Bayer, C-2/01 P, 
EU:C:2004:2, para 97. 
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should capture such instances, where the parties cooperate on the 
market.
2
 The concerted practice is characterised by the fact that it 
cannot be understood as a natural following of other party’s behaviour 
on the market. It is therefore clear that the parties are coordinated.
3
 
It is possible that a prohibited agreement (in a broader sense) is 
exempted by a general block exemption regulation or by Article 101 
para. 3 TFEU. This is also applicable (at least in theory) to restrictions by 
object. However, the burden of proof lies on the undertaking who wishes 
to benefit from the exemption.
4
  
Furthermore, this type of anti-competitive practice is also prohibited 
by national law. Taking Slovak law under scrutiny, Section 4 of Act No. 
136/2001 Coll. on protection of competition, as amended, prohibits 
anti-competitive agreements as well.  The Slovak regulation is de iure 
and de facto very similar to the EU regulation.
5
 
As it flows from the wording of Article 101 para 1, agreements can 
have two forms – by object and by effect. The prohibition of by object 
agreement is rather self-explanatory. It means that the agreement has 
as its very purpose the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition. In general, by object agreements captures horizontal 
agreements: “to fix price, to exchange information that reduces 
uncertainty about future behaviour, to share markets, to limit output, 
including the removal of excess capacity, to limit sales, for collective 
exclusive dealing”.
6
 Bid rigging is also a type of by object agreement.
7
   
The other type of agreements, by effect agreements, requires rather 
detailed analysis of the agreement’s effects on the market. Although a 
presentation of certain economic thoughts is required in a decision 
 
2 Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law (3rd 
edn, Cambridge University Press 2014) 1008. 
3 Peter Demčák, ‘Dohody obmedzujúce súťaž’ (Conference Efektívnosť právnej 
úpravy ochrany hospodárskej súťaže – návrhy de lege ferenda, Bratislave, 2017) 24. 
4 Cyril Ritter, ‘Joint tendering under EU Competition Law’ (2017) < 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2909572> accessed 14 August 2019, 16. 
5 Mária Patakyová, ‘Vplyv Európskej únie na legislatívu Slovenskej republiky v 
oblasti hospodárskej súťaže’ (Conference Míľniky práva v stredoeurópskom priestore, 
Častá-Papiernička, 2015) 124. 
6 Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (7th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2012) 124. 
7 Katarína Kalesná, ‘Tendrové kartely a ich špecifiká’ (Conference Aktuálne otázky 
súťažného práva v Európskej únii a na Slovensku, Bratislave, 2015) 23, 30. 
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fining by object agreement too, the detail required in a decision 
prohibiting by effect agreement is on a different level.
8
   
Moving on to the procedural aspects of competition law, it must be 
underlined that cartels are truly difficult to spot and enforce. The 
undertakings involved in a cartel agreement are usually aware that they 
are committing an illegal pursuit, which explains their intention to hide 
all the possible evidence. There are several ways on how to detect a 
cartel. To mention but two, first, competition authorities have at their 
disposal strong investigatory powers. Pursuant to Regulation 1/2003
9
, 
the European Commission is entitled to conduct sector investigations, to 
request information, to take statements and to conduct inspections in 
business and non-business premises.
10
 The last mentioned investigatory 
power, right to perform inspection, is a very effective, yet highly 
controversial investigatory tool.
11
  
Second, competition authorities may be given a helping hand by a 
whistle-blower. Under the leniency program, one party of a cartel 
agreement “blows a whistle”, in other words, it approaches a 
competition authority by giving them evidence on the existence of cartel. 
The whistle-blower is then pardon from a part or whole of the fine for the 
cartel.
12
  
2.1. Bid rigging as a form of horizontal agreements 
One of the competition-related concerns in the field of public 
procurement is bid rigging.
13
 Zooming in on cartels in procurement 
procedures, bid rigging is considered to be a hard-core cartel. Even 
more, it may be understood as one of the most serious form of 
 
8 Mária Patakyová, ‘Cieľové vertikálne dohody’ (Conference Aktuálne otázky 
súťažného práva v Európskej únii a na Slovensku, Bratislave, 2015)’ 59. 
9 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1 (“Regulation 
1/2003“). 
10 Articles 17-21 of Regulation 1/2003. 
11 See, for instance: Adam Steene ‘Nexans, Deutsche Bahn, and the ECJ’s Refusal 
to Follow ECHR Case Law on Dawn Raids’ (2016) 7 JECLAP 180. 
12 Richard Whish and David Bailey (n 6) 281. 
13 Albert Sanchez Graells, ‘Public Procurement and Competition: Some Challenges 
Arising from Recent Developments in EU Public Procurement Law’ (2013) < 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2206502> accessed 14 August 2019, 4. 
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competition law infringements, as it destroys both the competition on 
the market and the incentives under public procurement law.
14
  
As presented by the Dutch competition authority, bid rigging often 
results in higher prices or lower quality. Hence, contracting authorities 
pay too much for too little.
15
 
From a practical point of view, bid rigging is usually hidden from the 
sight of the authorities. The undertakings agree among themselves who 
would be the winning participant in the particular procurement. In order 
to cover their behaviour, there are usually more participants in the 
tendering procedure, not only the intended winner. Rather the opposite, 
it appears at first glance that undertakings compete against each other, 
whereas in reality the winner is set in advance and the other participants 
put so called cover bids into the process.
16
  
The principle of rotation may be based on various factors. For 
example, the geographic division of market may be implemented in this 
manner.  
Apart from pure bid rotation, bid rigging can also take another forms. 
For example, the parties could agree on compensation payments. Plus, 
bid rigging may be achieved not only through agreements, but also 
through information exchange, which may reveal the intention of a firm 
to bid as well as the price and conditions of the bid.
17
  
In any case, the breaking point of a cartel lies in the participants. It is 
assumed that there is a need for a majority of tenderers to collude, 
otherwise the bid rigging will be inefficient.
18
 
 
14 See the possibilities of blockchain technology for reassuring the trust in public 
procurment: Glavanits, J: The Future of Public Procurement: Innovation and Blockchain 
Technology. In:  Glavanits Judit – Király Péter Bálint (Eds): Law 4.0 Challenges of the 
Digital Age. Széchenyi István Egyetem Deák Ferenc Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar, 
Nemzetközi Köz- és Magánjogi Tanszék, 39–48 (2019). 
15 Netherlands Competition Authority, ‘Bid rigging, Detecting and preventing 
collusion in procurement’ (acm.nl, 2010) < 
https://www.acm.nl/sites/default/files/old_publication/publicaties/6726_brochure%2
0bid-rigging%20.pdf> accessed 25 August 2019. 
16 Kalesná (n 7) 23, 27. 
17 Ritter (n 20) 2. 
18 D. Raus, A. Oršulová, Kartelové dohody (1st edn, C.H.Beck 2009) 122, in 
Katarína Kalesná, ‘Tendrové kartely a ich špecifiká’ in Kristína Považanová (ed), 
Aktuálne otázky súťažného práva v Európskej únii a na Slovensku (Univerzita 
Komenského v Bratislave, Právnická fakulta, 2015) 23, 27. 
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2.2. Bid rigging and its enforcement 
Cartels related to tendering procedures may have several forms. All 
of them are usually well hidden and difficult to spot. Giannino presents a 
way on how to detect and investigate a bid rigging.
19
 A competition 
authority may detect certain abnormalities on the market, which may 
lead to a suspicion that a cartel has taken place. Subsequently, external 
evidence is searched in order to support the suspicion. The existence of 
the cartel may also be supported by internal evidence, for example by 
decision-making procedure within the undertaking at stake. If the 
undertaking participated in certain public procurements, but not in the 
other, why was the undertaking absent in the latter and not in the 
former? Last but not least, there is always a room for undertaking’s 
defence, in which the undertaking may present reasons for its activity (or 
lack of it).
20
 
The Dutch competition authority presents several signs which serve 
as a smoking gun, for example: bids of certain firms in certain regions, 
which were never the winning bids; few bidding firms; subcontracting to 
competitors; striking pattern of winners; certain bids being very brief; 
winner not accepting the contract and rather working as subcontractor. 
Apart from these signs regarding bid patterns, there are also signs 
regarding pricing or behaviour of firms.
21
 
3.  Algorithms and Artificial Intelligence 
Utilisation of software has significantly changed the modus operandi 
of states, public bodies, firms and people in general. The change has 
been shifted to a new level by employment of artificial intelligence. How 
has the use of AI and algorithms influenced the bid rigging?  
3.1. AI and algorithms as a tool for detection 
As mentioned above, abnormalities on the market may be one 
indicator of a cartel. Naturally, these abnormalities may be better 
 
19 Michele Giannino, ‘Collusion in Public Contracts Procurement: Suppliers of 
School Cleaning Services Fined for Bid Rigging (Italy)’ (2017) 8 Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice 247. 
20 ibid 248-250. 
21 Netherlands Competition Authority (n 14). 
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detected with algorithms and AI. In the following text, we will briefly 
present several methods of bid rigging’s detection. 
One of the basic methods of detection lies in the use of econometrics 
and statistics. A specific tool for detection of cartels was presented by 
Porter and Zona. The tool was related to the knowledge of relationship 
between bids and costs. The bids presented by undertakings involved in 
bid rigging were not so strictly related to the measurement of the costs.
22
  
 Not all the tools are based on econometrical and statistical methods. 
Indexing methods may be used as well. These methods concentrate on 
spotting “suspected” markets based on certain signals or signals sets. 
For example, Harrington
23
 showed a set of indicators based on price 
behaviour and market shares of undertakings. Subsequently, the 
indicators may be used for application of screening tests which may 
reveal a cartel environment, or, alternatively, an environment after a 
cartel was broken.
24
  
Zooming in on the real-functioning methods, one can take the 
example of the Netherlands Competition Authority. The so called 
Competition index takes into account nine indicators, which can be split 
into four main categories: degree of organization; prices; concentration; 
dynamics. In order to get a result, indexation methodology is used. 
Numbers of the nine indicators per industry are standardized. Weighted 
average of such numbers results in a ranking list of industries.
25
 
A new level of bid rigging detection may be brought by wide 
implementation of E-procurement.
26
 A significant advantage of moving 
the tendering procedure online is the availability of data for further 
analysis. The Artificial intelligence may be well employed in the 
 
22 R.H. Porter, J.D. Zona, ‘Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding’ (2017) 
30 RAND J. Econ., 263 in Andrzej Foremny and Wojciech Dorabialsky, ‘Review of 
collusion and bid rigging detection methods in the construction industry’ (Creative 
Construction Conference, Ljubljana, 2018) 946, 947.  
23 Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. ‘Behavioral Screening and the Detection of Cartels’ (EU 
Competition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceedings, 2006) < 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.63.4196&rep=rep1&type=
pdf> accessed 30 July 2019. 
24 Foremny and Dorabialsky (n 21) 946, 948. 
25 Lilian Petit, ‘The Economic Detection Instrument of the Netherlands Competition 
Authority’ (2012) NMa Working Papers, No 6 < http://ssrn.com/abstract=1992774> 
accessed 25 August 2019, 17. 
26 Sanchez Graells (n 13) 36. 
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processing of the data. Various important information may be learned 
through such data processing, for example personal ties, market 
concentration, geographical variability of ordered contracts etc.
27
  
3.2. AI and algorithms as a tool for collusion 
In general, digitalised markets have many advantages from 
competition point of view. Markets are more transparent and more 
effective.
28
 Digitalised markets brought new products to customers, for 
example social networks, as well as they make already existing products 
more available. The latter is related, for instance, to online shopping. 
On the other hand, digitalised markets are accompanied by various 
competition threats. For instance, algorithms may change structural 
characteristics of the industry, i.e. number of firms on the market, 
creation of barriers to entry, market transparency and frequency of 
interactions. The actual effect of algorithms depends on the industry, 
however, regarding the number firms, new technologies can make the 
number of competitors less relevant factor for collusion.
29
 
Moreover, availability of prices online may facilitate the sustainability 
of a cartel. If the market is transparent, cartelists do not need 
sophisticated tools for control of other cartelists’ compliance with the 
cartel. Necessary information is easily and publicly available. Plus, the 
combination of availability of market data and machine learning may 
leave to predicting the rivals’ actions and forecasting a deviation from a 
cartel before it actually takes place.
30
 
Besides, digitalised markets may lead to new competition law 
infringements. For instance, harvesting of data on large scale by a 
dominant undertaking can result in abuse of dominant position in this 
specific form. We may mention Facebook, which was under scrutiny by 
 
27 Foremny and Dorabialsky (n 21) 946, 952. 
28 Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E. Stucke, ‘Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When 
Computers Inhibit Competition’ (2015) Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
18/2015, 1 < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2591874> 
accessed 31 July 2019, 3. 
29 OECD, ‘Algorithms and Collusion - Background Note by the Secretariat’ (EOCD, 
2017) <https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2017)4/en/pdf> accessed 25 
August 2019, 19. 
30 ibid 20. 
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the German competition authority and the decision was issued at the 
beginning of 2019.
31
  
Once undertakings dispose with large scale data, they may 
implement data analysis tools and self-learning mechanisms in order to 
enhance their business strategy.
32
 The use of specific algorithms has 
already resulted in anticompetitive practices, for instance in the case of 
price fixing by Amazon Marketplace in USA. This case is dated to 2015.
33
  
3.2.1. Four categories of collusion with the help of computers 
Returning to the issue of collusion, Ezrachi and Stucke
34
 elaborated, 
among others, on the following questions: how may computers be 
involved in the process of collusion? Is competition law strong (and 
flexible) enough to cover these types of Article 101 infringements? In 
answering these questions, they presented four categories of collusion. 
The first category is characterised by using computers as 
“Messengers”. In this case, computers are used to execute the will of 
humans who decided to collude. For example, a software is created 
which serves as a forum to exchange sensitive information. The use of 
competition law is quite straightforward and the evidence on the parties’ 
intent is not necessary.
35
   
The second category is characterised as “Hub and Spoke”. This form 
is based on a use of a single algorithm which determines the price. If 
several undertakings use the same algorithm, it will logically lead to the 
similar prices charged by these undertakings. The result is, therefore, 
the same as the implementation of a price cartel. An evidence on the 
intention of the undertakings using the same algorithm may be used.
36
  
 
31 Bundeskartellamt, ‘Bundeskartellamt prohibits Facebook from combining user 
data from different sources’ (Bundeskartellamt.de, 7 February 2019) < 
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/201
9/07_02_2019_Facebook.html> accessed 31 July 2019 
32 Ezrachi and Stucke (n 27). 
33 Department of Justice, ‘Former E-Commerce Executive Charged with Price Fixing 
in the Antitrust Division’s First Online Marketplace Prosecution’ (Justice.gov, 6 April 
2015) <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2015/313011.docx> 
accessed 31 July 2019 
34 Ezrachi and Stucke (n 27). 
35 ibid 10-14. 
36 ibid 14-16. 
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The third category is named as “Predictable Agent”. In this scenario, 
undertakings use not the same, but similar algorithms. No agreement 
among the parties is proved and it even does not have to exist. If similar 
algorithms are implemented throughout an industry, anticompetitive 
effects may follow. However, in this case, such “collusion” is not, as 
presented by Ezrachi and Stucke, automatically illegal. A proof of 
intention is required according to the authors. Moreover, use of similar 
algorithms may lie directly on the edge between tacit collusion and 
conscious parallelism.
37
  
Within the EU environment, this type of behaviour may be relevant 
within the concerted practice analysis. Yet, again, one would need to 
distinguish between collusive and non-collusive behaviour. The 
concerted practice would take place if a practical cooperation between 
parties is knowingly substituted for the risks of competition. Therefore, 
the aims which are intended to be reached, together with the economic 
and legal context, shall be assessed.
38
 
The final, fourth category, is connected to “Autonomous Machines”. 
Software, backed up by artificial intelligence, determine the price 
independently from the will of the undertakings, with the aim of 
optimisation of profit. If there are more such machines on the market, 
they may communicate between each other and, through self-learning 
and experiment, commence to collude, totally independently from the 
will of the undertakings. In such case, liability is, in the view of the 
authors, unclear.
39
  
3.2.2. Bid rigging with the help of computers 
It is highly probable that collusive practices in tendering procedures 
may be fuelled by algorithms. As stated by OECD, collusion may be 
facilitated by monitoring algorithms, parallel algorithms, signalling 
algorithms or even self-learning algorithms.
40
 All of these may be virtually 
applied in bid rigging. 
 
37 ibid 16-22. 
38 Judgment of 4 June 2009, T-Mobile Netherlands and Others, C-8/08, 
EU:C:2009:343, paras 26, 27. 
39 Ezrachi and Stucke (n 27) 22-25. 
40 OECD, ‘Algorithms and Collusion - Background Note by the Secretariat’ (EOCD, 
2017) <https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2017)4/en/pdf> accessed 25 
August 2019, 24-32. 
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Addressing the four categories, it is undoubted that tenderers use 
certain types of algorithms when calculating the costs of providing of the 
particular goods or services, and, consequently, their bids. It cannot be 
excluded that participants will use a same software to calculate their 
costs; such behaviour might fall into the second category.  
What seems problematic from enforcement perspective is the case 
when several undertakings develop their own software, however, the 
result will be so similar as to lead de facto unification of bids. This may 
be done, for instance, by outsourcing the creation of algorithms to the 
came IT programmers.
41
 Such situation could fall into the third category.  
Without an actual agreement between the parties, it might be fairly 
difficult to establish concerted practices between them. To prove the 
intention of the parties may be very difficult in practice. Naturally, one 
must distinguish between normal behaviour of undertakings on the one 
hand, and forbidden collusive behaviour on the other. Moving towards 
transparent procurement procedures, which are in general very 
beneficial, one can imagine the situation in which algorithms, well-fed 
with data, may determine the bids of competitors, even without the 
algorithms being exactly the same.  
4.  Conclusion 
Constant penetration of technologies can hardly be slowed down. 
One shall learn how to master them, otherwise there is a risk of serious 
negative externalities. Increase use of algorithms and artificial 
intelligence by competition authorities mean that they may conduct 
sector studies to define the problematic industrial sectors as well as that 
they may spot collusion easier than before.  
On the other hand, AI is more and more used by undertakings. It 
would be naïve not to expect them to utilise algorithms also for illegal 
purposes, collusion included. Algorithms may facilitate performance and 
sustainability of “traditional” types of collusion. However, they may lead 
to creation of new forms. It seems that development of similar pricing 
algorithms by various undertakings should be focused on in particular. 
Enforcement of such practice will not be easy, hence, competition 
authorities might stand before a challenge how to prove that, in the 
 
41 ibid 27. 
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absence of a provable agreement, a collusive behaviour has taken 
place. 
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Abstract: As part of the results of a questionnaire from January 2019, on the sample of 
111 answers, a research had been performed in order to highlight the human aspect of 
the technological change. Different servicers are waiting the new (even disruptive) 
technologies on a different way, therefore it is worth to have a common understanding 
on the beliefs, especially on the fear... 
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1.  Introduction 
As in the last centuries, the development of the industry had several 
revolutions. After the invention of the steam power utilization, the mass 
production and the automatization (as you can see on the first figure), 
the Industry 4.0 is about the connectivity of the devices and 
environment, the application of the sensors. The improved processes 
sometimes replacing, sometimes assisting the daily tasks of the human 
workforce. The aim of the research is to call the attention to the 
attitudes regarding to the robots and automatization, as part of the 
above. 
The scaling of the research had been set as follows: the responders 
had been asked to pick one (or more) challenges from the offered list, 
therefore it shall be regarded as nominal scale. 
The statistical reliability of the used data had been validated by the 
Pearson Correlation and as the values had reach the level of confidence, 
(the correlation had been proved as significant) they had been selected 
as basic for the complete analysis. 
Importance of the topic cannot be questioned: the latest industrial 
revolution has a clear effect on the manufacturing environment and 
processes, because of the connected items can share their big data and 
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let it analyzed real time, which lead to proper, faster and efficient 
decisions. The revolution has effect on the human workforce as well, 
because the current blue (or even white) collar workers` jobs seems 
excellent training area to the learning robots and for the artificial 
intelligence, which may result changes in the employment on long term. 
And last, but not the least, the current status caused new solutions 
require investments as well, but they offer as compensation the 
possibility of higher-than-ever return. 
 
Figure 1: Industrial revolutions 
 
Source: http://trilliummfg.ca/the-rise-of-big-data-and-industry-4-0/ 
2.  The process of the empirical research 
The questionnaire of the research had been finalized in December 2018 
and as soon as it had been approved, it was sent out from the e-mail 
address as scientific.pesti@gmail.com. 350 professionals had been 
reached out directly and the Corvinus Alumni Club on LinkedIn (with 
3739 members) beside of the Hungarian Business Society (with 6478 
members) and Procurement People Network (with 6725 members). 
Approximately there was 17.000 professionals asked to fill out the 
survey, so compared with the number of arrived answers (111 pc), the 
answer rate is 0,65%. One representative of an FMCG manufacturer had 
noted that their internal policies do not allow them to reply and one 
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brewery supplier noted his concerns regarding to the GDPR. All of the 
responders had been coded with the value of „Company1-
Company111”.  
2.1. Responders 
As it is visible on the first figure below, the distribution of the 
responders shows a clear picture on the weight of the answers. As it is 
visualized on the second figure below, 58% of the responders are 
working on the field of supply chain, 18% of them noted „other” area, 
because the engineering/operation activities had not been listed. The 
HR and IT field are represented approximately in the same portion, by 
10-10%. The finance professionals are part of the answers in 4%. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of professional area of responders 
 
 
Source: Own creation 
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3.  Analysis 
3.1. Method 
From the multivariate statistical analyses - which are standard for high 
volume of data, we have selected the factor analysis. Our aim was to 
understand the variables and group them. There are correlations 
between the variables, they can be stated based on the directly 
unidentified background variables, as factors. The described variants’ 
linear combination creates new variants. As first step, we made the 
covariance matrix of the standardized variants, where the connection of 
the given variant had been set with the others. Than the factor extraction 
had been made, the identification of the factors. We had made the 
standard variants matrix, where the connection of each variant to 
another one had been identified. Later, the factor extraction had 
happened, so we had identified the factors. The weight estimation of the 
factors had been made based on the SPSS analysis: the more-than-1 
values had been considered from the decreased ordered values. As the 
own value of the factor shows the percentage of the variable from the 
total variance, therefore the less the own value of the factor, the less it 
contributes to toe total explained variance. 1.00 had been chosen as 
limit, because under this value, the factor does not explain its own 
variance. The understanding and naming had been performed in 
accordance with it, so there had been the following factors created: data 
analysis, robotics, logistics, office usage and customer management. 
The analysis had been performed because of exploratory nature, the 
overall goal of it was to create the group of the variables, which can be 
the basic for the further structure of the other answers as well. The 
factors had been rotated in order to gain additional data contain. The 
analysis had been validated with Kaiser criteria and the KMO value had 
been controlled. The KMO values show that the variants can be regarded 
as proper, so can be selected for factor analysis. The table can be 
divided into three main units: the first one shows the Initial Eigenvalues, 
the second one the Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings, the third one 
the Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings. The total row shows the own 
value, the „% of Variance” the percentage of explained variance within 
the total variance, the „Cumulative %” row shows the total variance. As it 
can be applied in case of lower measurement level variables, we had 
considered the application of crosstabulation, which is a table for the 
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description of the correlation between the variants. In the created 
matrix, there are two (or more) nominal or ordinal variant value common 
distribution had been visualized, so shows the combinations of the 
values of the variants. Obviously, the table had been created with those 
cells, which contains all combination of all values of the two variants. 
These cells are showing the correlation, but the above referred 
percentage and numeric values are not efficient to describe the 
correlation between the variants, therefore the chi-square test had been 
applied as well. The Null-hypothesis was that there is no correlation 
between the variants. As the chi-square value related significance level 
is lower than 0,05, the Null-hypothesis had been rejected. 
3.2. Factors 
In order to understand the big picture from the answers to the 
questionnaire, the answers on the Industry 4.0 solutions had been 
processed at first. We had included into the listed items those ICT and 
social media solutions, which are able to show the attitude of the 
responders to the topic. The factor analysis resulted 5 factors, where the 
information exists in a compressed, but not lost format. The first factor is 
the group of those companies, which already are applying this kind of 
solutions for data analysis, the processing and analysis are part of the 
daily tasks. The second factor is the group of those companies, which - 
based on their answers on the solutions - are familiar with the basics of 
robotics (eg. From 3D printing, etc.), with its substantial principles and 
daily operation of the robots, not necessarily in their own operation. The 
third factor is the group of those companies, which are focused on 
logistics. This significantly separated group had been categorized 
because of the similar task and position of these companies. The RFID 
and scanner usage are already existing on the market, but the given 
answers had highlighted the previous processes and tools of the old 
manufacturing technologies and their development, which shall be 
already considered as out-of-date. The fourth factor is the group of those 
digital business companies (having office applications), which are 
indirect processes, not related directly to the manufacturing of 
production, like HR or facility management. It became visible that the e-
invoicing and the online collaboration tools are known and used in front 
of the responders, but only at one part of the responders’ group. It was 
interesting to see that the cloud-based solutions are in this category as 
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related question, but their usage is much more than a standard data 
storage function. The last, fifth factor is the customer management 
focused companies, as the mobile- and social applications are known in 
a group of firms. The automatized customer service and the digitalized 
customer management might part of the daily operation of those 
companies, which are still using the tools and solutions of the previous 
industrial revolutions for material movement or inventory management. 
Overall, the reason of the selection of the factors was to reflect to their 
competency regarding to the ICT solutions, because the Industry 4.0 is 
about the application of them, The link between the factors is the 
maturity: it varies from the basic, office used technologies until the up-to-
date, state-of-the-art solutions. The hypothesis was that those 
companies, which are operating on the field of logistics, have more 
positive attitude to the robots as Industry 4.0 solution than other 
companies from the business, including the fact that the robots will 
assist human workforce in the operation, not replace. 
3.3. Results 
In relationship with the new digital technologies, in the questionnaire, 
the responders had been asked to note, which are the biggest 
challenges for them, with the following options: Available professional 
expertise, there shall be new workplaces, Robots shall replace the 
human workforce, Robots shall support the human workforce There was 
a relevant statistical correlation in the data analysis category, at the 
available professional expertise and the belief in new workspace 
creation. It can be interpreted as those, who are skilled in data analysis 
are considering the professional expertise as key element to the further, 
robot assisted operation and the new opportunities will create new 
workspace because of the increased and more efficient processes. In 
logistics category, there is a correlation with new workplaces and 
support of the human workforce, what is logically acceptable as the 
whole supply chain is currently influenced (beside of the manufacturing) 
the most by these new, disruptive technologies. In digital business 
category, the correlation exists with the available professional expertise 
as challenge, what refers to the fact, that the digital business solutions 
(eg. Office softwares, etc.) are representing the first steps in the digital 
era, do not request deeper ICT knowledge. 
Fear the robots? – Attitudes from the supply chain 49 
4.  Conclusion 
Independently from its role within the whole supply chain (whether is 
it a direct/indirect supplier/servicer of a brewery), the responders had 
been categorized based on their robotics attitudes. Based on this, their 
challenges had been analyzed towards the Industry 4.0 solutions: there 
are some activities (eg. Digital business solution application or data 
analysis), which do not require specific, deep ICT knowledge, therefore 
their attitude to the robotics can be regarded as neutral, they are mostly 
interested in the professional expertise as the way of managing a robot 
supported business. But the hypothesis of the research had been 
validated and confirmed: the logistic activity related answers had 
showed that they are more tolerant to the sensors caused changes, they 
believe – based on their current knowledge and experience – that the 
robots are going to support their daily work, they can not replace them. 
Even they can see the increased number of developments as 
autonomous vehicles, automatic processes and automated warehouses, 
they consider themselves as substantial part of the movement of goods. 
They have no fear from robots at all. 
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Abstract: Risk-assessment tools are Artificial intelligence (AI) systems, which are 
increasingly used to ease the decision-making process for humans in criminal justice 
system, especially in different phases of a criminal trial: pre-arrest phase, conviction 
phase, parole, etc. The number of countries using this type of tools in order to ensure 
objectivity of the police, prosecutors or judges decision process and, in the same time 
to ease this process is growing. Although risk assessments tools were declared to have 
a positive impact on the rights of individuals accused and convicted of crimes, recent 
researches have shown flaws and errors in their decisions, raising concerns on the fact 
that they might be producing harmful effects on the rights of indicted or convicted 
persons. The causes of such damaging outputs of the AI systems are worth to be 
analysed due to their long-term impact on the criminal justice system. If the algorithms, 
which are fed with data provided by humans, are not ”cleaned” of the discriminatory 
patterns, the use of such AI tools will produce more harm than benefit for the justice 
system. Another debate may be on the mandatory use of AI risk assessment tools by 
the judiciaries, because of recent research offering alarming results on their errored 
function or output data. 
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1.  What Risk Assessment AI Tools really are? 
Recently our society has witnessed an explosion in the use of 
algorithms in the public sphere especially in the United States, the US 
criminal justice system moving as well, from predictive policing to risk 
assessment in the corrections system1.  
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The verification of the risk factors most predictive of adult offender 
recidivism and identification of the actuarial instruments best suited to 
that end have major implications for corrections policymakers, 
practitioners, and program evaluators2. Nowadays, when the 
management of prisons must met the standards of cost-effectiveness 
while dealing with the increase in incarceration rates, it has been 
pointed out that maximum security prisons be reserved for the highest 
risk offenders while the design of effective offender treatment programs 
is highly dependent on knowledge of the predictors of recidivism.
3
  But 
still, the issue of misbehaving algorithms remains, the debate becoming 
even more fierce, as fundamental rights of the person could be in peril. 
Criminal doctrine identifies 19 (nineteen) risk assessment 
instruments in US criminal system (all of them being evaluated in 53 
studies published between 1970 and 2012). The risk assessment 
instruments varied widely in the number, type, and content of their 
items, but generally were characterized by static risk factors to the 
exclusion of dynamic risk factors and protective factors. But non of these 
risk assessment instruments emerged as producing the most accurate 
risk assessment in U.S.
4
 
There are a lot of types of recidivism risk assessment instruments 
and they may be distinguished in terms of their approach, item type, and 
item content. Desmarais, Johnson and Singh identified two broad 
categories related to approaches used by risk assessment instruments: 
actuarial and structured professional judgment.  
a) The actuarial approach represents a mechanical model of risk 
assessment in which offenders are scored on a series of items that were 
most strongly associated with recidivism in the development samples. 
Then, total scores are cross-referenced with actuarial risk tables. 
b) The structured professional judgment approach guides assessors 
to consider a set number of factors that are empirically and theoretically 
associated with the outcome of interest. Though individual items are 
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scored, assessors ultimately make a categorical judgment of risk level 
(e.g., low, moderate, high) based on their professional judgment rather 
than using total scores.
5
 
Risk assessment tools, measures and techniques are also classified 
within a developmental framework: first generation, second generation 
and third generation: 
a) first-generation techniques are based on clinical intuition and 
professional judgment.  
b) second-generation assessments are actuarial in nature. They are 
based on standardized, objective risk prediction instruments, such as 
the Salient Factor Score (SFS), that are based almost entirely on static 
criminal history items. These kinds of measures provide little direction 
for classification and treatment decisions because the fixed nature of 
the items does not allow for changes in the offender’s behavior to be 
reflected on subsequent retesting.  
c) third generation instruments are of two types:  
c.1 – prediction is based on dynamic factors (e.g., Community 
Riskmeeds Management scale; Level of Service Inventory (LSI-R); the 
Wisconsin system), which assess a wide range of criminogenic needs.  
c.2. - prediction is based on personality test scales in the antisocial 
personality/ sociopathy/psychopathy content area which are dynamic in 
nature but do contain static items. (e.g., the MMPI Pd scale, the 
Psychopathy Checklist - PCL-R); the Socialization scale – SOC - of the 
California Personality Inventory - CPI)
6
. 
In United States authorities prefer 6 (six) risk assessment AI tools 
using them to assess key risk factors in adult and youth correctional 
populations and to provide decision support for practitioners, risk for 
recidivism, in order to support various decision points in the criminal 
justice system (pretrial, community supervision, prison intake, etc.). 
In the following the most used AI risk assessment tools are going to 
be shortly presented: 
a) Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative 
Sanctions (COMPAS)  
This AI tool was developed by Northpointe Institute for Public 
Management, Inc. in 1998. This statistically-based tool was designed to 
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assess key risk and needs factors in adult and youth correctional 
populations and to provide decision support for practitioners charged 
with case planning and management. COMPAS can assess four types of 
risk - general recidivism, violent recidivism, non-compliance, and failure 
to appear - for use at a variety of decision points in the criminal justice 
system.7  
b) Inventory of Offender Risk, Needs, and Strengths (IORNS)  
IORNS was created by Dr. Holly Miller in 2006 as an offender 
assessment of static risk, dynamic risk/need, and protective strength 
factors. The tool is complimented by several subscales for specific 
assessments in the areas of violent and sexual criminal behavior.8 
IORNS has been described as demonstrating potential as a self-report 
measure of static risk, dynamic risk and treatment/management needs, 
and protective strengths. IORNS examination with several additional 
samples of offenders is warranted to further validate the measure. 
Additionally, studies that further examine the predictive power of the 
IORNS, especially to predict re-offense, are warranted in order to 
substantiate its use in the prediction of general, violent, and/or sexual 
recidivism9.  
c) LSI-R (Level of Service Inventory-Revised) and LS/CMI (Level of 
Service/Case Management Inventory) LS/RNR (Level of Service/Risk, 
Need, Responsivity)  
LSI-R was first developed in 1995 by Don Andrews and James Bonta 
as a third generation approach to offender risk assessment. As shown 
before, third generation tools assess static and dynamic risk and needs 
factors in the evaluation of an offender’s risk for recidivism and assess 
whether the offender may be amenable to community 
intervention/treatment for the purpose of risk reduction. The LS/CMI is 
 
7 T. Brennan, W. Dieterich and B. Ehret, ‘Evaluating the Predictive Validity of the 
Compas Risk and Needs Assessment System’ (2009) 36 Criminal Justice and Behavior 
<DOI: 10.1177/0093854808326545> accessed 18 March 2019, 22-23, also see C. 
Matacic, ‘In the United States, computers help decide who goes to jail. But their 
judgment may be no better than ours’ (Science, 17 January 2018), 
<https://www.sciencemag.org> accessed 18 March 2019. 
8 H. A. Miller, ‘A Dynamic Assessment of Offender Risk, Needs, and Strengths in a 
Sample of Pre-release General Offenders’ (2006) 24 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 
<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/bsl.728> accessed 20 March 
2018, 772. 
9 ibid, 780. 
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the fourth generation revision of the LSI-R that assesses offender risk, 
needs, and responsivity (RNR) to inform case planning via a built-in case 
management system. The LS/RNR is similarly comprised of the updated 
risk, need, and responsivity scales, but offer these separately from the 
LS/CMI case management system for organizations already equipped 
with established case management systems of their own. A quite 
important number of studies confirm predictive validity of LS/CMI with 
recidivism and prison adjustment, no matter the type of the offender 
(i.e., adults, juveniles, natives, females).10  
LSI-R is in use also in other countries such as Scotland, and in about 
20 probation services in England, Wales and the Channel Islands. It is 
the product of about 20 years' development, and a considerable amount 
of research has been carried out on its psychometric properties and its 
capacity to predict reconviction and various other correctionally-relevant 
outcomes in North America.11  
d) ORAS (Ohio Risk Assessment System)  
ORAS was developed in 2006 by the University of Cincinnati Center 
for Criminal Justice Research at the request of Ohio Department of 
Rehabilitation & Correction. It is a system meant evaluate offender risk, 
needs, and responsivity to be use statewide. ORAS was meant to be 
used at various decision points in the criminal justice system (i.e., 
pretrial, community supervision, prison intake, reentry) to facilitate 
communication and continuity across criminal justice agencies. Although 
the data collection period gathered information on over 1,800 offenders 
in Ohio, studies have shown it would be imprudent to assume that the 
findings are representative of all offenders in Ohio and, although the 
samples were gathered from specific populations, certain types of cases 
may be underrepresented in the population (e.g. sex offenders, Hispanic 
offenders, female offenders). The underrepresentation in the population 
has led to small numbers of these types of offenders in the sample12.  
 
10 Gendreau, Little and Goggin (n 2) 590. 
11 P. Raynor, J. Kynch, C. Roberts and S. Merrington, ‘Risk and need assessment in 
probation services: an evaluation’ (2000) 211 Home Office Research Study 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267419138_Risk_and_Need_Assessmen
t_in_Probation_Services_An_Evaluation/download> accessed 12 December 2018, viii. 
12 E. Latessa, P. Smith, R. Lemke, M. Makarios and C. Lowenkamp, ‘Creation and 
validation of the Ohio Risk Assessment System: Final report’ (2009) 
<https://www.assessments.com/> accessed 20 March 2019, 39. 
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e) OST (Offender Screening Tool)  
OST was developed and implemented in 1998 by the Maricopa 
County Adult Probation Department and David Simourd, being validated 
for statewide (US) use in 2003 and fully implemented statewide in 2005 
pursuant to Arizona Supreme Court Administrative Order 2005-12
13
. It 
was also revalidated in Arizona in 2008. In 2009, the Arizona Judicial 
Council adopted the use of a statewide standard presentence report that 
incorporates the criminogenic risks identified in the OST14. Still, studies 
have shown that obtaining quality information is the key factor for an 
accurate result of using this tool. ”Quality assessment information is 
essential if the assessment tool is going to be used to inform 
decisions”.
15
 
f) STRONG (Static Risk and Offender Needs Guide)  
In 2008, the Washington State Department of Corrections 
implemented there an automated offender assessment and case 
planning system with the research services of Washington State Institute 
for Public Policy and technical assistance from Assessments.com, 
following the adoption of Washington State’s Offender Accountability Act 
in 1999 which identified the need to “reduce the risk of reoffending by 
offenders in the community.” STRONG is an automated system including 
the Static Risk Assessment and an Offender Needs Assessment, which 
is used to identify offender needs and protective factors for use in case 
planning. It is a fourth-generation risk and needs assessment system 
and presents certain advantages:  
- Increased predictive accuracy;  
- Prediction of three types of high-risk offenders—drug, property, and 
violent;  
- Increased objectivity;  
- Decreased time to complete the assessment;  
 
13 Arizona Supreme Court, Administrative Order No. 2005-12: Adopting the 
standardized assessment and reassessment tool and conducting a pilot program for 
reassessment timeframes for adult intensive probationers. 
<http://www.azcourts.gov/portals/22/admorder/orders05/2005-12.pdf> accessed 
20 March 2019. 
14 J. Ferguson, ‘Putting the “what works” research into practice: An organizational 
perspective’ (2002) 29 Criminal Justice and Behavior 480-481. 
15 ibid 485. 
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- Accurate recording of criminal history for use with other Department 
of Corrections reporting requirements.  
The Risk Level Classifications include the following categories: high 
violent; high non-violent (drug/property); moderate; low.16  
Specific risk assessment tools were proposed to be used in Europe 
following terrorist attacks as a result of discussions which took place in 
Brussels on 9 and 10 July 2018 on Radicalization Awareness Network - 
RAN P&P meeting on risk assessment implementation. The risk 
assessment tools proposed, addressing only terrorism issues were: 
Radicalization Risk Assessment in Prisons (RRAP) tool set, VERA-2R and 
ERG 22+. 17 
2.  The ”Trojan Horse” effect 
Risk assessment tools are, as a matter of fact, complex AI systems. 
How do they actually work? Their outputs were qualified as 
unpredictable and opaque, due to the fact that specific human rights are 
to be particularly affected.18  
It is obvious that their use in the criminal justice system seems 
proper and the utmost efficient. But, in fact, the use of algorithms may 
lead to rights violations or may undermine the effective enjoyment of 
these human rights in the following cases, making them a modern Trojan 
Horse.19 
 
16 E. K. Drake and R. Barnoski, ‘New risk instrument for offenders improves 
classification decisions’ (Document No. 09-03-1201) (Washington State Institute for 
Public Policy, 2009) <http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/09-03-1201.pdf> accessed 20 
March 2019, 2. 
17 European Commission, ‘Prison and Probation Working Group (RAN P&P)’ 
<https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-p-and-p> accessed 21 
March 2019. 
18 Council of Europe, Committee of Experts on Internet Intermediaries ‘Algorithms 
and Human Rights. Study on the human rights dimensions of automated data 
processing techniques and possible regulatory implications’ DGI (2017)12 
<https://rm.coe.int/algorithms-and-human-rights-en-rev/16807956b5> accessed 15 
December 2018, 10. 
19Trojan horse, huge hollow wooden horse constructed by the Greeks to gain 
entrance into Troy during the Trojan War. The horse was built by Epeius, a master 
carpenter and pugilist. The Greeks, pretending to desert the war, sailed to the nearby 
island of Tenedos, leaving behind Sinon, who persuaded the Trojans that the horse was 
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2.1. Fair trial 
Automated processing techniques and algorithms in crime prevention 
and the criminal justice system may affect the presumption of innocence 
and other procedural rights of the defendant. In the present high-risk 
society, following the terrorist attacks that took place in Europe and U.S., 
online social media platforms were and are used to identify potential 
terrorists and to become efficient in the fight against terrorism.
20
 They 
are also used to identify accounts that generate extremist content. From 
this point of view, we must agree that there are consequences for the 
freedom of expression, but also for fair trial standards – art. 6 of the 
ECHR21 -, notably the presumption of innocence, the right to be informed 
promptly of the cause and nature of an accusation, the right to a fair 
hearing and the right to defend oneself in person. Risk assessment tools 
may contribute, as shown, to prejudicial and discriminatory decision-
making. 
 
 
 
an offering to Athena, goddess of war, that would make Troy impregnable. Despite the 
warnings of Laocoön and Cassandra , the horse was taken inside the city gates. That 
night Greek warriors emerged from it and opened the gates to let in the returned Greek 
army. The story is told at length in Book II of the Aeneid and is touched upon in the 
Odyssey. ”Equo ne credite, Teucri. Quiquid id est, timeo Danaos et dona ferentes”("Do 
not trust the horse, Trojans! Whatever it is, I fear the Greeks, even bringing gifts.") See 
J. K. Robertson, Virgil s Aeneid Book II, with introducton, notes and vocabulary (The W. 
J. Cage Company 1893) 2. 
20 Lindsey Andersen, ‘Human rights in the Age of Artificial Intelligence’ (Access 
Now, 2018) <https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2018/11/AI-and-
Human-Rights.pdf> accessed 12 December 2018, 22. 
21 Article 6 para 1 and 2 of the ECHR: Right to a fair trial: 
1.In the determination of his rights and obligations, or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time 
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be 
pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the 
trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, 
where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so 
require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special 
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.  
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law.  
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2.2. Privacy and data protection 
Due to the fact that all risk assessment tools are using algorithms in 
order to collect and sort all sorts of data and images, serious questions 
about breaching right to respect private and family life provided by art. 8 
of the ECHR22, including the right to data protection. ”Algorithms are 
used in online tracking and profiling of individuals whose browsing 
patterns are recorded by cookies. Moreover, behavioural data is 
processed from smart devices, such as location and other sensor data 
through apps on mobile devices, raising increasing challenges for 
privacy and data protection”. Scholars emphasized that ML (”machine 
learning”) models were developed that can accurately estimate a 
person’s age, gender, occupation, and marital status just from their cell 
phone location data. They were also able to predict a person’s future 
location from past history and the location data of friends. 23 
In the same time, everyone could notice that AI is enabling more 
invasive surveillance tools. The negative impact of AI-powered 
surveillance would be felt most acutely by the marginalized populations 
who are disproportionately targeted by security forces. Also,  because 
permanent monitoring of the general population is neither necessary nor 
proportionate to the goal of public safety or crime prevention, this will 
lead to the breach of the right to privacy with certainty. 
24
 
 
 
 
22 Article 8 of the ECHR: Right to respect for private and family life:  
1.Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.  
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
23 Steven M. Bellovin, Renée M. Hutchins, Tony Jebara and Sebastian Zimmeck, 
‘When enough is enough: Location tracking, mosaic theory, and machine learning’ 
(2014) 8 (2) New York University Journal of Law and Liberty 
<https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac_pubs/1375/> accessed 10 
December 2018, 555-556. 
24 Andersen (n 20) 21. 
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2.3. Non-discrimination 
The right to enjoy all human rights and fundamental freedoms 
without discrimination and in full equality is one of the most important 
rights in the democratic countries. 
In a study prepared for the Council of Europe on algorithms and 
human rights, it was emphasized that ”search algorithms and search 
engines by definition do not treat all information equally. While 
processes used to select and index information may be applied 
consistently, the search results will typically be ranked according to 
perceived relevance. Accordingly, different items of information will 
receive different degrees of visibility depending on which factors are 
taken into account by the ranking algorithm.”25 
A biased algorithm that systematically discriminates one group in 
society, for example based on their age, sexual orientation, race, gender 
or socio-economic standing, may raise considerable concerns not just in 
terms of the access to rights of the individual end- users or customers 
affected by these decisions, but also for society as a whole. Some 
authors have even suggested that online services which use 
personalised rating systems are inherently likely to lead to discriminatory 
practices.26  
2.4. Equality 
In order to develop ML process, the computers must be ”fed” with 
huge amount of data consisting in texts, images or recordings of sounds 
(e.g. human voice) – and then adding a classifier to this data (e.g. The 
computer is shown an image of a woman working in an office and then 
labelling this as woman office worker. In time the computer will learn to 
recognise similar images and be able to associate these images with 
women working in an office and eventually make predictions for things 
such as job candidate screening or making loan approvals.27).  
 
25 Council of Europe, Committee of Experts on Internet Intermediaries (n 18) 26. 
26 Alex Rosenblat and Luke Stark, ‘Algorithmic Labor and Information Asymmetries: 
A Case Study of Uber’s Drivers’ (2016) 10 International Journal Of Communication 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2686227> accessed 10 December 2018, 3777. 
27 Bettina Büchel, ‘Artificial intelligence could reinforce society’s gender 
equality problems’ (The Conversation UK, 1 March 2018) 
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The platform LinkedIn was reported because highly-paid jobs were 
not displayed as frequently for searches by women as they were for men 
because of the way its algorithms were written. And the algorithms were 
written that way because, in the beginning, man users of LinkedIn were 
predominantly looking for the high-paying jobs, so the ML ended up 
proposing these jobs to men – thus discriminating women and 
reinforcing the bias against them28.  
Also, automated testing and analysis of Google’s advertising system 
reveals male job seekers are shown far more adverts for high-paying 
executive jobs.29 
Another research has showed that two prominent research-image 
collections—including one supported by Microsoft and Facebook—display 
a predictable gender bias in their depiction of activities such as cooking 
and sports. Images of shopping and washing are linked to women, for 
example, while coaching and shooting are tied to men.30 If a photo set 
generally associates women with housework, softwares trained by 
studying those photos and their labels create an even stronger 
association with it.
31
 
The criminal justice system, increasingly relying on risk assessment 
tools as showed before, makes no exception on the discrimination issue 
and the breach of equality between citizens, being qualified as ”in 
crisis”
32
. Studies have revealed ”persistent racial disparities at every 
 
<http://theconversation.com/artificial-intelligence-could-reinforce-societys-gender-
equality-problems-92631> accessed 12 December 2018.   
28 Hope Reese, ‘Bias in machine learning, and how to stop it’ (TechRepublic, 18 November 
2016) <https://www.techrepublic.com/article/bias-in-machine-learning-and-how-to-stop-it/> 
accessed 10 December 2018. 
29 Samuel Gibbs, ‘Women less likely to be shown ads for high-paid jobs on Google, 
study shows’ (The Guardian, 8 July 2015) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/08/women-less-likely-ads-high-
paid-jobs-google-study> accessed 12 December 2018. 
30 Tom Simonite, ‘Machines Taught by Photos Learn a Sexist View of Women’ 
(Wired, 21 August 2017) <https://www.wired.com/story/machines-taught-by-photos-
learn-a-sexist-view-of-women/> accessed 10 December 2018. 
31 Büchel (n 27). 
32 Vincent Southerland, ’With AI and Criminal Justice, the Devil is in the Data’ 
(ACLU, 9 April 2018) <https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-
technologies/ai-and-criminal-justice-devil-data> accessed 15 December 2018. 
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stage, a different kind of justice for the haves and the have nots, and a 
system that neither rehabilitates individuals nor ensures public safety”
33
.  
When person is arrested in U.S. for example, he or she will be usually 
subjected to a pre-trial risk assessment tool in order to help the judge 
decide whether to incarcerate that person pending trial or to release that 
person. Some U.S. states have used these pre-trial AI tools at the 
sentencing and parole decision stage, in an attempt to predict the 
likelihood that someone will commit a new offense if released from 
prison
34
. 
But the negative consequences of this use are serious because of 
the biases they reinforce and perpetuate.  Because all risk assessment 
tools are based on actuarial historical data, if the data is not accurate or 
is obtained due to some illegal or exaggerate conduct (e.g. policemen in 
a city are usually arresting people from a certain community in a period 
of time. If that data is fed to the computer, the predictive model will 
suggest that people from that community are generally more likely to 
commit crimes so the results of the predictive test will perpetuate the 
discriminating pattern). If the algorithms are not ”cleaned” of the waste 
(discriminatory patterns), the use of such AI tools will produce more 
harm than benefit for the justice system. 
A study revealed that Black defendants were more likely to be 
wrongly labelled high risk than white defendants drawing attention on 
the perils of risk assessment tools ”scoring”.35 In many of the US states, 
”the results of such assessments are given to judges during criminal 
sentencing. Rating a defendant’s risk of future crime is often done in 
conjunction with an evaluation of a defendant’s rehabilitation needs. 
The Justice Department’s National Institute of Corrections now 
encourages the use of such combined assessments at every stage of the 
criminal justice process.”
36
  
 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid. 
35 Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu and Lauren Kirchner, ‘Machine Bias. 
There’s software used across the country to predict future criminals. And it’s biased 
against blacks’ (ProPublica, 23 May 2016) 
<https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-
sentencing> accessed 12 December 2018. 
36 ibid. 
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The study revealed that only 20 percent of the people predicted to 
commit violent crimes actually reiterated their criminal conduct. Also, in 
forecasting who would re-offend, the algorithm made mistakes with 
African-American and white defendants at roughly the same rate but in 
very different ways. The formula was particularly likely to falsely flag 
black defendants as future criminals, wrongly labelling them this way at 
almost twice the rate as white defendants. White defendants were 
mislabelled as low risk more often than black defendants.
37
 As a matter 
of fact, 23,5% of white people were labelled higher risk, but didn’t re-
offend in opposition with 44,9% African-American. In the same time 
47.7% of white defendants were mislabelled as lower risk, yet DID re-
offend, while 28.0% African-American labelled lower risk actually 
reiterated their criminal conduct.
38
 
3.  Concluding remarks 
In spite of all benefits resulted in using risk assessment tools, there 
are still a lot of issues the scholars and practicioners must address. Fiew 
initiatives, such as the adoption of Toronto Declaration
39
 or prudent 
approach by the Courts
40
 are not quite enough to determine what long-
 
37 Angwin et al. (n 35). 
38 ibid. 
39 Fulltext of Toronto Declaration available at 
<https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2018/08/The-Toronto-
Declaration_ENG_08-2018.pdf> accessed 12 December 2018. 
40 See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d. (Wisc. 2016). This case was one of the first 
major cases to address concerns about whether a judge’s consideration of a software-
generated risk assessment score during sentencing constitutes a violation of due 
process or overt discrimination. The Loomis case, challenged the use of COMPAS as a 
violation of the defendant’s due process rights. But the Wisconsin Supreme Court held 
that Loomis’s challenge did not clear the constitutional hurdles. Importantly, the case 
relies on two prior state court decisions: State v. Samsa (2015 WI App 6) and State v. 
Skaff 447 N.W.2d 84, 85 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989), the last one a 1989 decision which held 
that the right to be sentenced based on accurate information includes the right to 
review and verify information contained in the pre-sentence investigation report. As a 
matter of fact one of the most important arguments in the court’s reasoning in the 
Loomis case was the fact that the COMPAS score cannot be the only thing the sentence 
is based on, or even the determinative factor, thereby arguably ensuring that the judge 
will consider other information about the particular case and assign an individual 
sentence based on the totality of the circumstances. 
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term effects the widespread use of such artificial tools is going to 
produce. 
Accepting these new instruments in the criminal justice  field in a 
hurry and with great joy is going to transform the criminal justice system 
in an area of impredactibility and false objectiviy. As shown in Chapter 2 
of the present study, the objective outcomes are in fact sources of 
discrimination and violetions of the elementary human rights guaranteed 
bu ECHR.  My persopnal recommendation is to approach the issue with 
caution and to rely on such instruments in the criminal justice field only 
to strenghten the decision of the Courts and not to ground it. 
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problem?

 
 
 
Zsolt Bujtár*  
 
 
Abstract: Central bank issued digital currencies (CBDC) can be the viable substitutes of 
current cash and account type money. It is a major change any central bank should be 
careful about when introducing. The author examines the causes behind the urgency of 
introduction. One major driving force behind near future introduction can be the 
competition stemming from the launch of Libra, Facebook’s new digital money as a 
payment tool. It is also discussed in the paper how and with what kind of drawbacks 
and advantages can a new digital money be part of the monetary toolset of central 
banks. 
 
Keywords: CBDC, monetary policy, digital money  
 
1.  Introduction 
Central bank issued digital currencies (CBDC) are in the focus of 
more than 60 % of the central banks, representing 80 % of the 
population all around the world.1 Central banks have taken under 
scrutiny the possibilities of introducing a CBDC, and global financial 
institutions like the World Bank even experiment with a pseudo CBDC.2 
Certain smaller countries tried to pioneer the process, but failed to 
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achieve even short-term successes (Marshall Islands, Ecuador). China 
has also announced the creation of a new public CBDC, but has given no 
details about the date of introduction and specifics of new money.3 It is 
a quite complex challenge to introduce a new money when doing so is 
not an urgent public necessity like in the case of hyperinflation. This is 
why such a decision in the future should be planned and executed 
carefully. 
Why is it so abruptly urgent to evaluate such a major overhaul in the 
financial system? There are several reasons, but at least three of them 
are worth examining: the first is technological development, the second 
is the appearance of major competitors like Facebook, while the third 
encompasses the numerous advantages a new monetary tool can offer. 
On the other hand, there are also certain drawbacks which make the 
decision-making process regarding the introduction of CBDC even more 
complex. 
In this study, the author examines the major advantages and 
disadvantages of the possible introduction of different types of central 
bank issued digital moneys.  
After defining the different types of money, CBDCs and their 
functions, the author examines the functions of fiat money versus digital 
money. The paper assesses Libra, Facebook’s new world money in a 
separate section.
4
 Finally, the advantages and drawbacks of different 
forms of CBDC usage are presented, examined as digital money and a 
potential tool of monetary policy. 
2.  CBDC defined - Central bank issued digital currencies  
To provide the definition of central bank issued digital currency, it is 
necessary to classify the types of money and its equivalents currently in 
use as well as certain new forms of money. 
 
3 Thomas Simms, ’China’s Digital Currency Is Ready, Central Bank Says’ 
(Cointelegraph, 11 August 2019) <https://cointelegraph.com/news/chinas-digital-
currency-is-ready-central-bank-says> accessed 12 August 2019. 
4 Sonja Buncic – Alpar Losonc – Andrea Ivanisevic: Fluidity of term of 
Cryptocurrency – A Challange for Regulators page. In: J. Glavanits – B. Horváthy – L. 
Knapp (eds.): EU Business Law and Digital Revolution: Selected Studies from the New 
Fields of Technology. Széchenyi István University, Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and 
Political Sciences, Department of International and European Law, Győr, 2019, 91.  
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Taxonomy of money by its basic functions differentiated between 
several distinct categories. In the latest IMF research paper of July 
2019,5 experts set up a money tree-like table, which classifies the 
differences of money with four characteristics.6 According to the model, 
these characteristics are: type, value, backstop and technology. The IBS 
Committee on Markets and Payment Infrastructure in 2018 set up a 
taxonomy called money flower, in which money is classified on the basis 
of issuer, form, accessibility and technology.7 In the latter, widely spread 
IBS model form types divide public/retail CBDC8 into token and account 
type.
9
 The problem in the IBS model with using token and account types 
is that cryptocurrencies are divided into several token types like 
investment, utility and its hybrid, etc.10 As a result, this classification can 
be confusing, since a potential digital CBDC - as we will see later - can be 
at least theoretically DLT-typed11, just like cryptocurrencies.  
Based on the above-mentioned fact, the author uses the IMF money 
tree model in this study. There are two main categories of money type 
according to IMF money trees, which are the following: claim and object. 
The claim is defined as a liability of an entity not being present. This also 
 
5 Tobias Adrian and Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli, ‘The Rise of Digital Money’ (July 
2019) International Monetary Fund Fintech Note/19/1 < 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fintech-notes/Issues/2019/07/12/The-Rise-of-
Digital-Money-47097>. 
6 Bank for International Settlements: Committee on Markets and Payment 
Infrastructure, Market Committee, ‘Central bank digital currencies’ (March, 2018) 
<https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d174.pdf>. 
7 ibid 4-6. 
8 Public or retail CBDC, a digital money, is available for public use similar to cash 
nowadays, contrary to wholesale CBDC, which is available for legible financial 
institutions only. 
9 Péter Bálint Király: The Classification of Virtual Currencies Related to Blockchains. 
In: J. Glavanits – B. Horváthy – L. Knapp (eds.): EU Business Law and Digital 
Revolution: Selected Studies from the New Fields of Technology. Széchenyi István 
University, Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Department of 
International and European Law, Győr, 2019, 136.  
10 Gábor Szalay, ‘A kriptovaluták nemzetközi szabályozási trendjei: Kriptotőzsdék 
és ICO-k értékpapírjogi perspektívából’ (2019) 74 (3) Jogtudományi Közlöny 126-134. 
11 Distributed ledger technology (DLT) has a basic feature, which differentiates it 
from other centralized data processing and storage systems. DLT uses a web of 
computers, which has to agree on adding new data to a bloc of data. The owners of 
these computers are independent from each other, and their functioning is based on a 
predetermined consensus of proof of work or proof of stake. 
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means that paying by a claim type money can be instant, but the actual 
delivery of the money occurs later. In the meantime, an amount is 
deposited as a collateral of the actual payment, made by the claim, until 
the actual payment is made. 
 Claims have two forms, according to their redemptions value: fixed 
value or valuable redemption value. Fixed value redemptions are divided 
into two subcategories: b-money and e-money. B-money has a final 
guarantee in case its obligator is not able to fulfil its obligation. This so-
called backstop can be either a deposit insurance scheme or a central 
bank’s action, called lender of last resort.12 In both cases13 the central 
bank has unlimited power and the obligation to maintain the public’s 
trust placed in the monetary system. These monies are either direct 
claims towards a bank account (debit card) during an instant payment 
cleared later, or indirect claims for risk-free securities like government 
bonds of different states - in case of money market funds. National 
settlement systems of commercial banks are also part of the b-money 
group in a country, where these settlements are supervised or even 
executed by the central bank of a given state.14 It is important to note 
these settlements since they are forms of digital currency, and as such 
they are the potential predecessors of public/retail CBDC. 
Contrary to b-money, e-money is issued by a private entity that uses 
either a centralized or a decentralized technology, which controls 
issuance and clearance of this type.
15
 As its name implies, e-money is 
 
12 Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) is a key role for the monetary system. The central 
bank in a two-tier bank system or in the case of a one-tier bank system is a dedicated 
financial institution having the exclusive right to exercise this function. When a 
commercial bank needs emergency liquidity in case of a bank run, with certain 
conditions the central bank can provide unlimited cash to stop the fear of the bank 
running out of necessary cash to pay depositors.    
13 Deposit insurance system has limited money mostly from compulsory 
membership payments. If it is not enough to cover depositors’ losses, money is lent to 
the deposit insurance agency though security issuance guaranteed by the state. 
14 A good example is the Real Time Gross Settlement System (RTSG) see Michael 
Kumhof and Clare Noone, ‘Central Bank Digital Currencies - Design Principles and 
Balance Sheet Implications’ (2018) Bank of England Working paper No. 725, 3. 
15 Judit Glavanits: Smart Cities, Iot and Blockchain: The importance of Oracles. In: J. 
Glavanits – B. Horváthy – L. Knapp (eds.): EU Business Law and Digital Revolution: 
Selected Studies from the New Fields of Technology. Széchenyi István University, Deák 
Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Department of International and 
European Law, Győr, 2019, 214–215.  
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only a settlement money, there is no possibility to transfer this claim into 
cash form. It only functions as a money to buy services or goods 
provided by its issuer (actually its operator, since there is no money 
issued as it is only a privilege of central banks) or its subcontractor.  
Clearance can be made instantly if using card service companies like 
Visa or Mastercard, but usually it takes more time. The main 
characteristic of e-money is that it is only an online platform with 
payment services operated through the internet. Since it is only an agent 
type activity, the actual settlement made in b-money, which makes this 
money payment a fix-value-redemption type too, is similar to b-money 
transactions. 
 Claim type money has a special subtype called I-money, which is a 
variable-value redemption. Its variability (actually volatility) stems from 
the fact that its issuer is not a central bank and is not backed by one 
currency like for example currency backed stablecoins. Stablecoins are 
cryptocurrencies - among them the most notorious is tether16 - which 
claim or actually back its cryptocurrency by low volatility assets, like gold 
or fiat currency (as it is claimed by tether founders by USD), or basket of 
fiat currency like Libra. In such situations, I-money is a claim that cannot 
be transferred fully to fiat currency without price fluctuation, since its fiat 
currency conversion depends on the price of the asset it is backed by.  
The difference between decentralized, privately issued e-money
17
 like 
Paxos and I-money type Libra has significant importance with respect to 
this study. The fine line of difference is based on who issues the same 
basic type of money, like in the case of cryptocurrencies. Paxos, for 
example, is a stablecoin issued by a New York State licensed financial 
institution, a trust company18, whilst Libra’s will be issued by an 
 
16 Tether real full USD backing was questioned several times, see Nikhilesh De, 
‘Tether Lawyer Admits Stablecoin Now 74% Backed by Cash and Equivalents’  
<https://www.coindesk.com/tether-lawyer-confirms-stablecoin-74-percent-backed-by-
cash-and-equivalents> accessed 12 June 2019. 
17 Andrea Labancz: Cryptocurrencies: A Theoretical Approach. In: J: Glavanits – B. 
Horváthy – L. Knapp (eds.): EU Business Law and Digital Revolution: Selected Studies 
from the New Fields of Technology. Széchenyi István University, Deák Ferenc Faculty of 
Law and Political Sciences, Department of International and European Law, Győr, 
2019, 157. 
18 Charles Cascarilla, ‘Paxos standard white paper’ (2018) 
<https://www.paxos.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/PAX_Whitepaper.pdf> 
accessed 22 July 2019 
76 Zsolt Bujtár 
association based in Switzerland in which Facebook has only USD 10 
million stake out of a USD 1 billion capital. Because of the above-
mentioned facts, Paxos is a centralized stablecoin while Libra is 
decentralized. Libra’s value can fluctuate according to the fiat currency 
basket against which it is defined, but Paxos guarantees to change 
Paxos tokens19 to USD on its crypto exchange itBit and also on the over-
the-counter market for Paxos (PAX OTC) with a 7/24 availability.20       
In the case of an object as money, not only the payment is instant, 
but the transfer of money as a unit of account as well. There is no need 
for future clearance, since cash changes hand on the spot, finishing the 
transfer of money transaction too (not only the change of goods or 
services). This is the case for paper money or coins. It can be similar in 
the case of a central bank issued digital currency, when it is issued as a 
token on a digital device like mobile phones or tablets. As it is assessed 
in this paper, both type of CBDCs can be issued by the given central 
bank or any institution having a mandate from a central bank, but in the 
latter case only as a decentralized CBDC.  
This differentiation of centralization will have its relevance later when 
CBDC is examined as a monetary policy tool. CBDC in both cases works 
as a unit of account, meaning that it can be a measurement of goods 
and services. In case of cryptocurrencies issued by independent entities 
like bitcoin21 or ether, it has no unit of account function as long as it has 
the enormous volatility like bitcoin or ether have since their inception.22  
The borderline between the five different money types is not finite. E-
money issued in a digital form by private entities as money market 
funds’ shares or ETFs can easily become I-money, when its shares are 
tokenized or issued as coin representing certain unit of share in a money 
market fund or an ETF in any digital ledger. This is possible because 
 
19 ibid. 
20 ibid. 
21 Bitcoin has no independent entity which issues new bitcoins. It is mined by 
solving computer algorithms for which miners get bitcoins as a reward. Bitcoin has a 
limited number to be issued 21 000 450.    
22 The other major concern with cryptocurrencies is their limited regulation (to 
certain jurisdictions like Malta or Switzerland), if any at all. See Zsolt Bujtár, ‘A 
kriptovaluták európai és máltai szabályozásának összehasonlítása: A máltai sólyom 
szárnyalása’ (2018) 18 (5) Európai Jog 6-16 and András Kecskés and Zsolt Bujtár, ‘A 
kriptovaluta ökoszisztéma európai uniós és a svájci szabályozásának összehasonlítása’ 
(2018) 24 (2) JURA 427-439. 
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traditional mutual funds and ETFs – as shadow banking entities – 
overgrew the traditional banking system.23  
For the complete summary of different functions along four 
classifications of monies see Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: Money trees24 
 
3.  CBDC potential types and their functions 
Central bank money in its early form already existed as a unit of 
account in central settlements between commercial banks and their 
central bank. (See RTSG above as an example.)  This is because this 
type of money is not printed in any cash form, it exists only as the net or 
gross claims of banks against each other to have a daily settlement, 
which amount should actually be paid by the one who has net liability 
towards the one who has net claim. However, this central bank issued 
money is not DLT type like cryptocurrency, but it is data as an electronic 
settlement input. CBDC can be DLT type as well, like cryptocurrencies, or 
 
23 Adrian and Mancini-Griffoli (n 4). 
 
24 Adrian and Mancini-Griffoli (n 4). 
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based on other technology that makes it digitally possible to issue, store, 
retrieve digital money supervised by a central bank. 
The difference between central bank issued centralized CBDC and 
decentralized CBDC is the one who operates the technology that creates 
(mines or controls and sets up smart contract) the CBDC. In the case of 
centralized CBDC, creation is fully controlled by a central bank. However, 
in the case of decentralized CBDC, a central bank gives up its full control 
of creating money by giving the right to a third party – let it be a private 
or public, or non-profit entity – to mine or create in other way (e.g. by a 
smart contract) CBDC. It is relevant whether it is a centralized or a 
decentralized CBDC, since issuing money is the monopoly of central 
banks, as a central bank’s control of the money supply forms an integral 
part of its monetary policy. Because of this, central banks hardly even 
support the idea of issuing money which is uncontrolled in its quantity by 
the given central bank having jurisdiction over monetary policy under the 
laws of a given state.  
 The question is the following: why would a central bank replace a fiat 
money or support a parallel money besides its own fiat money.
25
 From 
the perspective of the banking system, the negative interest rate policy 
is one major reason. Because in case of a new CBDC, which is a 
different money type than fiat, the central bank can pay different interest 
on CBDC deposits.  On CBDC deposit this can also be negative interest 
on the long run, but on fiat money it should be positive to attract savings 
for the financial institutions to finance loans and to remain profitable. 
The other important issue is wholesale and retail money differentiation. 
Wholesale money, which is already a digital money, is a type of money 
that is used in interbank systems by privileged financial institutions.26 
Retail CBDC is one that would be available for households and 
 
25 Zsolt Halász: Virtual Currencies – Legal Challanges. In: J. Glavanits – B. Horváthy 
– L. Knapp (eds.): EU Business Law and Digital Revolution: Selected Studies from the 
New Fields of Technology. Széchenyi István University, Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and 
Political Sciences, Department of International and European Law, Győr, 2019, 116–
118.  
26 As an example, in Switzerland roughly 200 financial institutions. See Aleksander 
Berentsen and Fabian Schar, ‘The Case for Central Bank Electronic Money and the 
Non-Case for Central Bank Cryptocurrencies’ Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
(2018) 100 (2). 
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nonfinancial institutions too. If only the wholesale financial actors could 
use it with the functions above, then it would not be a new digital money, 
but only the acknowledgement of the status quo. In the following part, 
the author examines the possible advantages of the two above-
mentioned types of CBDC. 
4.  Public/retail CBDC – can it be a reality?  
Public/retail CBDC is a time journey in terms of going back to a 
certain level, to the one-tiered banking system, in which all economic 
actors except for households could have an account at the central bank. 
Already in 1987, the one-tiered banking system ceased to exist in 
Hungary. The possible difference is that even to households, access to 
new CBDC has to be given. But the household cannot be defined as an 
account holder, only the persons within the household, i.e. the citizens. 
Citizens in the free world, however, can move abroad or keep a 
citizenship and get another one, if the home country – based on its laws 
– so allows. This leads to the private persons’ taxation problems. Several 
hundreds of thousands change citizenship or settle in a low tax bracket 
country in order to pay less or no personal income or corporate tax.
27
 
This is especially true in the case of countries which are considered as 
tax havens and take bank privacy seriously. The central banks of these 
countries have to draw a line when determining who can open a CBDC 
account. For example, Switzerland or Cyprus can attract foreigners to 
open CBDC accounts at their respective central banks.  
This is possible because CBDC can replace current cash money, as it 
can work as an emergency reserve during problematic events like bank-
runs (in 2008 during the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007-2009) or 
state bankruptcy (for example in Venezuela in 2018-2019, or in 
Argentina and Ukraine numerous times in the last 50 years).  Cash is 
problematic because of its anonymity. It can be used for money 
laundering and tax evasion as well. This is why it can be another 
incentive for a central bank to replace it with CBDC or minimize its usage 
by the parallel usage of CBDC. The question is why a private person 
 
27 See the aspects of taxation from a different point of view: Glavanits, J. – Király P. 
B.: A blockchain-technológia alkalmazásának jogi előkérdései: a fogalmi keretek 
pontosításának szükségessége: Jog-Állam-Politika, 2018/3. 173–183.  
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would change cash for CBDC. And the answer is: because of the 
reputation of central banks. Contrary to commercial banks, modern 
central banks have a reputation of providing sufficient trust for the 
public to hold their money at the given central bank, just like cash at 
home. Central banks earned this reputation by playing the lender of last 
resort role during the previous century when the financial system 
collapsed as a result of the Great world Crisis of 1929-1933 and the 
Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2009. The FED,28 the US central bank, 
rescued not only the commercial banks as part of the US program 
named TARP, 29 but also insurance companies like AIG or complete 
financial sectors like the money market mutual funds.30 The latter 
financial institutions, however, were not the part of deposit insurance 
schemes, but of a new phenomenon called the shadow banking 
system.31 
In that case, a possible solution can be the introduction of CBDC to 
avoid the next great crisis which has already been dubbed - although it 
has only early indications – as the Great Liquidity Crisis, which is mainly 
the result of central banks’ quantitative and qualitative easing policies. 
As the next crisis arrives, there are two possible solutions to keep the 
 
28 Programs for shadow banking actors were Commercial Paper Funding Facility 
(CPFF), Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility 
(AMLF), Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF), and the Term Asset-Backed 
Securities Loan Facility (TALF) 
<https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_crisisresponse.htm> accessed 
21 July 2019. 
29 TARP - Troubled Asset Relief Program, as part of Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 provided much needed liquidity for the financial system by 
buying securitized obligations. 
30 Gábor Szalay, ’The Impact of the Lack of Transparency on Corporate 
Governance: A Practical Example’ (2018) 1 (2) Corporate Law & Governance Review 
21-28 <www.virtusinterpress.org/IMG/pdf/clgrv1i2p2.pdf> accesssed 12 July  2019. 
31 Shadow banking system is a part of the financial system like traditional banking 
system conduct maturity, liquidity and risk transformation without deposit insurance 
schemes and lender of last resort central bank as a backstop for investors. That is why 
a shadow bank run can be so dangerous as a bank run, but even more risky for the 
financial system. That is why as an exception the FED intervened to rescue some 
shadow banking institutions to avoid the collapse of the whole financial system. András 
Kecskés and Zsolt Bujtár, ‘Az árnyékbankrendszer jogi szabályozása az Egyesült 
Államokban és az Európai Unióban’ (2017) 23 (1) JURA 266-277.  
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world economy and the financial system afloat: one is the Chicago Plan32 
and the other is helicopter money.33 Professor Henry Simons from the 
University of Chicago coined the Chicago plan in 1936. According to his 
theory, commercial banks have to keep 100 % reserve on deposits by 
government-issued money. There are four benefits of this potential new 
financial system besides not causing another financial crisis. These four 
advantages are: commercial banks cannot create money and thus 
credit, which allows much easier control of credit cycles, furthermore, it 
would eliminate bank runs, while the central bank could issue money at 
zero interest rate, and finally private and public debt would reach much 
lower levels. Both the helicopter money and the Chicago plan have 
advantages and disadvantages, but both has reputational risk34 for a 
central bank to introduce. However, if with respect to both above-
mentioned scenarios - against all the advantages - hyperinflation occurs, 
the trust in the financial system and especially in central banks will be 
lost.  
 This can also happen in the case of CBDC. If public trust would be 
lost due to hacking attacks35 in connection with a CBDC, the central 
bank would suffer a reputation loss, the risk of which is not worth taking 
by central banks as institutions, being responsible for price stability and 
the stability of the financial system. 
5.  CBDC as a monetary policy tool 
 
32 Jaromir Benes and Michael Kumhof, ‘The Chicago Plan Revisited IMF Working 
Paper August 2012’ <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12202.pdf> 
accessed 22 July 2019. 
33 Helicopter money’s definition was introduced by Milton Friedman in 1969, but 
was popularized in 1986 by former FED Chairman Ben Bernanke in 2002.  According to 
theory central bank can inject money into the economy to exert inflation or increase 
GDP. It can be a one-time or a permanent policy action as well. Ansgar Belke, ‘After the 
Bazooka a Bonanza from Heaven – „Helicopter Money“ Now?’ (2018) ROME 
Discussion Paper Series, No. 18-02. 
34 Benes and Kumhof (n 26). 
35 Szilád Benk, László Kajdi, András Kollarik, Zoltán Mamira, Miklós Szebeny, Gergő 
Török and Lóránt Varga, ’Digitalizáció és pénzrendszer’ Gergely Fábián and Barnabás 
Virág (eds), Bankok a történelemben: innovációk és válságok (Magyar Nemzeti Bank 
2018) 696. 
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Current financial systems with the use of fiat money have one 
monetary system with the only type of money as a legal tender. All 
money on international money markets are treated as equal, meaning 
that any currency, cash or reserve, can be converted easily if freely 
floated. At the same time, reserve money can have a very different 
interest as opposed to the same money invested as private money in the 
form of government bonds. As an extreme example in Hungary, a 
commercial bank reserve has negative interest, but a new premium 
government bond pays on average 4,94 % interest fixed for five years.36 
The example shows how money can transform from one form to another 
as part of a monetary transmission process.37 Just days before the 
introduction of the new government bond the overnight BUBOR rate 
more than quadrupled. In a weak it normalized, getting very close to the 
previous level of 0,1 %, but with longer maturity BUBOR38 has increased 
constantly from 0,15-0,20 to 0,20-0,3 levels.39  
By the introduction of CBDC there are two possible solutions. One is 
the introduction of a limited access or wholesale CBDC. This CBDC can 
only be used by privileged financial institutions having the right to 
deposit money and certain low risk securities to get money in exchange 
from the central bank (swap deal) or as a collateral in a repurchase 
agreement with the central bank. The introduction of this type of CBDC 
has the advantage of making it feasible to pay higher interest to 
commercial banks on commercial bank fiat reserves, and making them 
profitable without changing the reserve money interest as part of the 
interest monetary mechanism of central banks’ monetary policy. This is 
not much of a difference compared to the current digital money used in 
the settlement systems of commercial banks. The only difference is 
maturity; since settlements are made on a daily basis, interest is not 
 
36 <https://alapblog.hu/az-akk-megkavarta-az-mnb-allovizet/> accessed 29 July 
2019. 
37 Monetary transmission has four channels bank rates is only one of four. The 
other three are exchange rate, asset prices capital market and, money credit market, 
see <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/intro/transmission/html/index.en.html> 
accessed 12 June 2019. 
38 BUBOR is abbreviation of Budapest offered bank rate at which commercial 
banks and Hungarian Central Bank give loans to each other. 
39 <https://www.mnb.hu/monetaris-politika/penzpiaci-
informaciok/referenciamutato-jegyzesi-bizottsag/bubor> accessed 29 July 2019. 
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relevant on current digital money. As it can have longer than one-day 
maturity, it can have much lower negative interest relative to fiat money 
interest rate. This can be a major advantage of this type of CBDC. Since 
insulated from private companies and private individuals, in the event of 
a bank run a CBDC would not attract too much liability against the 
central bank thus the devaluation of current fiat money could not occur.  
With respect to public/retail CBDC, there are several problems to be 
solved. First of all, the above-mentioned negative effect of CBDC on 
parallel fiat money. Secondly, the central bank’s control of money in 
circulation would become difficult by introducing this type of CBDC. The 
above-mentioned different interest-system cannot work with a 
public/retail CBDC because of its usage, as one entity in different 
channels of monetary transmission is not possible. However, it has to be 
kept in mind that a major advantage of introducing public/retail CBDC is 
that it evokes a higher degree of competition between commercial banks 
compared to a fiat money system. Public/retail money availability can be 
limited to non-privileged economic actors if this competition-evoking 
effect (concerning commercial banks) is ruled out from the system, since 
private individuals or companies in such case could only have CBDC as 
emergency money, like cash held at home or at home cashiers by 
companies.  Before the author examines the kind of digital money a new 
CBDC should be, it is worth looking at a major challenge of current fiat 
money Libra, Facebook’s new invention. 
6.  Libra as a turning point for digital currencies  
In the case of a cryptocurrency, the best starting point for analyzing 
the given asset is examining its white paper. The white paper, as an 
equivalent of the prospectus in an initial public offering, can give us 
details about the issuer of the cryptocurrency and its intent, as well as 
the solution the asset provides for the problem described in the white 
paper.  
Libra’s white paper states that its cryptocurrency can solve problems 
of hundreds of millions of people by providing a cheap and fast payment 
system for the ones most in need and having no access to commercial 
banks. This goal is achieved by a blockchain-based stablecoin. In this 
case, blockchain-based means that it is a DLT type, and as a result all 
transactions are kept in a distributed ledger verifying each transfer by 
different computer nodes. In the case of Libra, a basket of currencies 
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weighted means all fiat money invested in short term government 
securities issued by reputable central banks as a collateral for Libra. 
There will be no hedging of reserves, thus the value of Libra will only 
change if its basket currencies change.  
The question arises why the 2020 introduction of Libra became such 
an important event in the summer of 2019. There are two reasons: the 
first is Facebook’s more than 2.2 billion users, who are all potential 
clients of Libra payment methods, while the second is that if it succeeds 
it can pose a danger for the current role of USA dollar as a world 
currency. This is why almost all major financial authorities have raised 
their concerns against the fast introduction of Libra. Major criticism 
came from traditional commercial banks, being afraid of losing payment 
revenues and receiving a new competitor having completely different 
rules with respect to know your customer (KYC) rules working against 
anti-money laundering (AML) activities. With respect to introducing CBDC 
as a new digital money, a possible success of Libra known to billions of 
people would be a major catalyst. With the possible success of Libra, 
digital money can become a household asset, and the introduction of a 
CBDC would be viable if other conditions are also met. 
        Let us assume that Libra will be successful in early 2020. In that 
case, central banks can start working on a digital currency issued to the 
public, but in a limited amount of value and to locals only. This is the 
answer for the question raised at the end of the previous chapter: which 
type of CBDC should central banks issue? The central banks having the 
greatest need for new tools for fighting deflation and possessing very 
few tools since being in a negative interest rate environment like Japan, 
Sweden or Switzerland, also including the Eurozone. Although DLT 
technology is very attractive, the safety thereof is not proven 100 %. This 
is the underlying reason why the author agrees with professor Berentsen 
and his fellow researcher Fabian Schar on not risking central banks’ 
reputation by using a DLT technology for a CBDC which has not proved 
its security at the highest level, but rather with one having high security, 
scalability. 
7.  Conclusions    
As the author examined the possible introduction of central bank 
issued digital currencies, it can be concluded that it is a very complex 
problem to solve. The clock is ticking, while the launch of a potential 
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digital money, a DLT type having the capability to be a new world 
currency (Libra) is already on the horizon. As wholesale digital money is 
already introduced de facto into money markets for privileged financial 
institutions only, a public digital money controlled by central banks can 
be the new type of CBDC.  This is the one considered by central banks to 
be introduced. Fiat money as legal tender has not only object form as 
cash, but as b-money as claim or e-money as well. Central banks have 
the responsibility to keep the monetary system not only liquid, but also 
to keep its operation sustainable. Central banks use different forms of 
money to coordinate monetary policy in four different channels, and 
almost all of them with international relationships. By changing fiat 
money to digital money for the public, this transmission process is also 
overhauled. Bank runs and shadow bank runs are ruled out by definition, 
but new problems like cyberattacks arise. Most of the central banks 
consider it necessary to evaluate the introduction of a new money in the 
form of CBDC, however, as a conclusion, it can be stated that such 
introduction should be well prepared, gradual and limited at first, if it 
becomes necessary at all. According to our current knowledge, DLT type 
CBDCs should be ruled out since they have security loopholes which are 
not fixed yet.      
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group of people called miners who use software to solve mathematical problems. Vast 
expansion of this technology has brought cryptocurrencies to the attention of public 
authorities. However, legislative intervention in this area is only at its infancy. 
The greatest challenge in the process of regulation of cryptocurrencies is to set a 
legal term for cryptocurrency. The main problem that has inspired this work is the fact 
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observed regulation, there have been two sides of legal definition. Some countries 
define cryptocurrency as money, that is, as a means of exchange, and there has even 
been an unsuccessful attempt to identify cryptocurrency as digital, electronic money. 
Other countries define cryptocurrencies as assets, trying to determine them as 
financial instruments, commodities, securities or property with the aim of preventing 
tax evasion. 
Cryptocurrency has undoubtedly achieved the status of an exchange medium in a 
significant user community due to its ability to realize economic value, and there is 
basis for it to become a latent means of exchange. At the same time, cryptocurrencies 
have the potential to become immaterial assets and serve as a means of investing. The 
establishment of a unified definition would reduce uncertainty in their denationalized 
world and create a point that would allow regulators, in the future, to establish a 
balance between consumer protection and innovative freedom. Only then would this 
industry have the potential to embrace a wider customer base. 
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1.  Introduction 
The occurrence of cryptocurrencies is, in a historical context, 
determined by two phenomena. The first is a crisis that broke out in 
2007 and had significant financial aspects. The second one is the 
dynamics of digital technologies and their applications in relation to 
financial transfers. As for the first one, the cryptocurrency supporters 
hoped that they would overcome the possible monetary regressions 
(inflation / deflation, speculative bubbles, etc.). The supporters of the 
second phenomenon recognized the possibility of technology to replace 
standard financial mediation-based mechanisms by banks and state (a 
phenomenon called “disintermediation”1 which entails deconstruction of 
the institutionalization of monetary sovereignty), or we can also say that 
cryptocurrencies were intended as means of dismissing something 
called in law a “disinterested third party”, and that financial transfers are 
done in terms of “peer-to-peer payment network”. We can at least briefly 
state that the ambitions of those who have promoted cryptocurrencies 
are not modest: the avoidance of an always non-neutral state with its 
monetary policy is offered as a technologically mediated realization of 
spontaneous “anarchist” intersubjective relations. This should be 
enabled by rules that rely on technological algorithms, and therefore on 
technological automatism that regulates arbitrariness (self-executing 
programs in the sense of “smart contracts”)2. Given the fact that money 
is never just an instrument in human relations, cryptocurrencies project 
a profound transformation of exactly the same relationship. Instead of 
habitualizing trust without which standard money would be impossible, 
here the “fundamental trust embedded in money has simply been 
transposed into a ‘machine code’ ”3 in the sense of accounting 
automatization ("network ledger")4. 
The biggest legal challenge in regulating cryptocurrency is defining 
the term cryptocurrency (most often Bitcoin, as perhaps its most 
 
1 P. Vigna and M. Casey, The Age of Cryptocurrency: How Bitcoin and Digital Money 
Are Challenging the Global Economic Order (The Bodley Head 2015) 
2 L. Luu, DH Chu, H. Olickel, P. Saxena and A. Hobor, ’Making smart contracts 
smarter’ in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM-SIGSAC Conference (ACM 2016) 254–269. 
3 Adam Hayes, ’The Socio-Technological Lives of Bitcoin Theory’ (2019) Culture & 
Society 1–24. 
4 Nicholas Plassaras, ’Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin within the 
Reach of the IMF’ (2016) 14 (1) Chicago Journal of International Law 377–407. 
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significant representative), or determining its legal nature.5 Today, there 
is still no clear legal definition of this innovative phenomenon. The 
question is to what extent an extremely volatile phenomenon that 
undergoes constant transformations can be regulated at all, and to what 
extent the right can race with the dynamics of cryptocurrency: there is 
even Bitcoin 2.0. (just like b-money or bit gold, etc.), and at the time of 
writing this, the project Libra by agile Facebook has already emerged.
6
 
A key problem that has inspired this research is the fact that different 
countries of the world define cryptocurrencies differently. Definition of 
the notion and, therefore, the legal nature of cryptocurrency could 
reduce uncertainty; thus, it is a clear, predictable and comprehensive 
way to start a debate on how to regulate this new phenomenon related 
to the development of the internet and technology. 
Analysis of the existing regulations and theoretical considerations of 
the issue relating to the definition of the cryptocurrency term have 
revealed two perceptions of the concept and legal nature of 
cryptocurrencies, especially the bitcoin. One perception tries to link 
cryptocurrencies with money, and the other tries to designate 
cryptocurrencies as a good, that is, “virtual” asset (good).Our attempt, in 
this paper, is to analyze both aspects which tend to define the term of 
cryptocurrency in different ways, thus enabling the development of 
regulations that would somehow regulate this area. 
2.  Perceiving cryptocurrencies as money 
The first concept that relates cryptocurrencies, i.e. bitcoin, to the 
concept of money faces at least two problems. First, even when 
cryptocurrencies are accepted as money, legislations define them 
differently. Second, there is no single, completely satisfactory theory in 
 
5 M. Lambooij, ’Retails Directly Accepting Bitcoins: Tricky Tax Issues’ (2014) (3) 
Journal of Derivatives and Financial Instruments 138-144.; J. Glavanits – P. B. Király: A 
blockchain-technológia alkalmazásának jogi előkérdései: a fogalmi keretek 
pontosításának szükségessége: Jog-Állam-Politika, 2018/3., 173-183. 
6 Zsolt Bujtár: Central Bank Issued Digital Currencies: is it a Solution or a problem. 
In: J. Glavanits – B. Horváthy – L. Knapp (eds.): EU Business Law and Digital 
Revolution: Selected Studies from the New Fields of Technology. Széchenyi István 
University, Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Department of 
International and European Law, Győr, 2019, 71–72. 
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economic or legal theory about what money is, which requires an 
analysis of the notion of money and its characteristics or functions, and 
a comparison with the functions that cryptocurrencies have as 
innovative “money”.  
The fact that the legislation defines cryptocurrency in different ways 
even when it is regarded as money confirms the analysis of valid 
regulation. Thus cryptocurrency is defined as: digital currency (Argentina, 
Thailand and Australia), crypto-token (Germany), payment token 
(Switzerland), cyber currency (Italy and Lebanon), electronic currency 
(Canada, Colombia and Lebanon).7   
 Generally speaking, when considering the concept of money as a 
legal category, there is a distinction in the literature between the views 
of those who represent the so-called state theory of money and those 
who support the social theory of money. The representatives of the state 
theory of money put the role of the state at the forefront which, as the 
bearer of monetary sovereignty, enjoys a legal monopoly in issuing 
money. In contrast to the state theory, the representatives of social 
theory believe that public opinion is crucial in determining the concept of 
money.8 A general view of the theoretical conception of money indicates 
a completely different approach to its determination. Hence, the 
attempts to define cryptocurrencies as money and describe their 
characteristics with the characteristics of real, actual money give 
different results. 
In order to overcome the problem of different perceptions of money, 
it is much easier to rely on the generally accepted notion that certain 
conditions must be fulfilled in order for certain currencies to be 
considered money. There are different economic and legal conditions 
that a particular currency must satisfy in order to be considered money. 
Classical economic theories define money by its functions. Money in the 
classical sense of the word must be: 1. Medium of exchange, 2. Unit of 
measurement, and 3. Serve to preserve the value. 
The question is whether cryptocurrencies, i.e. bitcion as its 
representative, can be defined as money, or more precisely, whether it 
 
7 The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center, ’Regulation of 
Cryptocurrency Around the World’ (2018) < 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/cryptocurrency-world-survey.pdf> 
8 M. Dimitrijević, ’Electronic money in modern monetary law’ (2018) Collection of 
papers of Faculty of Law, Niš 2018/81 223. 
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possesses some of the characteristics of money. Therefore, we will 
analyze all three characteristics of money accepted in classical theory 
and compare them with the characteristics of cryptocurrencies.  
2.1. Money as a medium of exchange 
Cryptocurrencies are decentralized and unlike real (fiat) money, they 
are not eligible to be considered money. In contrast to money, there is 
no central government (central bank) that controls the issuance of 
cryptocurrencies nor does it determine their intrinsic value. In order to 
make a comparative review and determine whether cryptocurrencies 
may or may not be regulated as money, we will consider some solutions 
from different laws. 
We should start with the European Union, where cryptocurrencies are 
not accepted as money.9  
The European Banking Authority, the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority) have issued a warning10 to consumers that cryptocurrencies 
are risky and linked to the possibility of cybercrime, as specific 
cryptocurrency law has not yet been enacted. This warning depicts the 
attitude of these financial organizations that they do not consider 
cryptocurrencies to be money, but it also indicates that this innovative 
phenomenon has not been fully understood by the official authorities. 
Regardless of this misconception, it is commendable that these financial 
institutions still accept the existence of cryptocurrencies and the need to 
protect the users against possible risks. 
Therefore, all three organizations have tried to define the legal nature 
of cryptocurrency. The European Parliament's Report on Cryptocurrency 
11 states that it is a “currently existing and accessible cryptographic 
digital presentation of value that is not controlled or guaranteed by the 
 
9  European Central Bank defines a VC as a “type of unregulated, digital money, 
which is issued and usually controlled by its developers, and used and accepted among 
the members of a specific virtual community” (European Central Bank, 2012) 14. 
10 <https://eba.europa.eu/-/esas-warn-consumers-of-risks-in-buying-virtual-
currencies> related warning by ESMA <https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-
news/esma-news/esas-warnconsumers-risks-in-buying-virtual-currencies> accessed 11 
February 2018. 
11 Marek Dabrowski and Lukasz Janikowski, ’Virtual currencies and central bank 
monetary policy: challenges ahead’ (July 2018). 
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central bank or a public authority and that it does not have legal 
currency or money.” 
The view that cryptocurrencies cannot be considered money was also 
accepted by Australia. Cryptocurrencies are regulated by tax regulations 
according to which tax authorities do not accept this innovative 
phenomenon as money because ATO12 does not see cryptocurrencies as 
either money or foreign currency.13 
China's central bank, the National Bank of China (PBOC), has been 
conducting digital currency research for three years now and it has 
founded the Digital Money Institute within its National Bank (PBOC.) 
Zhou Ksiaochuan, the PBOC governor at that time, was working on the 
regulatory status of virtual currencies when, at a press conference held 
during the annual session of the National Congress of Nations in March 
2018 he stepped down. According to Zhou, Chinese regulators do not 
recognize virtual currencies like bitcoin as a means of payment in retail 
such as paper money, coins or credit cards. The banking system does 
not accept any existing virtual currency nor will it provide any 
corresponding services, he said.14 
The United States generally do not accept cryptocurrencies as 
money. The US Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FinCEN) does not recognize cryptocurrency as a “real currency” 
(legal tender), but recognizes administrators and account exchangers 
that have been converted to government currencies as “cash service 
companies” (MSBs), which means that they are subject to FinCEN 
registration, reporting and recordkeeping rules for MSBs (FinCEN, 
2013)15. Later on, we will see that there are different definitions of 
cryptocurrencies within the United States, depending on the state, and 
that there is no uniform opinion on the definition of cryptocurrencies. 
 
12 Australian Tax Office. 
13 Australian Tax Office, ’Tax Treatment of Crypto-Currencies in Australia – 
Specifically Bitcoin’ (last updated 21 December 2017) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/General/Gen/Tax-treatment-of-crypto-currencies-in-Australia--
-specifically-bitcoin/> archived at <https://perma.cc/UFZ7-QSUG>. 
14 Xiaochuan Zhou, ’Future Regulation on Virtual Currency Will Be Dynamic, 
Imprudent Products Shall Be Stopped for Now’ (Xinhuanet, 1 March 2018) 
<http://www.xinhuanet.com/finance/2018-03/10/c_129826604.htm> (in Chinese), 
archived at <https://perma.cc/2CW7-8F2T>. 
15 FinCEN, ’Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, 
Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies’ (2013). 
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In contrast to the above regulations, Japan has accepted 
cryptocurrencies as a legitimate means of payment. Namely, the Law on 
Payment Services of April 201716 legalized the existence of 
cryptocurrency exchange offices. The amended Law on Payment 
Operations provided a definition of cryptocurrency17. This implies that 
cryptocurrencies in Japan are given one of the characteristics of money, 
such as a legitimate means of payment without the status of money in 
the classical concept, and it is determined as the value of the property. 
Despite the fact that regulations and law do not see cryptocurrencies 
as money, they still have acquired characteristics of an exchange 
medium in everyday life. We read daily news articles and see various 
other proofs that cryptocurrencies, particularly the bitcoin, are used as a 
means of exchange. Most software and hardware companies have 
developed applications where services and goods can be paid in 
cryptocurrencies, and these companies also provide services that allow 
investors to invest in this currency.18 
According to David Yermack,19 real evidence of cryptocurrencies 
being a medium of exchange can be obtained from data existing in the 
universal ledger of bitcoin transactions. Most of these transactions are 
between speculative investors but about 26,000 of bitcoin transactions 
involve the purchase and sale of food or merchandise. It should certainly 
be noted that in a world with around 7 billion consumers, bitcoin is used 
for exchange purposes in an insignificant percentage when compared to 
the total number of transactions. Even though the percentage of bitcoin 
 
16 Payment Services  Act No. 59 of 2009, as amended by Act No. 62 of 2016. 
17 Payment Services Act art. 2, para. 5 defines cryptocurrency as property value 
that can be used as means of payment, purchase, rental, or provision of services by all 
persons, which can be bought or sold to anyone and transferred by electronic data 
processing system; or - property value that can be exchanged with anyone for higher 
property value and can be transferred by electronic data processing system. 
18 The most widely cited ranking of the top bitcoin merchants appears to be “The 
Bitcoin Ladder,” https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Bitcoin_Ladder, but it is badly out of date, as 
it ranks the defunct and notorious Mt. Gox and Silk Road as the top two worldwide 
merchants. 
19 David Yermack, ’Is Bitcoin a Real Currency? An Economic Appraisal’ (2013) 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 19747 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w19747> 9-10. 
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used for exchange is small relative to participation in general exchange, 
its presence is obvious and it is gaining an upward trend.20 
Cryptocurrencies, therefore, serve as a medium of exchange, since 
they allow individuals to pay directly for goods or services with no 
commission for the transactions desired. As we noted in the previous 
presentation, they are not legal tender, but due to the presence of this 
innovative technology and its implementation, it would be more accurate 
to define cryptocurrency as a means of exchange rather than a means of 
payment. 
This is supported by the hypothesis from the beginning that 
cryptocurrencies are not money but have one of its characteristics: they 
serve as a medium of exchange.  In the EU, cryptocurrencies are not 
designated as money but are recognized as a medium of exchange. The 
European Central Bank stated: “For the sake of reminder, the definition 
of virtual currencies according to AMLD521 is as follows: ’a digital 
representation of value not issued or guaranteed by a central bank or 
public authority is not necessarily linked to a legal currency and does not 
have legal status of a currency or money, but they are accepted by 
 
20 The co-founder of bitcoin payment processor BitPay estimated the number of 
worldwide businesses at 26,000 in a separate interview given contemporaneously. See 
<http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/17/smallbusiness/bitcoin-bitpay>. However, it is 
widely understood that most of these transactions involve transfers between 
speculative investors, and only a minority are used for purchases of goods and 
services.  For instance, Fred Ersham, co-founder of Coinbase, the leading digital wallet 
service, estimated in the interview in March 2014 that 80% of activity on his site was 
related to speculation, down from perhaps 95% a year earlier (Goldman Sachs, 2014).  
If we take this estimate as correct, then perhaps 15,000 bitcoin transactions per day 
involve the purchase of a product or service from a merchant.  In a world with 
7,000,000,000 consumers, most of whom make multiple economic transactions each 
day, bitcoin appears to have an extraordinarily negligible market presence. Ersham 
further states in his interview that 24,000 merchants are registered with Coinbase. 
21 In the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD5), “virtual currencies” means 
a digital representation of value that is not issued or guaranteed by a central bank or a 
public authority, is not necessarily attached to a legally established currency and does 
not possess a legal status of currency or money, but is accepted by natural or legal 
persons as a means of exchange and can be transferred, stored and traded 
electronically. 
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individuals or legal entities as a medium of exchange, and they can be 
transferred, stored and traded electronically’.”22 
2.2. Money as a unit of value measurement and cryptocurrencies  
Unlike the previously analyzed function of money as a medium of 
exchange, where there is possibility for cryptocurrencies to be accepted 
as a specific medium of exchange, linking cryptocurrencies to the 
characteristic of money as a unit of measurement shows a number of 
weaknesses. There are several reasons that indicate that this feature 
represents a major weakness of cryptocurrency. In order for a currency 
(digital or real) to have this characteristic, and to be considered a unit of 
measurement, it must be able to determine its value in an easy and 
simple way with respect to other world currencies. It is highly debatable 
whether cryptocurrency, or bitcoin, fulfills this requirement. Most authors 
(Perkins, Cviter, Yermack) find that bitcoin has been facing numerous 
problems in the course of becoming a unit of measurement. 
The first problem stems from its extreme instability. Its value against 
other currencies changes on a daily basis, every minute. We can easily 
check this feature by analyzing the change in the bitcoin value compared 
to dollar over the course of a day.23 Accepting the bitcoin as a unit of 
measurement would be extremely expensive and impractical because of 
its extreme volatility. 
The second problem arises from the “technical” definition of bitcoin 
as it is expressed with a value having at least 4 decimals. This creates 
great confusion and confusion among traders, and accepting bitcoin as 
 
22 Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 
May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and 
amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU (Text with EEA relevance) [2013] 
OJ L156/43. 
23 Yermack (n 19) 14: “As a result, many websites havetaken to relying upon 
unwieldy price aggregations, such as the average bitcoin price over several exchanges 
over the past 24 hours, but these aggregates do not indicate to merchants and 
consumers the true cost of procuring or selling a bitcoin at the present time.”  
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a unit of measurement under these conditions would be a high cost of 
calculating bitcoin in other currencies.24 
Therefore, we can conclude that cryptocurrencies do not qualify for 
this feature of money, and this is another reason why they should not be 
defined as money. 
2.3. Money as means of value preservation and cryptocurrencies 
When considering this characteristic of money and its comparison 
with cryptocurrencies, the main question that arises is: Are 
cryptocurrencies stable and reliable enough to measure other values, or 
can they represent a measure of value that could serve as a means of 
preservation of value? 
In the course of our analysis of money and its characteristic of being 
a means of preservation of value, the first thing to note is that the value 
of real money and its stability are controlled, but this control and 
maintenance of stability is subject to political and other influences. 
Unlike real money, cryptocurrencies are not subject to these influences, 
thus, it could be easily concluded that cryptocurrencies, free from 
political and other known influences, could have the characteristic of 
preserving values. This obviously strongly affects the value of already 
existing cryptocurrencies.  
In addition, as technology and its development affect the stability of 
cryptocurrencies, personal relationship of an individual and his/her 
prediction and trust in particular cryptocurrencies are extremely 
important for their value. Thus, cryptocurrencies are completely unstable 
and unpredictable for value preservation which is why they could not 
satisfy the necessary conditions to be considered as a means of value 
preservation. 
This brief analysis leads to a conclusion that cryptocurrencies could 
not be considered money; however, they are used as a medium of 
exchange in reality. In doing so, they are eligible to share only one 
characteristic of money and that is to serve as a medium of exchange. 
Yet, they cannot be categorized and defined as money. 
 
24 ibid. For instance, a visit to one online food retailer yields offers of a jar of salsa 
for 0.01694 BTC, chocolate bars for 0.00529 BTC, and a tea variety pack for 0.05255 
BTC.  
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3.  Electronic money and an attempt to identify it as cryptocurrency 
Electronic money has enabled virtual online payments. This money is 
not physically present but allows for easy transfer to electronic accounts 
and can be used for various purposes. Hence the idea of defining 
cryptocurrencies as electronic money. 
 Electronic money and cryptocurrencies are related to the internet 
and new, technological access to money, which is a similarity between 
them, but they can still not be identified based on that. First of all, the 
purpose of cryptocurrencies is much broader than that of issuing 
electronic money. Electronic money is considered to be merely a digital 
substitute for traditional currency banknotes and coins. Therefore, the 
legal definition given by the Japanese (Sıddık-Yurtçiçek)25  is necessary 
to realize the difference between electronic money and cryptocurrency. 
According to the author: “Electronic money is a digitalized monetary 
obligation, and therefore the definition of electronic money in the 
modern monetary literature is the one where electronic money is viewed 
as a set of information transmitted by issuing an electromagnetic 
amount based on a contractual obligation with an electronic currency 
issuer in order to fulfill a monetary obligation defined by a specific 
contract. ”  
Therefore, there must be a legal basis for issuance and use of 
electronic money. This can be found in laws, particularly those on the 
central bank, and laws governing commercial banks. Furthermore, it 
implies that electronic money is just another form or new functional 
application of real money. It is therefore under the control of the central 
government and subject to all regulations as cash is. Also, possible risks 
that electronic money is exposed to, as well as its online use and 
technological innovations require additional regulations by the state in 
order to protect consumers and ensure their safety in electronic 
transactions. Cryptocurrencies are not subject to these rules and they 
cannot be referred to as electronic money. 
 
25 M. Sıddık-Yurtçiçek, ’Тhe Legal Nature of Electronic Money and the Effects of the 
EU Regulations Concerning the Electronic Money Market’ (2013) (4) Law & Justice 
Review 276-321. 
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Electronic Money Directive 26  was adopted at EU level, but it is 
evident that the aim was not to include and regulate cryptocurrencies as 
it does not consider them electronic money. Unlike electronic money, 
cryptocurrencies are independent of the official national currencies and 
of their control and valuation. 
According to the ECB, which made clear distinction from the 
possibility of considering cryptocurrencies as electronic money, 
estimated in its special publication 27 that bitcoin could not meet all the 
necessary conditions in order to be considered electronic money. It gives 
the definition of electronic money.28 Furthermore, the ECB states that 
the inability to identify electronic money with cryptocurrencies lies 
primarily in the volatile value of cryptocurrencies. The value of 
cryptocurrencies changes, as it is usually based on its own supply and 
demand. Monetary authority has no influence on that which means that 
the control over cryptocurrency is left to its issuer, which is usually a non-
profit organization. In case of electronic money transactions, data on 
transfers and users are recorded while transactions with 
cryptocurrencies have anonymity as one of their important 
characteristics. 
3.1. Summary of views on cryptocurrency regarded as money 
We could say that no country in the world has accepted or recognized 
cryptocurrency as money. They are not recognized, legitimate means of 
payment because each country has its own currency that has the status 
of a legal tender. This implies that cryptocurrency cannot be accepted as 
a foreign currency either. Nevertheless, cryptocurrencies are in reality 
used as a medium of exchange for various goods and services, so they 
 
26 Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
September 2009 on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business 
of electronic money institutions amending Directives 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC 
and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC (Text with EEA relevance) [2009] OJ L 267/7. 
27 European Central Bank, ’Report on Virtual Currency Schemes’ (October 2012) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf> 
10. 
28 Electronic money is broadly defined as an electronic store of monetary value on 
a technical device that may be widely used for making payments to undertakings other 
than the issuer without necessarily involving bank accounts in the transaction, but 
acting as a prepaid bearer instrument. 
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could provisionally be considered as a medium of exchange. 
Conditionality stems from its instability and limitation so, for now, we can 
consider it a latent and sometimes speculative medium of exchange. 
4. Cryptocurrency as an asset– attempts to define it 
 Another understanding of cryptocurrencies and their legal 
qualification tends to qualify these currencies as an asset.29 This 
qualification arose from the government's need to protect itself against 
tax evasion and the practice of money laundering. Thus, determination 
of cryptocurrency as an asset originates in the acts issued by the 
competent tax authorities or special anti-money laundering bodies. We 
can also find cryptocurrencies qualified as asset in the general institutes 
of legal science and the concepts of property. 
Property rights are part of personal right that governs subjective 
rights, so the property is a set of subjective property rights. These are the 
rights with their own monetary expression or which relate to an asset 
that can be expressed in monetary terms. Recent case law has sought to 
enable the categorization of rights as property in cases where those 
rights have acquired economic value and have shown that they are 
subject to transfer or trade. The hypothesis, therefore, is that 
cryptocurrency units, which have undoubtedly shown that they have an 
economic value and great transfer potential  compared to other market 
participants and are sufficiently developed to be freely tradable, can be 
categorized as a type of property or asset by common law. However, this 
viewpoint is not generally agreed on and the categorization of 
cryptocurrencies as assets (usually virtual) in regulations that accept it 
as a type of property is made depending on the number of users as well 
as the scope and purpose that cryptocurrencies are used for. Namely, if 
cryptocurrencies are used as a means of investment on a larger scale, 
this leads to a conclusion that they represent property, and if they are 
predominantly used for buying and selling then they are considered as 
money. 
When it comes to accepting cryptocurrencies as a property, there are 
different interpretations and perceptions about them as assets. We will 
 
29 Joanna Perkins and Jennifer Enwezor, ’The legal aspect of virtual  currencies’ 
(2016) Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 203. 
102 Sonja Bunčić – Alpar Lošonc – Andrea Ivanišević 
explain some of these interpretations in more detail, especially 
cryptocurrencies as a financial instrument, a commodity or property, and 
a security. 
4.1. Cryptocurrency as a financial instrument 
Commodity production and credit system dictate markets to 
continuously create different instruments by which they register, transfer 
and realize monetary obligations from commodity turnover, holding 
money, credit, risk transfer from one subject to another, investments 
and the like. Investment in these instruments creates financial assets 
and not real assets. It is based on the principle that when someone buys 
an investment or capital value, that is, when they make investments, 
they buy the rights to the expected return. The connection between real 
and financial assets is achieved through financial markets, which is why 
these instruments are called financial instruments.30 
Cryptocurrencies are widely used as an investment asset31 and 
hence the desire of some regulators to refer to them as a financial 
instruments. However, there are reasons for rejection of this view. The 
definition of the term financial instrument is a matter of interest for both 
economic and legal science. Economic theory defines financial 
instruments based on the character and function of various financial 
instruments as an expression of the mobilization of monetary liabilities 
and receivables, starting from their basic function of money, which they 
express, as well as the nature of the liabilities they represent. Legal 
determination of financial instruments focuses on the enumeration 
system 32 while other legislation provide the definition of the basic types 
 
30 Sonja Bunčić, Banking and stock market right, Poslovni biro SB, Novi Sad, 2012., 
334. 
31 However, it is widely understood that most of these transactions involve 
transfers between speculative investors, and only a minority are used for purchases of 
goods and services.  For instance, Fred Ersham, co-founder of Coinbase, the leading 
digital wallet service, estimated in a March 2014 interview that 80% of activity on his 
site was related to speculation, down from perhaps 95% a year earlier (Goldman 
Sachs, 2014).   
32 USA Law on Securities from 1933 gives enumeration of financial instruments. 
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of financial instruments in relation to their characteristics,33 and 
individual legislation give a general definition of financial instruments 34.  
The given definitions imply that a financial instrument can also a 
financial derivative such as currency, commodity, security and various 
other statistical indicators, indices and percentages. So, if 
cryptocurrencies cannot be regarded as commodity or securities, they 
cannot be categorized as financial derivatives nor will they be treated as 
financial instruments.35 
For the time being, most states take the view that cryptocurrencies 
cannot be financial instruments, but are specific and yet undefined 
“virtual” assets. The idea of “virtuality” and identification of bitcoin as a 
virtual asset helps a bit in resolving the situation: there is a virtual 
dimension even with the standard form of money. Namely, we know that 
the present form of money is fiat-money and this does not rely on 
physical matter which destroys the classic maxim, ex nihilo nihil fit. 
Monetary theory has long been pointing out that money is created by 
banks, that is, financial intermediations, and that they are creative in the 
sense of creating out of nothing. This is the phenomenon of “credit 
money”.36 Also, it is interesting that bitcoin proponents are constantly 
invoking the material determination of bitcoin, that is, they want to go 
beyond the purely virtual image of bitcoin using phrases such as “digital 
metallism”, or “one key aspect of Bitcoin's appeal to its advocates and 
supporters qua money - and an important reason for its rising price up 
until recently - is that the currency effectively mimics the properties of 
gold in virtual form”.37 This means that bitcoin proponents want to exit 
the virtual and find a “non-virtual” medium. 
4.2. Cryptocurrencies as commodity or property 
 
33 In England, Financial  Services Act  from 1986  lists instruments and defines 
their characteristics. 
34 Slovenian Law specifies financial instruments as securities issued in a series. 
See at ebrd.com/downloads/legal/securities/slovfi.pdf 
35 Irina  Cvetkova, ’Cryptocurrencies Legal Regulation’ (2018) V (2) BRICS Law 
Journal 135. 
36 M. Aglietta and A. Orléan (eds.), La monnaie souveraine (Odile Jacob 1998) 
37 Nigel Dodd, ’The Social Life of Bitcoin’ (2017) Theory, Culture & Society 1–22, 8. 
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Commodity can be defined as tangible or intangible object with some 
economic value. Some legislation, especially the Anglo-Saxon one, have 
tried to define cryptocurrencies as commodities or even property for 
their specific characteristics (the possibility of attaching economic 
value).  
So, in 2014, ATO38 came to decision that bitcoin could not be 
considered a foreign currency, which we discussed earlier in more detail, 
but a means of exchange (barter).39 As bitcoin is neither money nor a 
foreign currency, the ATO has argued that transactions performed by 
cryptocurrencies are no different than exchange operations, just like the 
exchange of goods, so they should be treated as such, from a tax-legal 
aspect. This is an attempt to indirectly treat cryptocurrencies based on 
their purpose, which is the exchange of goods, and to put taxes on them 
accordingly. Different qualifications of cryptocurrencies as money, 
commodity, property or financial instruments indicate that each country 
aims at adopting its own regulations in order to establish control over 
the operations or results of operations with cryptocurrencies.40 
  In the US, depending on the country or institution, there are 
different opinions about how cryptocurrencies should be understood. 
The Commodities Futures Trading Commission thought that 
cryptocurrencies should be viewed as commodities. In 2014, the CFTC 
had its first attempt to categorize bitcoin and other types of 
cryptocurrency under the term commodity as defined under Commodity 
Exchange Act 7 U.S.C. 1-27.41 On the other hand, for tax purposes, the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) categorized cryptocurrencies as property 
 
38 Australian Taxation Office. 
39 Modern antropology believes that barter is rather a myth than a real instrument 
from history,  
40 ’New IRS Notice Confirms Tax Treatment of Bitcoins as Property and not 
Currency - Expected To Increase Popularity for Self-Directed IRAs, According to IRA 
Financial Group’ (Cision PrWeb, 25 March 2014) 
<http://www.prweb.com/releases/bitcoins-self-directed-/ira-taxproperty-
currency/prweb11704323.htm> accessed 18 June 2018. 
41 See In the Matter of: Coinflip, Inc., d/b/a Derivabit, and Francisco Riordan, CFTC 
Docket No. 15-29 
<http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalplea
ding/enfcoinfliprorder09172015.pdf> 
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or capital asset. 42 This is, once again, the confirmation of our view that 
the regulator defines  cryptocurrencies only in relation to the interest 
that individual control bodies might gain from the area (payment, 
investment, savings) in which the cryptocurrencies are most used.    
At the heart of the many regulatory issues surrounding virtual 
currencies is the question of how to classify this new and allegedly 
devastating technology into traditional property and personal rights 
developed by law. Lord Wilberforce: “… Before any right or interest can 
be categorized as property or right affecting property, it must be defined, 
recognized by third parties, capable of being accepted by third parties 
and of a degree of permanence or stability”. 43 Cryptocurrencies can 
hardly meet these conditions, especially to be recognized and accepted 
by third parties, to have some degree of stability or durability, and to be 
defined is the condition least possible to fulfill. Recognition of 
cryptocurrencies as a commodity or property depends on further 
development of technology when creation of “virtual asset” could be a 
new category of assets with specific characteristics. 
4.3. Cryptocurrencies as securities  
Whether cryptocurrencies are securities is a very controversial 
question. The general definition of a security is that it is a document 
obliging its issuer to fulfill the obligation recorded on that document by 
its rightful holder. It is necessary, therefore, that we have the security 
itself, the license for its issuance, and that it obliges the issuer to fulfill 
the stated obligations therein.  
The idea to address this issue arose from the emergence of “ICO” 
(Initial Coin Offering) that issues tokens. A token is a unit of value issued 
by a private organization in a blockchain system. Investigating the 
situation in the case of DAO blockchain, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of the United States of America stated that ICO should be 
 
42  At the heart of many of the regulatory questions which surround virtual 
currencies is the question of how to allocate this new and, allegedly, disruptive 
technology to the traditional categories of property and personal rights developed by 
the common law. 
43 Perkins and Enwezor (n 29) 570. 
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considered a securities issue, regardless of the consequences that the 
investor may have. 44   
On the other hand, there are a number of opponents  45 of this view 
who emphasize that this is not a matter of security issuance and that it 
is not an “IPO” or an initial public offering of stocks, but that they are 
specific projects. They contain no obligation in terms of rights or money. 
Projects offer some kind of exchange and have nothing in common with 
securities except the idea of financing themselves by offering investors 
their virtual currency in exchange for most typically - nothing. 
In addition, the issuance of cryptocurrency is decentralized and does 
not meet the concept of issuing securities. Also, any payment system 
participant can be the issuer because the transaction creates a new 
block in the chain of transactions. Therefore, there is not a single 
element that could categorize cryptocurrencies as securities. 
4.4. Summary of views on cryptocurrencies regarded as property 
Recognizing the new reality of the digital world has led to acceptance 
of the extension of traditional legal understanding of property. Hence the 
desire to have a digital form of cryptocurrency values accepted as a 
possible specific property as they enable the cryptocurrency holders to 
electronically possess them and make mutual payments and exchange 
virtual values. It should be noted that the value of this specific asset is 
based on the belief of its holders that its virtual, digital form has a real 
value. Thus, in today's world, some tax authorities, in an effort to 
establish control over cryptocurrencies and include them in their tax 
portfolio, have accepted that there is an argument for accepting 
cryptocurrency as a new form of property.  
According to previous observations on cryptocurrency definition, we 
can conclude that the dominant view is that cryptocurrency is a specific 
type of property in a digital form which its owners can hold or exchange 
electronically, and use it to make payments in accordance with the belief 
 
44 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, ’SEC Issues Investigative Report 
Concluding DAO Tokens, a Digital Asset, Were Securities: U.S. Securities Laws May 
Apply to Offers, Sales, and Trading of Interests in Virtual Organizations’ (25 July 2017) 
<https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-131> 18 June 2019. 
45 Cvetkova (n 35) 136. 
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that this virtual form has a real value. This conclusion is predominantly 
based on the 2014 EBA Opinion on cryptocurrency.46 
5.  Concluding considerations 
Analysis of different definitions of cryptocurrency should, at least to 
some extent, provide answers to the questions: Is cryptocurrency a 
replacement for a classic coin? Is it a specific property? What is its 
future or is it just a temporary “optimism trade”? 47 
Cryptocurrencies are decentralized and innovative system that 
functions as an individual system and develops without a supervisory 
central authority. At the same time, critics point to the hidden elements 
and consequences of cryptocurrencies; namely, the fact that they have, 
despite promises, brought new forms of centralization, as well as the 
forms of distribution that do not suit the libertarian-anarchist projections 
of the founders. The same critics point out that those who engaged in 
cryptocurrency trading and were offered to “isolate” themselves from the 
dominant capitalist relations failed in this (bitcoin as the realization of 
“anti-system-like” orientation, “counterpower”, “horizontalism” instead 
of verticalism,48 transformation of the relation between public and 
private spheres).  
 Since 2008, we have witnessed the emergence of the first 
cryptocurrency, the Bitcion, which had its ups and downs and was the 
matrix for the creation of many other cryptocurrencies. There was loud 
criticism and deep concern that this system would affect existing 
economic and monetary stability, and would be used for various criminal 
activities (money laundering, terrorist financing, or tax evasion, etc.). 
Although the Bank of Canada suggested that small, independent 
payment systems should not be too controlled and regulated, as they are 
certainly not too big a threat to the Canadian financial system (George-
 
46<https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/657547/EBA-Op-2014- 
08+Opinion+on+Virtual+Currencies> 
47 M. Babić, „Kriptovalute-računalna provokacija , monetarno-finansijska oda  ili 
budućnost“(2018) (1) Pravni  život , p.p. 430. 
48 Dodd (n 37) 9. 
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Cosh, 2014), 49 one should be very careful. This is one of the reasons 
that countries with smaller and less attractive financial markets do not 
regulate cryptocurrencies but have adopted a “watch and wait” 
strategy.
50
 After all, the contradictory reactions of the central banks 
regarding the already mentioned Libra are also indicative. The case of 
Ross Ulbricht and Silk Raod also point to a danger 51 which proves the 
inherently existing criminal dimension of cryptocurrencies. Besides, the 
cryptocurrencies have not proven to be resistant to excessive 
speculations (at least not in 2011 and 2017). 
A review of the existing regulations shows that the definition of 
cryptocurrencies is something that only countries with developed 
markets have dealt with. There is a disagreement on the definition of 
cryptocurrencies. We have presented different perceptions of 
cryptocurrency as money, digital money, a medium of exchange. Others, 
however, have accepted to define cryptocurrency as a good or even 
some kind of financial property only for tax purposes. Some of the above 
regulations are formal, while in some cases the regulations are made by 
simply accepting the operations with cryptocurrencies. 52 We believe that 
these differences in the definition of cryptocurrency arise because the 
states tend to control and regulate the operations involving 
cryptocurrencies that are dominant on their market. This means that if 
cryptocurrencies are used as an investment instrument, then they will be 
designated as a type of financial property, and if used for the purchase 
and sale of goods and services, then they are defined as money and the 
like. 
Technological development and operations with cryptocurrencies will 
continue to evolve, and those countries that have so far ignored or even 
banned them will not be able to remain indifferent and isolated from the 
spread of this global phenomenon. The future development of 
 
49 D. George-Cosh, ’Canada says bitcoin isn´t legal tender’ (16 January 2014) 
<https://blogs.wsj.com/canadarealtime/2014/01/16/canada-says-bitcoin-isnt-legal 
tender/?KEYWORDS=bitcoin>. 
50 J. Glavanits: Blockchain technology in the glance of consumer protection. In: R. 
Funta (ed): Počítačové právo, UI, ochrana údajov a najväčšie technologické trendy. 
Sládkovičovo, 2019., 17–28. 
51 <https://sr.wikipedia.org/srec/Put> 
52 Alexander Radivojević, ’Virtual currencies and regulations’ (2018) (29) Economic 
Ideas and practice 69.  
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cryptocurrencies will require their moving from the unregulated to the 
regulatory framework. Their designation as money or good will depend 
on technological development and the predominant purpose for which 
they will be used. It is important not to neglect the cryptocurrency 
phenomenon in relation to the analysis of the market. The purpose of 
creation of cryptocurrencies was a decentralized, liberal system versus 
controlled capitalism. A Citigroup analysis of bitcoin from 2017 found 
that “47 individuals held about 30%, another 900 held further 20%, the 
next 10,000 about 25% and another million about 20%.” No country on 
earth has such an unequal distribution of assets and wealth. Is this how 
the mask of a liberal, decentralized cryptocurrency project falls? 
The adoption of a single cryptocurrency concept is not yet realistic to 
expect today, primarily because of little knowledge about this innovative 
system and the difficulty in accepting and acknowledging its global 
strength and capabilities. Regulators should not only serve as a virtual 
currency exchange service in the denationalized world of 
cryptocurrencies, but they should also take on the role of a supervisor as 
agents of miners verifying electronic transactions, thereby enhancing 
consumers' security and confidence. Only then could they be sure that 
this whole system of cryptocurrencies will not become just “trading with 
optimism”.53 
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Abstract: The appearance of the virtual currencies raises several legal questions beside 
their economic nature and features. What can they be used for? Can they fulfil a real 
payment function like the traditional currencies? The very general question is whether 
virtual currencies (their issuance and/or usage) need to be regulated and if yes, how to 
regulate? Beside the general questions, there are also several particular issues, like 
among others payment of taxes, salaries, lending and borrowing in virtual currencies, 
the application of anti-money laundering regulations, and last but not least the 
difficulties caused in law-enforcement. This paper tries to collect those questions which 
are to be answered by legislators in the not too far future. 
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1.  Introductory remarks 
In the last couple of years, no single day could slip away without 
several news on the market and technology of the virtual currencies. It 
seems there is significant public interest towards the virtual currencies 
(VCs) comparable with the traditional or fiat currencies.  
Beside the remarkable enthusiasm, there are still several essential 
open questions to be raised and answered on the nature and operation 
of the VCs, which were fundamentally necessary for their everyday 
usage. There are several generic issues related to VCs like: 
-  Why should the VCs be regarded as real money? 
-  What factors influence their value? 
-  Do VCs need to be regulated? 
-  Can VCs be regulated? 
-  If yes, what elements and how to be regulated? 
-  Are VCs means of payments or are they financial instruments for 
investment services? 
-  Can VCs be real alternatives of the traditional currencies? 
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-  Can VCs take the place of the traditional currencies sometime in 
the future? 
Beside the general questions one can endeavour specific related 
topics like the usage of VCs in taxation, lending, savings, payment of 
salaries etc. 
Obviously both lists can be further extended. Hence before digging 
into the details, it is necessary to make clear some essentials.  
Firstly, one has to make clear that the VCs’ concept and their 
issuance is definitely different from electronic money, even if both 
operate in electronic environment and on basis of digital technology. VCs 
are different and independent from fiat currencies. Electronic money is 
issued against traditional money. VCs can be purchased or mined. The 
value and accounting of the VCs are independent from that currency 
from which the exchange has been happened. 
Currently, VCs are legally not regulated, they are digital moneys 
based on the internet, mainly but not exclusively on the blockchain and 
the distributed ledger technology. Issuers or creators of the VCs are not 
central banks entitled to issue banknotes and coins on behalf on the 
state. Creators are developer groups without any central authority. Users 
of the VCs are members of internet’s growing virtual community. 
According to the definition used by the European Banking Authority 
VCs are a digital representation of value that is neither issued by a 
central bank or a public authority, nor necessarily attached to a fiat 
currency, but is accepted by natural or legal persons as a means of 
payment, and can be transferred, stored or traded electronically. The 
main actors are users, exchanges, trade platforms, inventors, and e-
wallet providers1. European Central Bank uses a very similar definition in 
its report on virtual currencies. ECB highlights that key actors of the VCs 
are neither regulated nor supervised and users do not benefit from legal 
protection such as redeem ability or a deposit guaranty scheme, and are 
more exposed to the various risks that regulation usually mitigates.2 
Nowadays, there are more than 2450 VCs are existing, however this 
number can change at any time, due to the unregulated and 
 
1 European Banking Authority, ’EBA Opinion on ‘virtual currencies’’ (4 July 2014) 
EBA/Op/2014/08.  
2 European Central Bank, ’Virtual Currency Schemes – further analysis’ (February 
2015) 
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uncontrolled creation and issuance of them. Practically, anyone can 
create his/her own VC. In August 2019, the market capitalization of the 
VCs was around USD 278 bn equivalent to HUF 80 trillion or Hungary’s 2 
years’ GDP. Bitcoin’s share of the whole market is around 68%3. The 
number and market of the VCs are constantly growing. Since beginning 
of 2018 the number of the VCs has grown by 1000. In 2017 the number 
of VC users were estimated between 2.9 and 5.8 million users4. In 2019 
one can observe 300.000 to 450.000 VC transactions daily5. 
The novelty and even appearance of virtual currencies – in most 
cases, but not exclusively – is based on the development and existence 
of the blockchain technology. This technology, unlike a traditional 
centralized monetary system, operates in a decentralized IT system, in 
other words in a shared database. Without analysing its details, I would 
only emphasize here one main characteristic of this system, namely 
compared it to the computational operations performed on the 
traditional IT systems where the operations can be subsequently 
modified, it is not possible in the blockchain, where the system is 
unbreakable (until no one have 50%+1 of computers attached to the 
system). This feature undoubtedly promotes the use of technology in 
payment transactions. The possibility of creating a non-manipulatable 
and – within the system – cheaper payment system6 through the virtual 
currencies is undoubtedly an important positive factor. 
For the usage of VCs as means of payment it is necessary to have a 
limited number available of them. (However, if we consider that the 
number of virtual currencies cannot be restricted, anyone can create a 
new one, this allegation is less likely to be in place). Further advantage is 
the faster transaction implementation compared to traditional payment 
systems, transaction costs are cheaper and the system is more secure 
than a traditional payment system due to its non-centralized nature. 
 
3 See data on <coinmarketcap.com>. 
4 Garrick Hileman and Michael Rauchs, ’Global Cryptocurrency Benchmark Study 2017’ 
(University of Cambridge) 10. 
5 Source of the figures: <www.blockchain.com>. 
6 The cheapness is to be understand within the system only, because commission fees 
are usually added to the exchange operations between traditional and virtual 
currencies and there are certain differences between bid and sell rates either. 
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A question emerges, however, whether VCs can be real alternatives 
to the traditional ones issued by the central banks?
7
 A further question is 
how to classify them: as means of payment or investment, or both, or 
none of them? And furthermore, whether it is necessary to regulate their 
operation and usage? 
Any payment system can operate only in case of the users – a whole 
society – trust in the proper operation of the monetary system – namely 
in the state and the central bank (in its monetary policy, flexibility and 
ability to make proper decision when needed) and also in the 
commercial banks (backed by the prudential regulations, the central 
banks, the supervisory authorities and the deposit guarantee schemes) 
– since this is one of the core elements of the economy, the trade, the 
everyday life. The appearance of the VCs relates to the question of this 
trust in the traditional monetary system, or the attenuation of it – 
especially at the time and after the last financial crisis. The trust has 
weakened in the traditional monetary system and became stronger in 
unknown developers and officially uncertified IT systems…. 
2.  Can VCs become real money of everyday usage? 
To approach this question from theoretical side, it worth to analyse 
whether VCs will ever be able to reach a level of development when they 
can work as real money by looking at the concept and functions of 
money itself. András Vígvári pointed out that the emergence of money 
was closely linked to the increasing degree of division of labour and 
specialization: money emerged when the exchange of labour activities 
and products was replaced by the exchange of activities’ outcomes8.  
Money first appeared in the form of commodity money. The ancient 
Greeks distinguished three main functions of money: means of counting, 
means of exchange, and reserve asset. 
Jean Bodin, who was the first to describe the concept of sovereignty, 
regarded the issuance of money as one of the main or substantial 
 
7 Zsolt Bujtár: Central Bank Issued Digital Currencies: is it a Solution or a problem. 
In: J. Glavanits – B. Horváthy – L. Knapp (eds.): EU Business Law and Digital 
Revolution: Selected Studies from the New Fields of Technology. Széchenyi István 
University, Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Department of 
International and European Law, Győr, 2019, 74–75. 
8 András Vígvári, Pénzügy(rendszer)tan (Akadémiai Kiadó 2008) 74. 
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attributes of sovereignty. „There is nothing of more moment to a country, 
after the law, than the denomination, the value, and the weight of the 
coinage”9. In other words, according to Bodin, the definition and 
issuance of the money – as a part of sovereignty – is an exclusive and 
non-transferrable right of the state, the sovereign. 
Karl Marx identified five different functions of money10:  
-  measure of values (expresses the value of commodities),  
-  means of circulation (provides the exchange of commodities),  
-  means of payment,  
-  formation of value/reserves,  
-  universal money. 
Max Weber classified money as means of circulation and means of 
exchange. Money becomes means of payment through state regulation. 
According to Weber, money is emerged by state will and state regulation. 
The modern state keeps in its own hands the monopoly of monetary 
system regulation and money issuance. Money is kept alive by legal 
state force. The main function of money is to settle various debts (paying 
taxes to the state, paying interest payments by the state, etc.). The state 
collects taxes to finance its own needs and public functions, and the 
simplest form of tax collection in a general means of exchange instead 
of various forms of commodities. Since the usage of money as universal 
means of exchange is provided by legal state force, its main function will 
be the payment function 11. 
The European Central Bank analyses the operation of VCs on the 
basis of the following main functions of money: 
- medium of exchange, 
- store of value, and   
- unit of account12. 
The fundamental question for the regulation of money and the 
monetary system is: who creates the money and where does it stem 
from? Is it created by the state through regulation as Weber says or as 
Prof. Tibor Nagy points out „money is not created by state regulation, 
 
9 Jean Bodin, Six books on the Commonwealth, Chapter X: The true attributes of 
sovereinty. 
10 Karl Marx, Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Öekonomie (first edition, Verlag von 
Otto Meissner 1867). 
11 Cf. in details Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Mohr 1922). 
12 European Central Bank (n 2) 23. 
118 Zsolt Halász 
because it’s emerged spontaneously.”13 István Simon adds that entities 
- not necessarily the national states exclusively - having sufficient power 
try to extend their power to money issuance because it brings economic 
benefits on the one hand, and on the other its political yield is also 
significant, namely by control over the economy.14  
The European Court of Justice also had to analyse the nature and 
operation of the VCS. The Court had to answer the question in a 
preliminary ruling procedure: whether transactions, which consist of the 
exchange of traditional currency for units of the ‘bitcoin’ virtual currency 
and vice versa, in return for payment of a sum equal to the difference 
between, on the one hand, the price paid by the operator to purchase 
the currency and, on the other hand, the price at which he sells that 
currency to his clients, constitutes the supply of services for 
consideration within the meaning of the relevant article of the VAT 
Directive? In its ruling the Court declared „bitcoin virtual currency, being 
a contractual means of payment, cannot be regarded as a current 
account or a deposit account, a payment or a transfer. Moreover, (…) the 
‘bitcoin’ virtual currency is a direct means of payment between the 
operators that accept it. Transactions involving non-traditional 
currencies, that is to say, currencies other than those that are legal 
tender in one or more countries, in so far as those currencies have been 
accepted by the parties to a transaction as an alternative to legal tender 
and have no purpose other than to be a means of payment, are financial 
transactions. It is common ground that the ‘bitcoin’ virtual currency is 
neither a security conferring a property right nor a security of a 
comparable nature.15   
It should be noted that the European Central Bank represent an 
opposite view on VCs. According to the ECB VCs are not used widely to 
exchange value, they are not legally money, and – in the absence of 
minted versions – they are not currency either, and no virtual currency is 
a currency. However, it doesn’t exclude to use VCs as contractual 
moneys between private parties.16  
 
13 Tibor Nagy, ’A pénzrendszer joga’ in István Simon (ed) Pénzügyi Jog I. (Osiris 2007) 
275.  
14 István Simon, ’Állandóság és változás a pénz jogi szabályozásában’ in: István Simon 
(ed) Tanulmányok Nagy Tibor tiszteletére (Szent István Társulat 2009) 253. 
15 Judgment of 22 October 2015, Hedqvist, C-264/14, EU:C:2015:718. 
16 European Central Bank (n 2) 24. 
Virtual Currencies – Legal Challenges 119 
Four centuries after JEAN Bodin a completely new theory on the 
money (currency) and on its relationship to the state has been published 
by Nobel laureate Friedrich-August Hayek17, who has described the 
concept of the private – non-state-issued – money. Hayek’s concept 
preceded by three decades the factual appearance of the first VCs. 
According to Hayek’s concept, the state’s right for money issuance would 
be abandoned, and the monetary policy as we know it would not exist. 
3.  Legal issues and dilemmas 
There are a number of legal dilemmas about the functioning and 
especially the usage of VCs. Here, one should not simply refer to the 
current regulations declaring a currency as official currency in a 
country18 and to the fact that each traditional currency is declared to be 
an official currency in at least one country.
19
 
My legal dilemmas are more focused on the legal consequences and 
risks associated with unregulated nature of this issue and furthermore 
whether it is possible and/or necessary to create any kind of regulation. 
Our traditional financial system operates on the fundament of a 
number of important factors, however this system has gone through a 
number of important changes, including the legal basis, in the not too 
distant past. Let us just refer here e.g. to the Bretton Woods rules and 
the elimination of the gold standard. 
Among the referred factors two elements are to be highlighted as a 
basis of the current monetary system: 
- the legal background: official currencies are to be accepted as official 
means of payments, and  
- the trust in the financial intermediary system. 
 
17 Friedrich August Hayek, Denationalisation of Money (Institute of Economic Affairs 
1976). 
18 Cf. According to Art. K) of the Basic Law of Hungary the official currency of Hungary 
shall be the Hungarian Forint. Further reading: Zsolt Halász, ’Public Finances’ in András 
Zs. Varga, András Patyi and Balázs Schanda, The Basic (Fundamnetal) Law of Hungary 
– A Commentary of the new Hungarian Constitution (Clarus Press 2015) 321-343. 
19 For more details on the development of money cf. Andrea Labancz: 
Cryptocurrencies: a theoretical approach. In: Judit Glavanits, Balázs Horváthy, László 
Knapp (eds.): EU Business Law and Digital Revolution, Széchenyi István University, 
Győr, 2019.  
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Official currencies are not exclusive means of payment, however 
certain payments (e.g. that of taxes) generally have to be implemented 
in official currencies. While legal regulation is difficult to be disrupted, a 
financial crisis can easily originate distrust in the traditional monetary 
and banking system. After the 2008 crisis the trust has partially 
eliminated, which might have initiated the creation of the first VCs. 
However, as we have seen, the idea of private money was not new. 
In addition, other aspects may arise, such as the novelty nature or 
the promise of fast, safe and cheap payments. This promise is based on 
a new kind of technological operation that allows financial transactions 
to be implemented directly between virtual wallets bypassed the 
traditional banking system. In most cases, transactions are implemented 
in the blocks of the blockchain, which guarantees the secure 
implementation of the transaction in two ways. On the one hand, the 
blocks contain the data of all previous transactions (e.g. the elements of 
the ownership chain) except for the identity of the participants in the 
transaction and on the other hand the authentication is done by the user 
community. 
In principle the system is able to implement transactions quickly, 
although this advantage is less and less significant due to the 
development of traditional payment systems. 
However, it is important to see that we must face risks beside 
positive features. First and foremost, we need to emphasize the 
complete non-regulated nature of the VCs and their operation, 
technology are not officially certified either. Virtual currencies are not 
created by any central bank, nor by a financial institution.
20
 They are 
created by private actors. As a result, the basis of the operations is the – 
blind – trust in the unknown creator/issuer, and/or the technology 
created by it, without any kind of legal guarantee. Until now, it is not 
possible to know exactly who created the most popular virtual currency, 
the Bitcoin. There is neither a contractual link, nor any legal protection if 
any unexpected loss or damage occurs related to the transactions with 
VCs. In fact, such losses happen. The state regulation of a monetary 
 
20 Despite the private money nature of the VCs most of the central banks focus on 
the creation of central bank issued digital currencies. Cf. Zsolt Bujtár: Central bank 
issued digital currencies: is it a solution or a problem? In: Judit Glavanits, Balázs 
Horváthy, László Knapp (eds.): EU Business Law and Digital Revolution, Széchenyi 
István University, Győr, 2019.  
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system has lent and generally lends - stronger or weaker, and 
sometimes varying - confidence in the legal tender in the course of 
history. 
The system and technology promise anonymity to the users 
equivalent to cash. The virtual currency system allows anonymous 
ownership and anonymous transfers between users with a virtual wallet. 
The identification requirements and practice are less strict than in the 
traditional financial services. I do not think there is a need for a detailed 
explanation of how such a loose system can be used for tax evasion, 
money laundering and other illicit purposes. Furthermore, the anonymity 
is just pseudo-anonymity in case if many VCs (e.g.: Bitcoin) and the users 
can be tracked back. In case of other VCs (e.g.: Monero, Z-cash) the 
anonymity is real, raising real concerns related to the above-mentioned 
activities. 
A substantial feature of this system and technology is the global 
access and usage, even if the freedom of usage and mining of VCs is 
divergent around the world. (In Europe or in the US they are not banned 
or restricted, but in certain countries like China or India.) This can also 
be a major advantage in many places that will allow a reduction in the 
number of conversion transactions between different currencies, 
however it also poses serious threats to the easy movement of money 
stemming from crimes or other illicit activities. 
In the case of traditional currencies, it is important to recognize the 
ability like the issuing central bank to create money and to adjust the 
volume of money in circulation to the needs of the economy. For virtual 
currencies, we need to make two comments. On the one hand, due to 
the mathematical logic of the system, in case of several VCs the possible 
quantity is limited from the top and this quantity can be predetermined. 
For Bitcoins, this is 21 million units, which can be divided into 8 decimal 
places. Thus, the issuable quantity of virtual money is foreseeable and 
can be easily determined however this quantity is not flexible and thus 
less able to meet the varying needs of the economy. It is also important 
to point out that since no one and nothing limits the creation of new 
virtual money, there is no obstacle to the creation of additional VCs 
beside the currently popular ones. Right now, we know more than 2450 
VCs and no one can predict the potential further increase of their 
number. 
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Last but not least, it is important to mention that the costs of 
transactions of the VCs are considered to be low, although conversions 
to and from the traditional currencies can bear significant transaction 
fees in addition to the difference between buying and selling rates. At 
this level of costs, the extreme volatility of the exchange rate is also a 
question that developers and users have to face. Many see this as a 
kind of investment opportunity, which, however, involves extreme risks 
due to the nature of virtual currencies. 
It is therefore necessary to ask the fundamental question: how to 
classify and define the VCs and consequently how can/should they be 
regulated. 
According to our recent knowledge, it’s hard to answer these 
questions. It is not easy to answer what was the purpose of creating 
more than 2450 different virtual currencies. We cannot exactly see the 
different purposes of their creators. We do not know which ones will 
really exist in the future and until when and for what reason 
(uninteresting for the user, or upon creators will) will any of them cease 
to exist, and how will the exit from the market happen. 
We know that instead of the traditional monetary system, there are 
ideas to create a safe monetary system free from external influences. 
We have seen that blockchain technology has the same functional 
benefits (e.g. speed, in-house cheapness, irreversibility) that would be 
advantageous for the operation of any kind of monetary systems. 
However, it is not yet clear what could be the real functions of the 
VCS. One of these could be to renew or reshape the payment system, 
but it requires moderate volatility and minimal exchange rate 
fluctuations. Many see VCS as an investment opportunity despite of the 
obvious and less obvious risks. 
Looking back to the basic assumptions (Tibor Nagy) that money is 
originally independent from the state as it is created in a spontaneous 
development; the state regulates it due to different considerations 
(Istvan Simon); and considering Samuelson's and Nordhaus's money 
paradox21 that money is accepted because it’s accepted, then we should 
classify VCs as money. We should consider these means as money 
because they developed spontaneously, and there are people around 
 
21 P. A. Samuelson and W. Nordhaus, Közgazdaságtan I. (KJK 1990) 386.  
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the world (even if still not in majority) who accept it as a means of 
payment. 
As we can see in the development of money, there is recently no 
other widely-used, accepted currency in the world than the currencies 
issued and regulated by a state or group of states (e.g. Eurozone 
Member States). Currencies became official currencies of any states by 
regulation. Looking back in history, a relatively long time ago each 
currency had a "host or owner/issuer state" that solely regulates the 
issuance and the functioning of its currency and own monetary system. 
The emergence of virtual money, virtual currencies have disturbed 
this long-standing world-wide social convention since we suddenly have 
to face the existence of these new kind of money that some people 
accept even if they do not have a "host/owner" state regulating system 
and issuance. Question is whether what consequences should be drawn 
for regulation of virtual currencies and their markets? Should the states 
of the world allow the emergence of an alternative monetary system (s) 
along the traditional ones? 
Virtual currencies are a kind of criticism on the traditional monetary 
systems. We must also see, however, that this criticism erodes one of 
the basic elements of state sovereignty, the financial sovereignty, 
including the right to issue the own currency.22. Ernő Várnay has 
highlighted two specific rights of the state related to the monetary 
sovereignty: the right to determine the official currency on its territory 
and the right to determine the rules applicable on the currency 
exchange.23. Interestingly, central banks of Europe, US, Canada don’t 
see the appearance and development of the VCs as threat on the 
traditional monetary system. Central banks issue only notices on the 
risks of usage of VCs. 
 
 
 
 
22 Cf. Bodin’s concept on soveregnty (n 8). 
23 Ernő Várnay, ’Költségvetési és monetáris szuverenitás az Európai Unióban’ Pro 
Publico Bono – Magyar Közigazgatás (2013) (1) 26-59., and Ernő Várnay, ’A fiskális és 
a monetáris szuverenitás az Európai Unióban – az Európai Unió alkotmányos 
szerződésére is figyelemmel’ in István Simon (ed), Tanulmányok Nagy Tibor tiszteletére 
(Szent István Társulat 2009) 295–309. 
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4.  Virtual currencies as systemic risks 
Before the appearance of the VCs the monetary system of the world 
was homogeneous: almost each sovereign state (either alone or 
together with others) had its own currency, and each monetary system 
was regulated by a state. This global regulation provided the possibility 
of state (central bank) intervention through monetary control and the 
central banks were anyhow liable for their decisions. An essential issue 
is that by the emergence of the virtual currencies – especially in case if 
the capitalization and the significance of them compared to the current 
levels gains more importance, states and central banks may lose control 
over financial and monetary systems and processes (or at least their 
control capacity may weaken substantially). Another issue could be that 
if a substantial amount of liquidity flows from traditional currencies to 
VCs, this can have a negative effect on the situation of the traditional 
banking sector. VCs are outside the scope of the central bank's 
monetary policy toolbox, and therefore neither the central bank's interest 
rate policy (virtual assets is conceptually interest-free) nor the exchange 
rate policy can have any impact. 
In my view, in the light of this background, the national states of the 
world cannot afford to ignore this issue and not provide an adequate 
regulatory response within the foreseeable future in order to stabilize the 
monetary system of the world. The question is, however, whether it is 
possible to adopt any effective regulation beyond the prohibition, and 
what can be regulated? 
As a first step, the regulator definitely has to focus on payment 
function of the VCs. In this area, it is necessary to define transactions 
which can be implemented by a virtual currency. In my view for example 
the payment of taxes and other state revenues in will not be possible in 
the foreseeable future in other currency than the one issued by the 
respective national state. Waiving taxation on own currency would 
practically mean waiving and cessation of own currency either. This 
restriction is a serious constraint itself for the conversion of all other 
transactions into VC, since the conversion of "market" transactions to 
VCs immediately involves a significant exchange rate risk for merchants, 
service providers and other taxpayers, as well for the states themselves 
collecting taxes in VCs. One of the first experiments is the attempt of US 
State of Ohio, however it is not a real VC payment. The treasurer’s office 
doesn’t have a bitcoin account. When a business pays in bitcoin, that 
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payment is routed through an intermediary company, which converts the 
bitcoin into USD, which then get sent to the tax office. This method of tax 
payment didn’t proof a huge success. According to press reports24 citing 
Ohio treasurer’s office fewer than 10 companies had used the option. 
Beside Ohio, there are pilot projects in the Switzerland (in canton Zug 
and in the municipality of Chiasso). 
In the light of the above-mentioned circumstances, it does not 
appear necessary to introduce limitations on market transactions and 
private parties related to the usage a VCs instead of using their 
traditional currency (similarly as it is possible to use different traditional 
currencies). The task of the states and central banks to draw the 
attention of the users on the risk related the volatility of the exchange 
rates. Prohibitions and restrictions should only be considered if the 
stability of the monetary and financial system was compromised, or 
specific legal interests are to be defended like the value of wages. 
However, payment of wages in VCs raise specific issues. Wage payment 
in cryptocurrency makes it convenient to hire remote workers globally 
since payments can be made almost instantly and around the globe, 
even without access to the local banking institutions. On the other hand, 
beside the possible significant exchange rate fluctuation and related 
risks, there are legal issues employers and employees have to face with. 
Firstly, for the reason of defence of wages, several jurisdictions require 
the payments of wages in local currency25, but in some countries (e.g. 
New Zealand26) it is already allowed to pay in VCs. Factually, there are 
further countries (Japan, Australia, Denmark), where employers can pay 
wages – in lack of legal regulation and/or at least partially – in 
cryptocurrencies. Although, VC payments – even salary payments – can 
be used globally, one has to keep in mind that taxation of these assets 
and payments differs country by country. Furthermore, a remarkable 
constraint can be the different nature of certain VCs, namely whether 
they are to be regarded as securities or not. The Securities and 
 
24 <https://www.marketplace.org/2019/04/08/ohio-experiments-bitcoin-tax-
payments/> 
25 This is the case for example in Hungary either. Cf. Art 154 of Act I of 2012 on the 
Labour Code. 
26 Cf. ’New Zealand legalises salaries paid in cryptocurrencies’ (Financial Times, 12 
August 2019) <https://www.ft.com/content/54dd4854-bd06-11e9-b350-
db00d509634e>.  
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Exchange Commission (“SEC”) of the USA has taken the stand that since 
the value of any given cryptocurrency may appreciate due to the efforts 
of third parties, it is as good as a speculative instrument and therefore 
must be regulated as such27. In case of payment salaries in VCs, there 
are also differences between two situations: (1) salaries defined and 
contracted in fiat currency and changed (on choice of the employee as 
fringe benefit) to VC before payment, (2) salaries defined and contracted 
in VC. The second option has not been really wide-spread yet. 
As a second step, it is necessary to examine whether the 
lending/borrowing activities in in VCs can allowed. In fact, VC lending 
services are already existing28. VCs can be simple means of P2P lending 
platforms. In case of P2P platforms, no bank type intermediary 
institution is needed, the platform itself connects the creditor and the 
borrower. For proper creditor and borrower protection P2P platforms 
would need special regulation – independently from the type of 
currencies (fiat or virtual) they use for operation. 
To illustrate the risks of this issue on both creditor and borrower side, 
it is perhaps enough to mention the FX-based lending, which resulted 
the most serious domestic financial disaster of the last two decades in 
Hungary. It may only be allowed if and when the incomes of the 
borrowers involved are predominantly originating in virtual currency. 
Until that happens, this activity must be definitely restricted.  
A related question is the VC backed lending. Even currently lending 
services backed by VC assets are also available29. These operations are 
less risky than VC lending, however the fluctuation of rates may make 
additional coverage necessary. 
As a third step, it is necessary to examine whether virtual currency 
can be considered as a financial instrument serving as an investment 
target. Applicable regulations30 do not even consider traditional 
currencies as a financial instrument, as a subject of investment services. 
 
27 Cf. SEC President Clayton’s statement at <https://www.sec.gov/news/public-
statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11>. 
28 E.g. <www.ethlend.io>. 
29 Cf. <www.saltlending.com>. 
30 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of The Council on markets in 
financial instruments (MIFID II) [2014] OJ L173/349, Act CXXXVIII of 2007 on 
Investment Firms and Commodity Dealers, and on the Regulations Governing their 
Activities (Hungary). 
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Virtual currencies don’t pay interest or dividends. Financial benefits, 
returns on them can only arise from their exchange rate fluctuations. 
However, this is known to show significant shifts. With regard to 
traditional convertible currencies, the convertibility and the financial 
gains arising from the exchange rate changes are not restricted and the 
gains are not subject of income tax in the case of private individuals (in 
Hungary). There is no apparent reason for any restriction on the 
conversion or redemption of traditional currency into a virtual currency or 
vice versa, even if it is for any gainful purpose. Prohibitions and 
restrictions here are only to be considered if the stability of the financial 
system is compromised. 
Fourthly, it would be necessary to have a look at the current 
regulatory environment of the service providers and their operation, who 
provide currency exchange services related to virtual currencies. The EU 
bank regulations31 and the Hungarian Credit Institutions Act32 define 
currency exchange as an auxiliary financial service provided by a bank 
(and by its agent).  
However, by definition foreign exchange transactions (and services) 
mean only the sale of foreign currency (money issued by a foreign 
state/central bank) against a domestic or foreign currency and vice 
versa. The sale/exchange of virtual currencies against traditional 
(foreign or domestic) currency is outside the concept of currency 
exchange service and as such does not fall under the scope of the Credit 
Institutions Act. Consequently, this activity doesn’t require the 
authorization by the financial supervisory authority and neither 
supervised by it. The regulation of this activity is possible and justified in 
line with the traditional currency exchange services, especially if we 
consider that the unregulated trade of these instruments can be a 
simple tool for covering of various illicit activities or criminal offenses 
and/or the gains originating from them. In lack of legal regulation and 
protection, the operation of VC trading platforms and wallet service 
 
31 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of 
credit institutions and investment firms (CRD) [2013] OJ L176/338, Regulation No 
575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (CRR) [2013] OJ 
L176/1. 
32 Act CCXXXVII of 2013 on Credit Institutions and Financial Enterprises (Hungary). 
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providers can carry serious security risks. As many examples show their 
possible malfunction, bankruptcy, or technical failure causing serious 
and irreversible damage for VC owners. 
In further steps, it is necessary to examine the impact of the use of 
VCs on the implementation different financial transactions. Here, inter 
alia, the applicability of various law enforcement measures (e.g. 
enforceability of claims, administrative decisions, court rulings) may 
become at least questionable. For law enforcement authorities the legal 
regulation technically cannot provide such an easy access to VC storage 
facilities (e.g. wallets) as to a traditional bank account. For example, in 
the case of Bitcoin, the owner's access to his/her wallet can be limited 
by law enforcement and/or forensic measure, but the success of the 
coercive measures depends in many cases on the owner's willingness to 
cooperate. 33 In case of other, yet less popular VCs like Monero, Zcash 
the identifying and tracking of the owner is much more complicated or 
even told as impossible. 
Finally, I consider as a basic question to take substantive steps as 
soon as possible in order to prevent money laundering and other 
criminal offenses by usage of virtual currencies. This problem persists 
until, for example, the Bitcoin transactions themselves can be tracked 
but the identification of the parties involved remains insufficient. 
5.  Conclusions 
We have seen the fundamental question related to the effective 
functioning of the current financial and legal system is not whether it is 
necessary to regulate the VCs (both their issuance and usage), but all 
the more how can this be achieved and furthermore how can we ensure 
the proper operation and of our monetary, financial and also legal 
system in case of a surely occurring further proliferation of the VCs? The 
usage of VCs cannot be abolished. Taking down any computers of the 
P2P network have very limited effect on the whole system. Any legal 
prohibition would unlikely stop VC usage since one’s identity on the 
network is almost untraceable. The first possible step could be the 
regulation and monitoring of the traditional/virtual currency 
exchange/intermediary activities (not solely AML) – by transnational or 
 
33 Cf. Zoltán Szathmáry, ’Az elektronikus pénz és a bitcoin biztosítása a 
büntetőeljárásban’ (2015) (11) Magyar Jog, 639.  
Virtual Currencies – Legal Challenges 129 
rather global regulatory measures. Local or regional regulations don’t 
worth a single Bitcoin. 
At the time of writing of this study, there are no Hungarian and EU 
laws in force regulating this subject in general and neither any regulatory 
measures are there in at least that areas of it having the highest risks 
due to the non-regulation. In July 2016, the European Commission has 
tabled a proposal on the amendment of the Anti-Money Laundering 
(AML) Directive34 ,, proposing the list of so-called obliged entities defined 
by the Directive to be complemented by virtual exchange platforms and 
custodian wallet providers. The proposal also includes a definition of the 
term "virtual currency"35. The proposal aims to counterbalance the 
anonymity related to the VC transactions in comparison with traditional 
currency transfers, with particular emphasis on the fact that public 
administrations (in and outside EU) are currently not monitoring the 
payments in VCs. The proposal has been approved the Council and the 
European Parliament after 2 years of discussion in May 201836 Once 
came into force and will be transpositioned by 10 January 2020, the 
Directive affects only one element of the issues raised.  
Right now, in the world of the Internet, the state can determine its 
own currency, its usage in taxation and obligatory acceptance, however 
the state cannot ensure its exclusivity either. Although the regulation of 
creation or issuance of VCs is practically impossible, it may be easier to 
regulate the access to them and the exchange transactions especially 
between the traditional and the virtual currencies.
37
 
 
34 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the 
purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and amending Directive 
2009/101/ECCOM(2016) 450 final. 
35 “Virtual currencies” means a digital representation of value that is not issued or 
guaranteed by a central bank or a public authority, is not necessarily attached to a 
legally established currency and does not possess a legal status of currency or money, 
but is accepted by natural or legal persons as a means of exchange and which can be 
transferred, stored and traded electronically. 
36 Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 
2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial 
system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending 
Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU [2018] OJ L156/43. 
37 As other authors highlight, the different theories of money (state theory, 
societary theory) and the legal approaches based on these theories don't make the 
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The task, therefore, is not simple but requires a global regulatory 
response. The bitcoin.org page itself points out that “the Bitcoin protocol 
itself cannot be modified without the cooperation of nearly all its users, 
who choose what software they use. Attempting to assign special rights 
to a local authority in the rules of the global Bitcoin network is not a 
practical possibility”. the situation can be even more complicated by the 
creation and use of further less well-known virtual currencies that might 
also help illicit purposes. 
The VC schemes as whole cannot be regulated effectively. The 
regulation can focus on the activities (e.g. exchange services) and the 
intermediaries. However, the regulation cannot cover the whole scheme 
due to the lack of central authority controlling the system. If once 
exchange services were not needed anymore due to the spread of any 
VC, the regulation was even more extremely difficult. 
In addition to the necessity of regulation, a further question is 
whether the blockchain system underlying the operation of the VCs can 
be adapted to the development of the traditional financial system? Since 
this new technology has undoubted advantages either, and it cannot be 
ruled out that a VC operating without the above-mentioned issues might 
emerge in the future, the state and central bank decision-makers should 
it consider in the development and regulation of the financial system.
38
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Abstract: In the 21. century there is an increasing number of digital or virtual assets, 
that have some kind of value. We use different names for these assets, and countries 
have different definitions for those names. Among these there are virtual currency, 
digital currency, cryptocurrencies, security and utility tokens, and so on. As these 
assets are digital or virtual, and are existing on the internet, they can be used globally. 
That is why regulators should come up with a unified definitions and terminology. In my 
presentation and paper I will present what is considered to be a virtual currency. I also 
try to answer the question what are the cryptocurrencies and other digital tokens that 
are generated in a blockchain system, and whether they can be seen as a kind of 
virtual currency. 
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1.  Introduction 
Over the last few years, we have heard a lot about FinTech in the 
television on the Internet. The term refers to an active relationship 
between financial services and IT development, in which either new e-
services are created or existing financial services are further developed 
by electronic, digital devices. Fintech is one of the umbrella terms of 
financial developments in the 21st century.1 Out of the Fintech 
innovations, in this paper I will introduce the definition of the 
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blockchains and their associated tokens, ie, cryptocurrencies, security, 
utility and asset tokens.  
We encounter a typical problem when we want to deal with the legal 
analysis of blockchains and related technologies: the technical 
description of the technology and its economic analysis is much more 
advanced than the legal studies about the topic. Cryptocurrencies, as an 
element of the phenomenon, are already present in the legal literature,2 
but those who are interested in blockchains and other types of tokens typically 
get their information about them through blogs and thematic forums. In 2015, 
the Central Bank of Hungary drew attention to the dangers of new 
technologies,3  but the legislator did not take a substantive position on the 
relevant issues: Can they be consider as currencies? Or are they securities, 
maybe commodities? In the following, I am looking for the answer to these 
questions of how can we categories the different tokens using the existing legal 
framework. 
2.  What are the blockchains and tokens? 
Here are two basic definitions that need to be clarified: blockchains 
and tokens. I consider it important to explain the concepts, because 
without knowing the definitions it is not possible to continue a 
substantive discourse on the subject. In addition, I want to clarify the 
common misbelief that BitCoin, cryptocurrencies and blockchains are 
synonymous terms. However they are not the same. 
By many blockchains are already considered the most important 
invention of the 21st century, and they say it can change the world in a 
similar way the internet did. The blockchain is a peer-to-peer protocol, a 
network of which anyone can join, can initiate transactions and 
authenticate them by creating so-called blocks. Blockchain is essentially 
a distributed or decentralized ledger, which is public and thanks to 
cryptographic procedures validates the recorded data (for example, 
 
2 Ádám Kerényi and Júlia Molnár, ‘A FinTech-jelenség hatása − Radikális változás 
zajlik a pénzügyi szektorban?’ (2017) 16 (3) Hitelintézeti Szemle, 32–50. 
3 Central Bank of Hungary, ’Sajtóközlemény: Újabb kockázatok a fizetésre 
használható virtuális eszközök körében’ (2015) 
<https://www.mnb.hu/felugyelet/felugyeleti-keretrendszer/felugyeleti-hirek/hirek-
ujdonsagok/sajtokozlemeny-ujabb-kockazatok-a-fizetesre-hasznalhato-virtualis-
eszkozok-koreben> accessed 28 October 2018. 
The Classification of Virtual Currencies Related to Blockchains 135 
transactions) credibly in an unalterable manner without any 
intermediary.4 
How does it work? In case of BitCoin (the very first cryptocurrency) 
information about the transactions are gathered and bundled up in so-
called blocks every 10 minutes.5  The transactions in the new block are 
then authenticated and verified by the computers of the blockchain 
system, e.g. confirm that the buyer actually had the amount of 
cryptocurrency at his disposal. Then, the so-called header of the 
previous block is also added to the data series of the new block. This 
headset practically works like a personal identification number. Each 
block has a unique header, through which it can be identified. This 
means that each block refers to the previous block, consequently, the 
chain of transactions can be traced back to the original block of the very 
first transactions. Once the header of the previous block has been added 
to the new block, encryption of the data in it will begin by deciphering a 
cryptographic puzzle.6 All computers that run the block chain are 
competing to solve the cryptographic puzzle as soon as possible, 
because whoever first solves the puzzle gets rewarded with BitCoin (or in 
case of another blockchain with some other kind of cryptocurrency) for 
their work. This process is called "mining" in the internet slang and this is 
the way to get Bitcoin or other cryptocurrency without real money.7 
(Nowadays you can buy cryptocurrencies with real money in a way 
similar to currency exchange. In addition, BitCoin and other 
cryptocurrencies are also listed on the stock market.)8  The verified new 
block will be the proof of work. The thus-authenticated block is then 
 
4 Primavera De Filipp and Aaron Wright, Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code 
(Harvard University Press 2018) 13-14. 
5 Mayukh Mukhopadhyay, Ethereum Smart Contract Development - Build 
Blockchain-based Decentralized Applications Using Solidity (Pact Publishing 2018) 15-
18. 
6 Daniel Drescher, Blockchain Basics – A Non-technical Introduction in 25 Steps 
(Apress 2017) 23. 
7 Adam Hayes, ’What factors give cryptocurrencies their value: An empirical 
analysis’ (2014) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2579445> 
accessed 13 October 2018, 2. 
8 Jonathan Chiu and Thorsten V. Koeppl, ’The Economics of Cryptocurrencies – 
Bitcoin and Beyond' (2017) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3048124> accessed 28 
March 2019, 1-5. 
136 Péter Bálint Király 
provided with a time stamp and then added to the blockchain's previous 
blocks in a chronological order.9 
The blockchain contains all transactions that have ever been 
executed by using it. The entire blockchain is constantly updated, and it 
can be found on all participating computers. Thus, all computers are 
capable of proving that a certain transaction is completed, and who is 
the current and former owner of a particular product or money.10 It is 
also safe because the transactions are practically unchangeable and 
unhackable after being added to the blockchain. In order for a hacker to 
change a transaction, it is necessary to modify not only the block of the 
transaction in question, but also the data of the preceding and 
subsequent blocks, as they are all linked together. In addition, they need 
to do hack all of (up to millions) the nodes’ computers, because all of 
them store the whole blockchain. In addition, thanks to consensus 
models, nodes benefit more if they are involved in the operation of the 
system, in maintaining its safety and reliability, than hacking the 
blockchain.11 
Different tokens may be associated with the operation of the 
blockchains. The tokens are fungible and negotiable assets, which has 
financial value or represents a right, and what is recorded on a 
blockchain.12 Four types of tokens can be distinguished: 
a) Utility tokens: embody the right to access a future service or 
product (usually a blockchain).  
b) Security tokens: embody the ownership of an investment asset or 
other intangible asset. 
 
9 Hayes (n 7) 2. 
10 Hossein Kakavand, Nicolette Kost De Sevres and Bart Chilton, ’The Blockchain 
Revolution: An Analysis of Regulation and Technology Related to Distributed Ledger 
Technologies’ (2016) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf 
m?abstract_id=2849251> accessed 5 November 2018, 4-5. 
11 Sarah Wurfel, ’Blockchain is unhackable but these are 5 possible vulnerabilities 
of “the new Internet”’ (2018) <https://captainaltcoin.com/blockchain-hacks/> 
accessed 13 Januar 2019. 
12 Jonathan Rohr and Aaron Wright, ’Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin 
Offerings, and the Democratization of Public Capital Markets’ (2017) Cardozo Legal 
Studies Research Paper, No. 527 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3048104> accessed 21 April 
2019, 17-20. 
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c) Asset tokens: embody the ownership share of a movable or real 
estate thing.  
d) Cryptocurrencies: assets, that are aaccepted and used as an 
exchange or payment instrument. They are issued not by a central 
bank, but by a developer / developer team.13 
The distinction between the above categories can be difficult, as 
there is only a thin line between them, and one can transform into 
another. 
3.  The issue and functions of tokens 
The purpose of creating cryptocurrencies was to create a virtual 
currency which functions like real money, with the difference that in the 
case of Bitcoin there is no need for an intermediary institution (e.g. 
bank) for the execution of transactions. The system thus provides direct 
(peer-to-peer), faster, cheaper and safer financial transactions. The 
traditional bank transfer is slow (especially if we want to transfer money 
to a foreign bank account) and comes with a lot of administrative tasks. 
In addition, a third party’s (financial institution’s) contributuion is 
necessary, who monitors and executes the transfers, which will incur 
additional costs. The banking system is vulnerable to fraud and 
cyberattacks, and the possibility of human error can not be excluded. 
Cryptocurrencies address these problems with introduction of the 
blockchain technology. 14 
Among the blockchains there are those in which the release of 
cryptocurrencies is continuous, since the participants in its operation 
receive newly issued cryptocurrency units in return for their contribution 
to the authentication of transactions as a compensation or reward. This 
process is called mining.15 Continuously issued cryptocurrencies include 
those that have an upper limit on their quantity, while others can be 
issued in unlimited quantities. In addition, there are also block chains in 
 
13 Ferdinando M. Ametrano, ’Hayek Money: The Cryptocurrency Price Stability 
Solution’ (2016) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2425270> 
accessed 10 December 2018. 
14 Don Tapscott and Alex Tapscott, Blockchain Revolution: Hot the Technology 
Behind Bitcoin is Changing Money, Business and the World (Portfolio Penguin 2016) 
55-59. 
15 Hayes (n 7) 2. 
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which the amount of cryptocurrency associated with it is predetermined 
and issued at once during its establishment, and its amount does not 
change later. In these cases, a transaction fee is paid for the miners as a 
reward for their work in authentication of transactions. The function of 
the cryptocurrencies is twofold: on the one hand, they serve as a means 
of exchange (currency) and on the other hand they play an incentive role 
in the blockchain system. The cryptocurrencies themselves have no 
value. They only gain value, because they are accepted as a means of 
exchange within the users of a blockchain.  
In contrast security, utility and asset tokens don’t have inherent 
value, they only have value because they represent some valuables or 
rights.16 Both security and utility tokens are issued in a predetermined 
number.17  In addition utility tokens can only be used once, as they are 
„burned” after they are redeemed. Exactly what kind of rights a token 
owner has is different case by case. These permissions determine 
whether it is a security, utility or asset token. Security and utility tokens 
are issued through the process of the so-called Initial Coin Offering 
(hereafter ICO). ICOs are essentially a form of fund raising, when we 
create a new blockchain, and the amount of money needed to set up the 
system associated with it is offered to us by others usually in 
cryptocurrencies like BitCoin or Ether, or in legal tenders.18 In this sense 
they work as a tool for crowdfunding. The essence of this is that an 
external financial resource can be collected without the use of any 
intermediary, since the collection of money is handled through the 
blockchain system. Usually when someone wants to create a new 
blockchain they turn to the public for monetary support. The founders 
offer tokens for those who give them money for the establishment of a 
 
16 Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., ’The ICO Gold Rush: It's a Scam, It's a Bubble, It's a Super 
Challenge for Regulators’ (2017): (2017) University of Luxembourg Law Working Paper, 
No. 11/2017 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3072298> 
accessed 7 December 2018, 8-9. 
17 Vlad Burilov, ’Utility Token Offerings and Crypto Exchange Listings: how 
regulation can help?’  (2018) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3284049> accessed 16 
March 2019. 
18 Theodoros Stylianou, ’An Investigation into the Utility and Potential Regulation of 
Initial Coin Offerings and Smart Contracts in Selected Industries and Jurisdictions’ 
(2018) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3276822> accessed 
16 March 2019, 9-10. 
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blockchain. The entrepreneur thus gets the money to start the business, 
while the contributor acquires a token that embodies their rights in the 
future blockchain system. Its advantages are that it is a token that can 
be sold at any time and therefore has a high level of liquidity.19 
Furthermore, there is practically no transaction costs and is available to 
potential investors at a global level, and because of unregulated nature 
of the phenomenon, it also entails fewer legal obligations than the initial 
public offering.20 
So what is the connection between tokens and blockchains? 
Blockchains register and record the transfer of tokens. As I already 
mentioned blockchain is a basically a ledger, and its main purpose is to 
create a way to transfer value without any intermediary like banks, in a 
cheaper, faster and safer way. Through the tokens, the team of 
developers of the blockchain can also obtain financial resources for the 
operation of their project. The tokens are also a reward for contributing 
to the operation of the block chain, as the „miners” receive tokens for 
their contribution in the operation of the blockchain system.21 
4.  The legal classification of tokens 
Are these tokens considered to be money, or investment or 
commodity? As long as it remains a question, token holders will always 
refer to the version that is more appropriate for them. Today countries 
have different solutions, and sometimes even different authorities in a 
given state interpret tokens differently.  
Tokens can be seen as currency. In the economic sense in order to 
be considered currency,
22
 it needs to have the following three functions: 
a) a store of value, b) a means of exchange and c) a unit of account.23 
 
19 Stylianou (n 18) 9-10. o. 
20 Philip Stastny, ’Underpricing Effects in ICOs’ (2018) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3206323> accessed 16 
March 2019, 1-2. 
21 Judit Glavanits and Péter Bálint Király, ’A blockchain-technológia 
alkalmazásának jogi előkérdései: a fogalmi keretek pontosításának szükségessége’ 
(2018) (3) Jog – Állam – Politika. 
22 Zsolt Bujtár: Central Bank Issued Digital Currencies: is it a Solution or a problem. 
In: J. Glavanits – B. Horváthy – L. Knapp (eds.): EU Business Law and Digital 
Revolution: Selected Studies from the New Fields of Technology. Széchenyi István 
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 The store of value function is met if the thing can reliably keep its 
purchasing power for a long period of time. Some authors say that due 
to frequent changes in the value of tokens compared to other 
currencies, it is unable to function as a store of value. However, 
according to the European Central Bank the frequent and significant 
changes in value does not affect the ability to preserve the value, since 
all legal tenders are subject to such changes.24 
The  medium of exchange function is fullfilled if something „passes 
freely from hand to hand troughout the community in final discharge of 
debts and full payment of commodities, being accpeted equally without 
reference to the character or credit of the person who offers it and 
without the intention of the person who receives it to consume it or apply 
it to any other use than in turn to tender it to others in discharge or 
debts or payment for commodities. Tokens, mainly cryptocurrencies 
comply with this condition, since it was originally created for this 
purpose, plus they are actually being accepted as counterparties for 
various transactions in increasing numbers.25 
The unit of account function means that the value of goods and 
services can be expressed in the subject matter. This may actually be 
true of any thing as is shown in history (e.g. gold, shells, etc. were used 
as money). Tokens are in principle capable of fulfilling this function, but 
most of the time we see that the price of products is determined in 
dollars, euros or other currencies beside e.g. BitCoin.26 
 
University, Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Department of 
International and European Law, Győr, 2019, 72–77. 
23 István Gárdos, ’A pénz fogalma’ (2016) (1) Polgári Jog 
<https://gmtlegal.hu/cikkek/a-penz-fogalma.php?kid=4&did=273> accessed 11 
October 2018, 1. 
24 Antonio Madeira, ’How legal is Bitcoin and Crypto Currencies?’ (2015) 
<https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/how-legal-is-bitcoin-and-crypto-
currencies/> accessed 23 November 2018. 
25 Wiliam J. Luther and Lawrence H. White, ’Can Bitcoin Become a Major Currency?’ 
(2014) George Mason University Working Paper in Economics, No. 14-17 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2446604> accessed 12 
February 2019, 1-6. 
26 Stephanie Lo and J. Christina Wang, ’Bitcoin as Money?’ (2014) (4) Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston Current Policy Perspective 
<https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/current-policy-perspectives/2014/bitcoin-
as-money.aspx> accessed 19 November 2018, 3-4. 
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So cryptocurrencies meet the requirements to be considered money 
in the economic sense. In legal sense, however, we can only speak of 
legal tender, if the money was issued by a central bank or other 
monetary authority of a State.27 Cryptocurrencies are not currencies, 
because it is not issued by a central bank. 28 
Tokens can also be interpreted as investment, because of the 
constant and large changes in their value. Consequently, it is more like a 
speculative investment instrument, especially if we add that there are 
some who just buy e.g. BitCoin in order to later sell it, and thus gain 
profit.  However, high volatility can easily discourage investors. Also it is 
easy to see the resemblance to investments in the case of security 
tokens. In case of ICOs we can say that, they are similar to the Initial 
Public Offering (IPO). The question is whether this way of financing can 
be considered as a security? According to the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC): „the federal securities laws apply to those 
who offer and sell securities in the United States, regardless whether the 
issuing entity is a traditional company or a decentralized autonomous 
organization, regardless whether those securities are purchased using 
U.S. dollars or virtual currencies, and regardless whether they are 
distributed in certificated form or through distributed ledger technology.”  
The SEC based its decision on the Howey test, according to which a 
contract is qualified as investment contract, if there is an investment of 
money, there is an expectation of profits from the investment, the 
investment of money is in a common enterprise, and any profit comes 
from the efforts of a promoter or third party.29 If someone buys 
cryptocurrency for the purpose of gaining profit later on by selling them, 
then the first two conditions are fulfilled (however it is still a question 
whether somebody bought the BitCoin in order to sell them later). The 
joint venture element is also accomplished as the transaction executed 
through the blockchain network contributes to the investor's growth, and 
the position of investors is affected by the appreciation or depreciation 
of the cryptocurrency. The last condition is also met if miners are 
considered to be third parties or promoters and the invertor’s profit is a 
 
27 Ametrano (n 13). 
28 Luther and White (n 24) 1-6. o. 
29 Securities and Exchange Commission, ’SEC Issues Investigative Report 
Concluding DAO Tokens, a Digital Asset, Were Securities’ (2017) < 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-131> accessed 19 November 2018. 
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consequence of the miners activity.30 Interestingly, according to the 
same statement of the SEC, Ether is not qualified as an ICO, but as 
virtual currency,31 from which it follows that the authority makes a 
distinction between investment-like cryptocurrencies and money-like 
cryptocurrencies. Therefore, if a cryptocurrency can prove that it at least 
one of the conditions is not met, then it will not qualify as a security.32 
However, it should be noted that not all cryptocurrencies based on 
mining (e. g. the ones that use the Proof of Stake consensus method).  
Furthermore according to SEC a token can transition from being a 
security token into a cryptocurrency, and thus it cannot be considered as 
a security anymore, because once the blockchain is established, and the 
value of the token is no more based on the efforts of third parties. But 
there are two problems with this phenomenon: a) when can we say that 
a given token is ceased to be a security; b) in case of cryptocurrencies 
their is always based on the efforts of a promoter or third party, ie. 
miners.33 
Tokens can be considered as commodity, because of their 
resemblance to gold. Gold and tokens both have: a) finite supply (BitCoin 
allows the mining of 21 million Bitcoin in total), b) none of them is 
supervised by a single government, c) the value of both are determined 
by demand and supply. But these statements are not true for all 
tokens.34 Some cryptocurrencies can have be mined in unlimited 
amounts (e.g. DogeCoin). Some have a predetermined amount available 
since their establishment (e.g. Ether). However asset tokens (even 
 
30 Tara Mandje, ’Bitcoin, its Legal Classification and its Regulatory Framework’ 
(2015) 15 (2) Journal of Business & Securities Law 
<https://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=jbsl
> 172-178. 
31 Securities and Exchange Commission (n 28). 
32 Marinoff, Nick, ’SEC Chairman: Cryptocurrencies Like Bitcoin Are Not Securities, 
but Most ICOs Are’ (2018) <https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/sec-chairman-
cryptocurrencies-bitcoin-are-not-securities-most-icos-are/> accessed 11 April 2019.  
33 James J. Park, ’When Are Tokens Securities? Some Questions from the 
Perplexed’ (2018) UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper, No. 18-13 < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3298965> accessed 16 
March 2019. 
34 Evan Faggart, ’What Happens to Bitcoin Miners When all Coins are Mined?’ 
(2015) <https://news.bitcoin.com/what-happens-bitcoin-miners-all-coins-mined/> 
accessed 17 October 2018. 
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though they are not really similar to gold) could be seen as commodity, 
because they represent real life commodities,35 
5.  The solution 
In my opinion there are two preliminary questions that need to be 
clarified before we can categorize cryptocurrencies. 
1. Can we list every token into the same category? As we saw earlier, 
cryptocurrencies are considered as commodities because of their 
resemblance to gold, because both of them is finite in number, and 
demand and supply affect their value. However, this argument is not true 
for all cryptocurrencies, not to mention security, utility and asset tokens, 
since, as I have already mentioned, some of them have unlimited 
amounts available, or those that already have a limited amount in the 
system from the beginning. 
2. Can we list a single token, e.g. BitCoin into only one category? This 
question arise from the fact, that Bitcoin can be used as money, as an 
investment, and as a commodity as well. But if that is the case, then 
legal acts for all the three categories should be applied, which can very 
easily lead to over-regulation, which would hinder the development and 
use of cryptocurrencies, although it is an extremely useful and versatile 
invention. 
In conclusion we saw that the classification of tokens is not easy to 
do, as legal framework in effort is not suitable to them. So what can be a 
solution here. In my opinion we need to come up with an umbrella 
category that covers all of these tokens. I think the most ideal candidate 
for this task is the category of virtual currencies. There is no exact 
definition of virtual currencies. According to the Financial Action Task 
Force: Virtual currency is a digital representation of value that can be 
digitally traded and functions as a medium of exchange; and/or a unit of 
account; and/or a store of value, but does not have legal tender status 
in any jurisdiction.36 However the European Central Bank use the term 
 
35 Margaret Nail, ’How infinite are cryptocurrencies?’ (2017)  
<https://bitnewstoday.com/market/mining/how-infinite-are-cryptocurrencies/> 
accessed 12 February 2019. 
36 Financial Action Task Force, ’Virtual Currencies Key Definitions and Potential 
AML/CFT Risks’ (2014) <https://www.fatf-
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virtual currency with the following meaning: a virtual currency is a type of 
unregulated, digital money, which is issued and usually controlled by its 
developers, and used and accepted among the members of a specific 
virtual community. Both of them consider cryptocurrencies to be virtual 
currencies, and in my opinion we can also see security, utility and asset 
tokens as such.37 
In conclusion it is likely that in the near future none of the blockchain 
related tokens will accepted as legal tenders by most countries, because 
– among other reasons – it would jeopardise the money-issuing 
monopoly of states. Moreover, their interpretation as an investment and 
a commodity is also not certain, as it was explained above. The legal 
consequences (such as taxation, consumer protection, etc.) are based 
on the classification, so it should be the priority of legislation to answer 
this question.
38
 Tokens cannot remain unregulated due to their growing 
importance, therefore, it is much more likely that states will regulate 
them in some way. The question is merely what the regulation will be. In 
my view, the most important thing to do is to create uniform regulation. 
This would be extremely beneficial because token are a virtual asset that 
are available through the internet at anywhere and anytime around the 
world, and it can be exchanged regardless of borders. In my opinion, the 
process launched by BitCoin and other cryptocurrencies is irreversible. 
That is why it would be necessary to agree whether tokens are a 
currencies, a commodities or an investments, or to come up with a new 
category (like virtual currencies) that cover all tokens. It is essential 
since a single regulation would ensure that we can take advantage of 
the economic opportunities inherent in tokens much more easier.  
 
 
 
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-
aml-cft-risks.pdf> accessed 3 December 2018, 4-5. 
37 European Central Bank, ‘Virtual Currency Schemes’ (2012) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf> 
accessed 28 November 2018, 13. 
38 J. Glavanits: Blockchain technology in the glance of consumer protection. In: R. 
Funta (ed): Počítačové právo, UI, ochrana údajov a najväčšie technologické trendy. 
Sládkovičovo, 2019., 17–28.  
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Abstract: The focus of interest was relatively fast on cryptocurrencies after Satoshi 
Nakamoto published an online document entitled Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic 
Cash System in 2009. Even though one could face with the theoretical definition of the 
so-called peer-to-peer electronic cash therein, several years has passed until a legal 
definition related to cryptocurrencies was established by the Anti Money Laundering 
Directive 5 (AMLD5). In connection with the above, this study focuses on giving an 
introduction of the so-called cryptocurrencies from a historical point of view by 
highlighting the original purpose and nature of them, and by comparing 
cryptocurrencies with ’traditional’ forms of currency among certain characteristics. 
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1.  Introduction 
The economic crisis in 2008 has brought many changes to the 
financial sector. 
The crisis has led to stricter rules of the financial system through the 
reform of the financial supervision and the lending area and the 
strengthening of the financial consumer protection.  
The strengthening of the financial consumer protection is considered 
to be of paramount importance for the proper functioning of the financial 
system. Ensuring high level of consumer protection is necessary, given 
that the information asymmetry that is considered to be the 
fundamental feature of consumer relations plays an increased role in 
the financial sphere. The reason for this is the increasing complexity of 
the financial products.1 
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law in its international dimension’ in Geraint Howells, Iain Ramsay, Thomas 
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Law (Edward Elgar, 2010) 10–13. 
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In addition to the establishment of the stricter legislation, market 
players in the broad sense have also developed innovative, technology-
based solutions. One of these is the so-called cryptocurrency.  
Cryptocurrencies, due to their unclear legal status, have attracted the 
attention of legislators and law enforcement bodies in the short term. 
The difficulty of the situation regarded to cryptocurrencies is well-
illustrated by the fact that while the term of ‘cryptocurrency’ is 
considered a common concept in the practice, the term ‘virtual currency’ 
or ‘crypto-asset’ is typically used by European Union’ bodies. In addition, 
cryptocurrencies are usually defined not only as currency or money, but 
also as securities, things, and property rights by theoretical studies.
2
 
AMLD5, the directive related to cryptocurrency regulation, uses and 
defines the term 'virtual currencies'. According to this: 
 
“virtual currencies means a digital representation of value that is not issued 
or guaranteed by a central bank or a public authority, is not necessarily 
attached to a legally established currency and does not possess a legal 
status of currency or money, but is accepted by natural or legal persons as 
a means of exchange and which can be transferred, stored and traded 
electronically.”3  
 
Concepts with similar content are used by the ECB4, the IMF,5 the 
EBA,6 the ESMA7  and the FATF.8 However, according to the ENISA, 
cryptocurrencies are a subset of virtual currencies.9  
 
2 J. Glavanits – P. B. Király: A blockchain-technológia alkalmazásának jogi 
előkérdései: a fogalmi keretek pontosításának szükségessége: Jog-Állam-Politika, 
2018/3., 173-183. 
3 Council Directive 2018/843 of 30 May 2018 on the prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing amending 
Directive 2015/849 and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU [2018] 
OJ L156/43.  
4 European Central Bank, ’Virtual Currency Schemes (October 2012) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2019. See also ECB Crypto-Asstes Task Force, ’Crypto-Assets: 
Implications for financial stability, monetary policy, and payments and market 
infrastructures’ (May 2019) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecb.op223~3ce14e986c.en.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2019. 
Cryptocurrencies: a theoretical approach 151 
It is easy to see that the issue of cryptocurrencies is closely linked to 
the issue of financial consumer protection. In a case, where 
cryptocurrencies are considered to be financial products, they fall under 
the scope of financial consumer protection provisions and therefore 
must comply with relevant legal provisions. Ensuring a high level of 
financial consumer protection in the EU is an area where harmonized 
regulation of cryptocurrencies is of paramount importance. Taking into 
consideration the above, the study seeks to establish a taxation of 
cryptocurrencies by considering a historical overview. 
2.  Brief history of cryptocurrencies 
Analysing cryptocurrencies, it is necessary to consider their history. 
Bitcoin, the first and thus typical cryptocurrency, was established in 
2009. Following its launch, a number of similar innovative financial 
solutions have been developed, such as Litecoin, Ether, ZCash, Monero, 
etc. 
After the launch of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, their use has 
begun to spread. For example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation and 
 
5 Dong He, Karl Habermeier, Ross Leckow, Vikram Haksar, Yasmin Almeida, Mikari 
Kashima, Nadim Kyriakos-Saad, Hiroko Oura, Tahsin Saadi Sedik, Natalia Stetsenko, 
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<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1603.pdf> accessed 30 August 
2019. 
6 European Banking Authority, ’EBA Opinion on ‘virtual currencies’ (4 July 2014) 
<https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/657547/EBA-Op-2014-
08+Opinion+on+Virtual+Currencies.pdf> accessed 30 August 2019. 
7 European Securities and Markets Authority, European Banking Authority, 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, ’ESMA, EBA and EIOPA warn 
consumers on the risks of Virtual Currencies’ (2018) 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma50-164-
1284_joint_esas_warning_on_virtual_currenciesl.pdf> accessed 30 August 2019. 
8 Financial Action Task Force, ’FATF Report on Virtual Currencies: Key Definitions 
and Potential AML/CFT Risks’ (June 2014) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-
aml-cft-risks.pdf> accessed 30 August 2019. 
9 European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, ’ENISA Opinion Paper on 
Cryptocurrencies in the EU’ (September 2017) 
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WikiLeaks have been accepting Bitcoin as a currency since 2011. 
Shortly afterwards, several market players announced the acceptance of 
cryptocurrencies in business transactions.10 Cryptocurrencies are 
typically accepted in payment transactions as an alternative to money – 
essentially as an electronic exchange of digital value.  
The concept of interpreting cryptocurrencies as money is confirmed 
by the judgment of the Eastern District of Texas of the Fifth Circuit, 
stating that Bitcoin is 'a currency or a form of money'.11 In addition, 
according to Germany's Finance Ministry, Bitcoin is essentially a ‘unit of 
account.’12 This means that it shall be interpreted as a financial 
instrument. According to the Cabinet of Japan, cryptocurrencies, like 
Bitcoin, have a function similar to money; and adopted legislation in 
2017 to make Bitcoin transactions de iure payment transaction.13  
In general, it can be stated that the closer in time the innovative 
solutions called cryptocurrencies are to Bitcoin, the more likely they have 
similar features to it; so that they can serve as a basis for research. 
However, as time passes, it is likely that innovative financial solutions 
can be used for different purposes as Bitcoin; consequently, they may 
not necessarily be interpreted as cryptocurrency. Characteristics such as 
being an alternative to traditional payment, existing in a peer-to-peer 
system and being decentralized, using specific IT procedures, using 
mining as a key element and being convertible should be considered 
specific features in case of cryptocurrencies.14 
 
10 As for examples WordPress, the Internet Archive, University of Nicosia, the 
Overstock.com, Newegg, Dell, Microsoft, Steam, and different businesses. 
11 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Shavers et al, No. 4:13-CV-416 (E.D. 
Tex. 2013). 
12 Luong Hoang Anh, ’The Story of Bitcoin Part 1’ (Medium, 26 July 2018) 
<https://medium.com/twogap/the-story-of-bitcoin-449de3c49493> accessed 30 
August 2019 
13 Garrett Keirns, ’Japan’s Bitcoin Law Goes Into Effect Tomorrow’ (CoinDesk, 31 
March 2017) <https://www.coindesk.com/japan-bitcoin-law-effect-tomorrow> 
accessed 30 August 2019 
14 Satoshi Nakamoto, ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System’ (2008) 
<https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> accessed 30 August 2019; ‘Lite Coin White Paper’ 
<http://zioncoins.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Lite-Coin-Whitepaper.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2019; Eli Ben-Sasson, Alessandro Chiesa, Christina Garman, 
Matthew Green, Ian Miers, Eran Tromer and Madars Virza, ‘Zerocash: Decentralized 
Anonymous Payments from Bitcoin’ (18 May 2014) <http://zerocash-
project.org/media/pdf/zerocash-extended-20140518.pdf> accessed 30 August 2019; 
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Given the above, when establishing the taxation, cryptocurrencies 
need to be compared primarily with the legally relevant topics of ‘money’ 
and further examined under this factor. To do this, it is first necessary to 
define the legally relevant concept of money. 
3.  Formation and regulation of ‘money’ 
In the taxonomy of cryptocurrencies, the examination of historical 
factors plays a prominent role. In this context, it is first necessary to 
examine the establishment and development of money.  
In this context, it should be noted that there is a strong correlation 
between the development of money and the development of commerce; 
money should be considered the result of simplifying commercial 
relations, as follows. 
The period of ‘barter’ should be considered the first stage in the 
development process, where commodities were acting as money. The 
value of commodities was determined by the value of other commodities 
and the exchange of goods based on consensus. However, the process 
was made difficult since determining the relative value of the goods was 
concerned.15 
The issue was solved in the period of ‘commodity money’, where 
generally accepted exchange tools were used as money. Such means of 
exchange were also goods; those which, by virtue of their specific 
characteristics, were suitable for use as commodities (value stability, 
divisibility, uniformity, transportability, general acceptance).16 Examples 
include salt, cattle or shell, etc. During this period, it was also necessary 
for commodities to have an intrinsic value, which contributed to the 
development of social trust towards them.17 
During the Bronze Age, the use of precious metals served as a 
medium of exchange, where coins were used as money. However, given 
 
‘A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform’ 
<https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper> accessed 30 August 2019. 
15 Jaksity, György, A pénz könnyelmű természete (Alinea Kiadó 2005) 29-30. 
16 Gárdos, István, ’A pénz fogalma’ (Gárdos, Mosonyi, Somogyi Ügyvédi Iroda, 6 
March 2016) < 
https://gmtlegal.hu/upload/G__rdos_Istv__n_A_p__nz_fogalma_Polg__ri_Jog.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2019. 
17 Gárdos (n 15) 
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the limited availability of precious metals, other means of exchange were 
needed.18 
The change was linked to early technological development. In the 
period of the Industrial Revolution, due to economic development and 
mass production, merchants began to issue bills of exchange as 
promises of payment. The development of banknotes should be 
considered the next step in the process, which resulted in banks issuing 
a bill of exchange on their own behalf, committing themselves to paying 
upon presentation. It was another dimension when the state entered 
into the process and already had the sole right to issue banknotes to 
unify the country's currency.19 
The development of technology has led to the appearance of account 
money; and the development of e-commerce has led to the creation of e-
money.20 
Obviously, with the development of money, the need for regulation 
has occurred. An important part of the provisions relating to money 
should be considered under the topic of payment services. In this 
context, it should be examined whether cryptocurrencies fall under the 
scope of the regulated categories of money. To do this, the specifics of 
the parties and the subject of the transaction, the issuance and the 
convertibility need to be discussed under the topic of financial 
characteristics. 
Institutional players of traditional payment transactions should be 
considered the parties of the transaction, so that central banks and 
financial institutions. 
In the two-level bank system, the central bank only indirectly contacts 
customers, through financial institutions. The tasks of the central bank 
include monetary policy, banknote and coin issuance, the management 
of the country's foreign exchange and gold reserves, ensuring the 
smooth flow of payments and supporting the stability of the financial 
system.21 
 
18 Jaksity (n 14) 30-38 
19 ibid 41, see also Gárdos (n 15) 
20 Fehérvári Erzsébet, Online banking, Elektronikus banki szolgáltatások 
(AKAPRINT 2008) 13-15. 
21 Ernő Huszti, Pál Péter Kolozsi and Csaba Lentner, ’Jegybanki szabályozás és 
monetáris politika Magyarországon’ in Lentner, Csaba (ed), Bankmenedzsment 
(Nemzeti Közszolgálati és Tankönyv Kiadó 2012) 112–124.; see also László Bódy, 
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There are two sub-categories of financial institutions: credit 
institutions and financial enterprises. These institutions must meet strict 
statutory requirements related to the establishment and operation.22 
Only these institutions, subject to certain exceptions, can professionally 
provide financial services by having a license. Such activities include, but 
are not limited to, providing payment services or issuing of electronic 
money.23 
Apart from financial institutions, payment institutions should also be 
considered which are engaged in activities related to payment services. 
Similarly to financial institutions, these institutions must meet statutory 
requirements related to their establishment and operation. The rules 
cover the licensing, the amount of the solvency margin and initial capital, 
the protection of client funds, the scope of the activities, liability and 
supervision.24 
With the development of e-commerce, electronic money institutions 
have also been established, and later regulated. Strict requirements 
related to the commencement, continuation and prudential supervision 
of electronic money institutions have also been developed.25 
 
Katalin Botos, Klára Schneider, József Zavodnyik, József Rotyis and Andás Nemescsói, 
Magyar pénz- és tőkepiaci rendszer (Osiris 2001) 16–22.; Judit Glavanits: A pénzügyi 
piac szabályozásának és felügyeletének új irányai. In: Kálmán János (ed): A pénzügyi 
piac szabályozásának és felügyeletének aktuális kérdései. Győr, Batthyány Lajos 
Szakkollégiumért Alapítvány, 2015., 79–128.  
22 Council Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit 
institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, 
amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 
2006/49/EC [2013] OJ L176/338, Council Regulation 575/2013 of 26 June 2013 on 
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 [2013] OJ L176/1. 
23 Bálint Csere and Márta Quirin, ’Hitelintézetek és pénzügyi szolgáltatást végző 
egyéb szervezetek jogi szabályozása’ in Lentner Csaba (ed), Bankmenedzsment 
(Nemzeti Közszolgálati és Tankönyv Kiadó 2012) 209-217. 
24 Council Directive 2015/2366 of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the 
internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU 
and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC [2015] OJ 
L337/35. 
25 Council Directive 2009/110/EC of 16 September 2009 on the taking up, pursuit 
and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions amending 
Directives 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC [2009] 
OJ L267/7.  
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The direct object of the transaction is the payment transaction, the 
indirect object is the money itself. Payment transaction shall mean any 
payment, transfer or withdrawal of funds by or on behalf of the payer, 
irrespective of the underlying obligations between the payer and the 
payee.26 
Money is at the heart of these payment transactions. It should be 
noted that legislation defines money-related terms with different 
content. The category of legal tender includes banknotes and coins 
issued in an official currency of a country; the category of payment 
services includes banknotes, coins, account money, and electronic 
money;27 the category of payment instrument includes a personalised 
device(s) and/or set of procedures agreed between the payment service 
user and the payment service provider and used in order to initiate a 
payment order.28  
Consequently, a distinction may be made between the material and 
the non-material appearance of money. Banknote and coin should be 
considered under the category of material appearance of money, while 
account money and electronic money should be considered under the 
category of non-material appearance of money.29 While banknotes and 
coins may circulate as cash; account money, in an IT sense, is an 
electronic sign stored in a financial institution, and, in a legal sense, a 
deposit account held in a credit institution or central bank account and 
essentially means a deposit on a payment account of indefinite 
 
26 Council Directive 2015/2366 of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the 
internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU 
and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC [2015] OJ 
L337/35. 
27 Council Directive 2015/2366 of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the 
internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU 
and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC [2015] OJ 
L337/35. 
28 Council Directive 2015/2366 of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the 
internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU 
and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC [2015] OJ 
L337/35. 
29 Ziád Bánfi, ’A Bitcoinról pénzelméleti szempontból’ (2018) 1 (5) Gazdaság és 
Pénzügy <http://www.bankszovetseg.hu/Public/gep/2018/002-
30ig%20Banfi%20Ziad.pdf> accessed 30 August 2019. 
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duration;30 and electronic money is a monetary value, represented by a 
claim on the issuer, stored electronically, including magnetic storage, 
issued on receipt of funds for the purpose of making payment 
transactions and accepted by any person other than the issuer. Such 
payment transaction shall be any payment, transfer or withdrawal of 
funds by or on behalf of the payer, irrespective of the underlying 
obligations between the payer and the payee. 31  Electronic money may 
be stored electronically, for example, on mobile phones or online 
payment accounts. 
Given that both account money and electronic money are based on 
technological solutions, their safe technological operation is 
standardized. In case of using account money via a payment instrument, 
it is needed to comply with the Europay–MasterCard–Visa (EMV 
standard) standards for international payment cards. The EMV standard 
has been developed to make payment card transactions more secure 
and to increase confidence in payment cards.32 Similarly to account 
money, in case of electronic money, standardized solutions play an 
important role, so that the CEPS (Common Electronic Purse 
Specifications) should be considered. 
It is also necessary to refer to the issuance of money. The exclusive 
right of issuing legal tender is typically linked to a central body, more 
specifically to the central bank, which is responsible for the circulation of 
banknotes and coins.33 Commercial banks and the central bank are 
authorized to create account money, and legal persons, by having a 
license, may issue electronic money.34 It should be noted that in all 
three cases (cash, account money, electronic money), a body or an 
 
30 Gárdos (n 15). 
31 Council Directive 2009/110/EC of 16 September 2009 on the taking up, pursuit 
and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions amending 
Directives 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC [2009] 
OJ L267/7. See also Bánfi (n 28). 
32 Central Bank of Hungary, ’Pénzforgalomról mindenkinek 1.’ (2008) 
<https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/penzforgalomrol-mindenkinek-bankkartyak.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2019 
33 Bódy, Botos et al. (n 20) 17-18. 
34 Council Directive 2009/110/EC of 16 September 2009 on the taking up, pursuit 
and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions amending 
Directives 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC [2009] 
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enterprise is authorized to issue money by having license. Essentially, 
this should be considered a kind of a centralized characteristic in the 
process of issuing money.
35
 
Today's money is typically convertible, meaning that one nation's 
currency (foreign currency) is typically convertible to another nation's 
currency. It should be noted that in international commerce and, 
increasingly in e-commerce, it is of utmost importance that each service 
be defined in the legal tender of a nation. 
Summarizing the above, it should be highlighted that the 
characteristic of being accepted by persons other than its issuer should 
be considered the general feature of money. The development of money 
cannot be considered closed; money is undergoing constant changes as 
a result of socio-economic and technological developments. In this 
context, persons and bodies issuing the money, commodities accepted 
as money and the form of money should be considered. At the same 
time, the ideology of the cashless economy is becoming more and more 
widespread. In addition, trust should be considered an important social 
factor relevant to the development of money, which is intended to be 
guaranteed by law through consumer protection provisions.36  
4.  Cryptocurrencies in light of money regulation 
As defined above, trust should be considered the basis of traditional 
payment transactions. Similarly, cryptocurrencies are also built on trust. 
The Bitcoin system has a closely tight link to the financial crisis in 2008. 
Essentially, it has evolved from it to address the financial and confidence 
issues arisen from the crisis. 
An Edelman’s survey from 2019 entitled Trust Barometer examined 
trust and credibility of people in institutions and organizations. According 
to the survey, the level of trust in institutions has declined significantly 
over the last 10 years, while the level of trust in self-managed 
relationships is increasing. According to the survey, the technology 
 
35 Zsolt Bujtár: Central Bank Issued Digital Currencies: is it a Solution or a problem. 
In: J. Glavanits – B. Horváthy – L. Knapp (eds.): EU Business Law and Digital 
Revolution: Selected Studies from the New Fields of Technology. Széchenyi István 
University, Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Department of 
International and European Law, Győr, 2019, 75–76. 
36 Bánfi (n 28).  
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sector is leading the confidence index in each industry, while the 
financial sector is the least trusted, but with the highest confidence 
growth.37  
The results of the survey can be compared with the increasing use of 
cryptocurrencies. According to Satoshi Nakamoto's work, the basic 
purpose of creating Bitcoin is to exclude financial institutions as trusted 
third parties from participating in payment services.38 This parallel leads 
to an alternative to the two-level bank system by establishing a special 
payment and settlement system for cryptocurrencies, called the 
blockchain. 
In terms of financial characteristics, the parties of cryptocurrency 
transactions are therefore not financial institutions, payment institutions 
or electronic money institutions. Legally relevant features of such a peer-
to-peer system include the ability to execute payment transactions 
without the involvement of financial intermediaries and the ability to 
execute each payment through an electronic communications network.  
One particular difference is the anonymity of the account holders and 
the transparency of the transactions.39 
Transactions should be considered quasi payment services or 
transactions, which focused on cryptocurrencies. In their form, 
cryptocurrencies are similar to account money and electronic money 
since payments appear as data (digital signals) and cryptocurrencies 
appear as a series of digital signatures. All this means that 
cryptocurrencies have non-material form. The parties and the subject of 
the transactions are linked in such a way that the beneficiary of the 
quasi payment transactions also strengthens the chain of former owners 
by confirming the digital signature.40 
Despite similarities, there are important differences between 
traditional forms of money and cryptocurrencies. These differences are 
 
37 ’Trust Barometer’ (Edelman, 2019) 
<https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2019-
02/2019_Edelman_Trust_Barometer_Global_Report_0.pdf?utm_source=website&utm
_medium=global_report&utm_campaign=downloads> accessed 30 August 2019. 
38 Nakamoto (n 13). 
39 Eszteri Dániel, ’Bitcoin: Az anarchisták pénze vagy a jövő fizetőeszköze?’ [2012] 
Infokommunikáció és Jog 71. 
40 Bánfi (n 28). 
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most likely to be interpreted in light of the centralized-decentralized 
binary code analysis.  
While traditional payment transactions are established and executed 
typically in a centralized model, cryptocurrency transactions are 
established and executed in a decentralized model. The decentralized 
model is characterized by the fact that not only a special institution has 
decision-making autonomy but many local players, as nodes. This also 
means that while the information distribution of the centralized system 
is vertical, the information distribution of the decentralized system is 
horizontal between nodes.41 
Examining the decentralized model in case of cryptocurrencies, both 
at the moment of ‘issuance’ and the execution of each transaction 
should be considered of significant importance. Although we cannot talk 
about issuing money in the traditional sense, a specific issuing method 
may be examined. Mining may be defined as an alternative to issuing 
new cryptocurrency, since miners are using software to help creating 
new cryptocurrencies and get them into the system by solving 
mathematical problems.42 Consequently, the community of mining can 
be interpreted as a special or quasi issuer. 
Distributed feature of cryptocurrencies (which can occur in both 
centralized and decentralized systems) should also be considered. The 
distributed system means that there are different nodes in the system 
that communicate continuously with each other. However, the 
distributed character does not equal with the decentralized character; a 
centralized system can be distributed. In a distributed and decentralized 
system, nodes are interconnected.43 
It is also necessary to identify specific IT procedures. These include 
the hash function, the digital signature and cryptography that is able to 
distinguish cryptocurrencies from other forms of money.
44
 
 
 
 
41 Kirankalyan Kulkarni, Learn Bitcoin and Blockchain (Packt, 2018) ch 3 
42 Cf. Marcell Tüzes, ’Bitcoin – A pénz új formája’ [2012] Infokommunikáció és Jog 
155. 
43 Kulkarni (n 39). 
44 See  János Folláth, Andrea Huszti, Attila Pethő, Informatikai biztonság és 
kriptográfia (Kempelen Farkas Hallgatói Információs Központ, 2011). 
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5.  A possible taxonomy 
Given the many specific features of cryptocurrencies, it should be 
emphasized that, inter alia, they shall be interpreted under the category 
of the legally relevant money if they existed in connection with a 
pecuniary claim against a financial institution, or could be used to 
access cash in charge of pecuniary claim or could be used as 
remuneration of transactions. In view of the above, this is conceptually 
excluded.45 
Examination of cryptocurrencies concluded that they could not be 
interpreted under the current and legally relevant concept of money. 
However, it is not a negligible circumstance that they typically perform 
almost all the economic functions of money.46 Therefore, it seems logical 
to take the view, on the one hand, that cryptocurrencies are similar in 
purpose and nature to money, and, on the other hand and on the basis 
of the first observation, could be defined as another dimension of the 
development of money. 
It is also appropriate to agree with the view that any commodity can 
function as money, given that money is mostly a symbol system.47 
Therefore, in order to address the legal uncertainty surrounding 
cryptocurrencies, a possible taxonomy needs to be established. 
In such a taxonomy, payment instruments may be the broadest 
category. This category should be interpreted as a broadly defined set in 
which both traditional and innovative payment instruments can be 
placed. Within the category of payment instruments, the regulated 
payment instruments can take place. These are banknotes, coins, 
account money and electronic money, so that the material and non-
material forms of money.  
Payment instruments intended to provide an alternative to traditional 
money, differ from the category of regulated payment instruments.
48
 
 
45 Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, ’Papíralapú ajándékutalvány 
készpénz-helyettesítő fizetési eszköznek minősül-e?’ 
<http://alk.mnb.hu/data/cms2103337/penz17.pdf> accessed 30 August 2019. 
46 See Tamás Gábor and Gábor Dávid Kiss, ’Bevezetés a kriptovaluták világába’ 
(2018) 1 (5) Gazdaság és Pénzügy 
<http://www.bankszovetseg.hu/Public/gep/2018/002-30ig%20Banfi%20Ziad.pdf> 
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Given that these alternative solutions typically mean virtual solutions, it 
is advisable to refer to these devices as alternative virtual payment 
instruments. Essentially, the category of alternative virtual payment 
instruments should be considered approximately equal with the category 
of the European Union’ definition of virtual currency. A common feature 
of the category of alternative virtual payment instruments is that they 
originate from intense innovation efforts of the 21st century. In this 
category cryptocurrencies can be interpreted as a subset because of 
their above-defined distinctive features. Taking into consideration these 
features, the study considers the concept of cryptocurrency developed 
by the ENISA to be acceptable, according to which  
 
“cryptocurrency refers to a math-based, decentralized convertible virtual 
currency that is protected by cryptography. - i.e., it incorporates the 
principles of cryptography to implement a distributed, decentralized, secure 
information economy.”49  
 
Within the category of alternative virtual payment instruments, virtual 
payment instruments do not meet the criteria of cryptocurrencies may 
mean a further subcategory.50 Centralized, non-convertible, non-
mineable virtual payment instruments are not considered de facto 
cryptocurrency under this study. Given that these are typically FinTech 
solutions, it may be advisable to define them as FinTech virtual 
currencies.  
Although not of particular relevance for the purposes of the study, it 
is necessary to refer to a third sub-category. This is the category of 
personal data which can also be used as payment instrument in the 21st 
century. 
It is necessary to distinguish instruments can only be validated on a 
limited network from the category of alternative virtual payment 
instruments. All this means that these instruments cannot leave the 
network in which they represent value. More precisely, they represent 
 
48 J. Glavanits: Blockchain technology in the glance of consumer protection. In: R. 
Funta (ed): Počítačové právo, UI, ochrana údajov a najväčšie technologické trendy. 
Sládkovičovo, 2019., 17–28. 
49 European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (n 8). 
50 As for examples centralized Ripple or LibraCoin (Facebook). 
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value only in the network and for the parties of the network. 
Subcategories can also be created in this category. Such a subcategory 
may include virtual payment instruments that can only be used in 
computer games. Alternatively, another sub-category may be set up by 
different cards and value stored on them issued by businesses.  
6.  Summary 
The aim of the study is to examine cryptocurrencies. In connection 
with cryptocurrencies, it is necessary to emphasize that the general trust 
should be considered the basis of the functioning of the monetary 
system. The role of trust, though a sub-legal factor, is unquestionable in 
the financial sector. For an instrument to be universally accepted as 
money, it is necessary to build social trust in it. This social trust naturally 
develops and consolidates if the instrument itself is reinforced by a 
system of state guarantees. These guarantees may be summed up in 
the provisions of consumer protection law and in the financial sphere, in 
the provisions of financial consumer protection law.51 
However, in the age of digitalization, the question arises whether the 
role of a guarantee system can still be fulfilled only by the state or an IT 
system that is transparent, robust and secure due to the use of 
technological solutions can also meet the said criteria. 
In order to answer the question, a test was carried out in which the 
parties, the subject, the financial and IT features of the transaction were 
emphasized. As a result of the test, it can be concluded that 
cryptocurrencies do not fall into the legally relevant category of money, 
and therefore cannot be subject to financial consumer protection 
provisions. In addition to the establishment of taxonomic categories, 
regarding the financial consumer protection needs expressed above, the 
question of possible regulation arises. Beside this, it is necessary to take 
into account the enhanced technological nature of the area. Strict legal 
 
51 See Council Directive 2014/49/EU of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee 
schemes [2014] OJ L173/149, Council Directive 2015/2366 of 25 November 2015 
on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 
2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing 
Directive 2007/64/EC [2015] OJ L337/35, Council Directive 2014/65/EUof 15 May 
2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and 
Directive 2011/61/EU [2014] OJ L173/349 or the FIN-NET. 
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provisions do not necessarily mean the best solution for regulating 
technology. Instead, technology solutions are typically standardized.   
In addition, it is necessary to point out the fact that, in the field of 
cryptocurrencies, the technological and IT characteristics ensure that the 
system operates almost without error and misuse. These characteristics 
may be suitable for meeting the requirement of high confidence in the 
financial sector. 
Ensuring the possibility of self- and co-regulation for alternative 
payment instruments may be an open question for the future regulation. 
It is easy to see that cryptocurrencies relate to traditional money as self- 
and co-regulation relate to traditional law: they are an alternative. 
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Abstract: Rapid advancement in Information and Communication Technology over the 
past two decades has affected human life in every respect; education sector being no 
exception. World over, Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) have adopted ICT for 
enhancing their efficiency and effectiveness. India has undertaken a number of policy 
initiatives to promote the use of ICT in HEIs in the country. Available secondary data 
clearly shows that the penetration of Internet into rural India is only a fraction of the 
figure for urban India. In light of the above, this paper will find answers to the following 
questions: 1) What is the current level and preparedness of students regarding 
adoption of ICT in Universities located in rural India 2) What are the technology needs 
and preferences of these students for Academic purposes and what is the readiness of 
the system to fulfil those? 
The study uses the DigComp framework developed by the European Commission 
that examines digital competence on the parameters of internet safety awareness, 
digital communication, creating digital content and problem solving. Primary data is 
collected using structured questionnaire, with close-ended questions, from 260 
students in four pre-selected universities from rural India. The study will be divided into 
two parts: 1) discussion on the Higher Education system in rural India and the role of 
ICT through a review of the relevant literature, leading up to the formulation of the 
objectives of the research 2) detailed analysis of the findings to answer the research 
questions. 
 
Keywords: India, HEIs, ICT, Digital competence, rural students  
 
1.  Introduction 
Rapid advancement in Information and Communication Technology 
over the past two decades has affected human life in every respect; 
education sector being no exception. The landscape of teaching and 
learning is changing with digital technologies like internet, computers 
and mobiles accelerating student’s learning, enhancing access to 
educational opportunities, and supporting interactivity, interaction and 
 
* PhD student, National University of Public Service, Doctoral School of Public 
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collaboration.1 The advantages of digital technologies are ubiquitous 
because of the unique features of technologies, which include 
portability, low cost, personalization and improved communication 
abilities and interactivity. World over, Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) 
are investing in ICTs for enhancing their efficiency and effectiveness not 
just in the administrative management but also in academic 
management. In both developed and developing countries digital 
technologies have become an icon of 21st century higher education 
provision. In this changing educational landscape, learners require new 
literacies. In recent years, digital competence has become a key concept 
in discussions on the kind of skills and understanding learners need in 
the Knowledge Society.2  
India has a population of 1.35 billion and a high population among 
them is young and enrolled in higher education. According to 2011 
census, 72% of the population resides in rural areas and 28% live in 
urban conglomerates. The ICT infrastructure in rural areas is limited and 
not evenly distributed. On the other hand the urban areas have the right 
infrastructure and high internet penetration. The studies show that there 
is an urban rural divide and two thirds of the population in India do not 
have access to internet.3 The review of literature suggests that socio-
economic barriers like poverty, illiteracy, poor awareness of technology 
has restrained the growth of digital literacy in rural India. This divide is 
prevalent in urban–rural education institutions also. HEIs located in 
urban areas have better access to new technologies compared to the 
institutions located in rural or semi-urban areas. Hence urban academic 
institutions can equip students with better knowledge of ICT.  
In the last decade, however, India has escalated its efforts to bridge 
the rural urban digital divide in terms of infrastructure and internet 
penetration. India has taken giant leaps in recent years to use ICT in its 
education system. The Government of India came up with the idea of 
 
1  N. Selwyn, ’The use of computer technology in university teaching and learning: a 
critical perspective’ 2007 23 (2) Journal of Computer Assisted Learning 
(doi:10.1111/j.1365-2729.2006.002) 83–94. 
2 Eliana Gallardo-Echenique, Janaina Minelli de Oliveira, Luis Marqués-Molias and 
Francesc Esteve-Mon, ‘Digital Competence in the Knowledge Society’ (2015) 11 
MERLOT Journal of Online Learning and Teaching 1-16. 
3 Amit Singh Khokhar, ’Digital Literacy: How Prepared Is India to Embrace It?’ 2016 
7 (3) International Journal of Digital Literacy and Digital Competence 1-12. 
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promontory use of ICTs in education in its Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2012-
2017). There are plenty of ICT projects launched in India, which help and 
motivate learners to learn using ICT tools. A study by Sampath states 
that initiatives have been taken to implement ICT-integrated education 
and enabling provision of ICT-integrated examination and e-governance 
at the institutional and systemic level including setting up of education 
portal(s) (India Planning Commission, 2013).
4
 E-Gyankosh, which aims at 
preserving digital learning resources is a knowledge repository launched 
by IGNOU, the National Open University. Almost 95% of IGNOU’s printed 
material has been digitized and uploaded on the repository. The National 
Programme for Technology Enhanced Learning (NPTEL) launched in 
2001 is another joint initiative of IITs and IISc which promotes education 
through technology. The National Mission on Education through ICT is 
centrally sponsored scheme submitted by the Ministry of HRD (Human 
Resource Development) and approved by the Cabinet Committee on 
Economic Affairs (CCEA). The Mission has planned a variety of initiatives 
aimed at developing and standardizing digital content for Indian higher 
education segment. The Mission envisions catering to the learning 
needs of 500 million people in the country.5 
But all these initiatives can be fully successful only if these digital 
resources are accessed and adopted by students of rural India; at the 
same time penetration of appropriate infrastructure needed for digital 
access should also be available in rural India. We are yet to achieve the 
desired level of ICT adoption in higher education in the whole country. 
One of the reasons for the underutilisation of these initiatives is the low 
level of digital literacy among the rural students. The majority of Indians 
living in rural areas have poor access to internet, it is necessary that they 
are exposed and trained in basic computing skills and ICT utilization. 
Extending and improving digital competence is an essential component 
in the development of employable graduates. Since 90% of new jobs will 
 
4 B.T. Sampath Kumar and S.U. Shiva Kumara, ’ The digital divide in India: use and 
non-use of ICT by rural and urban students’ 2018 World Journal of Science, Technology 
and Sustainable Development 
<https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/WJSTSD-07-2017-
0021/full/html?fullSc=1&mbSc=1>. 
5 U. K. Pegu, ‘Information and Communication Technology in Higher Education in 
India: Challenges and Opportunities’ (2014) 4 International Journal of Information and 
Computation Technology 513-518. 
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require excellent digital skills, those without sufficient ICT skills will be at 
a disadvantage in the labour market and have less access to 
information. Digital literacy enables us to match the medium to the 
information presented and to the audience targeted.6 ICT can be 
effectively used to enhance the quality of learning and create social 
payoffs, which would be conducive to sustainable growth and equitable 
development.
7
 
With this background, the study has been conducted to assess the 
digital competence of rural students in Higher Education on their 
Readiness i.e. the ability to understand and appreciate digital 
technology. This study will help HEIs design the innovative use of ICT 
based on the students’ needs and abilities in the rural areas aimed at 
embedding digital competences into curriculum development and 
delivery. 
2.  Digital Competence 
In the 1990s computers were limited in availability to a few 
professionals, but with advances in technology there has been a shift 
from programming languages to graphic user interfaces, the 
technologies have become user friendly and more available to the 
society.
8
 Now there is a need to take advantage of technology and to be 
functional in society, digital competence or literacy is the essential 
requirement of life. Today it is paramount that every citizen should have 
the opportunity to experience the value, technology can bring into the 
way they live, work and exist. Digital Literacy is recognised as one of the 
UN’s Sustainable Development goals. It has also been officially 
recognised that digital literacy is of the same importance as reading, 
writing and numeracy.
9
 According to OECD,
10
 Digital competence has 
 
6 C. Lankshear and M. Knobel, Digital Literacies – Concepts, Policies and Practices 
(Peter Lang 2008). 
7 A. M. Barret, ’The Education Millennium Development Goals Beyond 2015: 
Prospects for Quality and Learners, EdQual Working Paper No. 13, 2009. 
8 Expert views on DIGCOMP, see A. Ferrari, ‘Digital Competence in Practice: An 
Analysis of Frameworks’ (2012) European Commission JRC 68116. 
9 Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 
2006 on key competences for lifelong learning. OJ L 394, 30.12.2006, 10–18. 
10 OECD, PISA 2009 Results: What Students Know and Can Do. Students 
performance in reading, mathematics and science (vol. 1, OECD 2010) 
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both become a requirement and a right. India has also recognised that 
building digital skills is as essential as creating digital infrastructure. 
Apart from providing the infrastructure, government has also launched 
National Digital Literacy Mission to impart training to one person in every 
family where none of the members are digitally literate so as to enable 
them to take part in citizenship through e-governance. But what exactly 
is meant by digital skills?  
It has been interpreted in various ways (e.g. Digital Literacy, Digital 
Competence, e Literacy, e-Skills, e Competence, Computer literacy, and 
Media literacy) in policy documents, in the academic literature, in 
teaching, learning and certification practices. All these terms highlight 
the need to handle technology in the digital age.
11
 So we understand 
that the concept of digital Competence is a multi-faceted moving target, 
covering many areas and literacies and rapidly evolving as new 
technologies appear. According to Ferrari, being digitally competent 
today implies the ability to understand media, to search for information, 
be critical about what is retrieved and be able to communicate with 
others using variety of digital tools and applications. Further, the concept 
is much wider than the ability to use a specific set of tools or 
applications. Digital competence is not centred on a tool oriented 
perspective only.12 Eshet argued that digital literacy is more than just 
using software as it covers most of the cognitive skills like reading 
instructions, using digital reproduction in learning and, evaluating 
information.13 The study provided a holistic conceptual model to 
effectively utilise digital literacy in educational contexts. Alkali and 
Hamburger built upon the work of Eshet (2002) by arguing that digital 
literacy comprises of five digital skills namely: photo-visual skills, 
reproduction skills, branching skills, information skills and, socio-
emotional skills.14 An institutional definition comes from the European 
Commission. Digital competence, as defined in the European Parliament 
and the Recommendation on Key Competences for Lifelong Learning of 
 
11 Ferrari (n 8). 
12 Y. Eshet, ‘Digital literacy: A new terminology framework and its application to the 
design of meaningful technology-based learning environments’ (2002) ERIC Paper 143. 
13 Eshet (n 12) quoted by Khokhar (n 3). 
14 Y. E. Alkali and Y. Amichai-Hamburger, ‘Experiments in digital literacy’ 2004 7 (4) 
CyberPsychology & Behavior (doi:10.1089/cpb.2004.7.421 PMID:15331029) 421–
429, quoted by Khokhar (n 3). 
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the Council of the European Union,15 ‘involves the confident and critical 
use of Information Society Technology (IST) for work, leisure and 
communication. It is underpinned by basic skills in ICT: the use of 
computers to retrieve, assess, store, produce, present and exchange 
information, and to communicate and participate in collaborative 
networks via the Internet’. 
We can see that the scope of digital skills has changed over the 
years. After a focus on access of ICT and Internet in the 1990s, a new 
type of digital divide has appeared which goes beyond access. As society 
is becoming digitised, the knowledge, skills and attitudes that are 
needed are becoming manifold: being digitally literate today is not 
restrained to the understanding of hardware and software devices. It 
now encompasses the knowledge, skills and attitude needed to be 
digitally competent. The management of information and ability to use 
the internet with the knowledge about the risks of internet are seen as 
crucial fields. Moreover critical thinking, creativity and innovation are 
essential aspects of digital competence.
16
  The all-encompassing 
definition of Digital Competence thus is: 
Digital Competence is a set of knowledge, skills, attitudes (thus 
including abilities, strategies, values and awareness) that are required 
when using ICT and digital media to perform tasks;  solve problems; 
communicate; manage information; collaborate; create and share 
content; build knowledge efficiently; appropriately, critically, 
autonomously, flexibly for work, leisure, participation, learning, 
socialising, consuming and empowerment.17 
We now come to understand that the ability to use specific tools and 
applications is just one of the several competence areas that need to be 
developed by citizens in order to function in a digital environment. The 
concept of digital competence includes domains such as internet safety 
awareness, digital communication, creating digital content and problem-
solving. This understanding of digital competence is in line with the 
digital competence framework initiated by the European Commission.
18
 
The other areas that need to be taken into account for a multi-
 
15 Recommendation (n 9) 13. 
16 Ferrari (n 8). 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid. 
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dimensional approach and more adapted to the current needs is as per 
the framework developed by Digcomp. 
 
Figure 1: The Digcomp framework (source: Ferrari 2012) 
 
World over, new digital readiness programmes are being set by the 
respective governments to coordinate initiatives on digital inclusion, 
cyber safety, information and media. Policy makers and educational 
institutions need to be at the forefront to devote resources to educate 
citizens and future citizens to become digitally competent and become 
functional in this digitised world. 
As mentioned earlier, 72% of India’s population lives in rural areas, 
while 28% lives in towns and in urban conglomerates. Poor access to 
technology, besides poverty, illiteracy and a general lack of awareness 
has restrained the growth of digital literacy in rural India. It is rather 
disappointing that while in the developed world the divide is over skills 
and attitude, in India the argument of digital divide persists. There is no 
dearth of initiatives in the form of schemes and resources earmarked by 
the Government of India to bridge this divide, more so in the field of 
Higher Education as discussed in the preceding sections. This study 
aims to examine the digital competence among students of Higher 
Educational Institutes in rural India. The following section discusses the 
objectives of the study in detail. 
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3.  Objectives of the study 
The literature on ICT penetration in India suggests an urban rural 
divide. The perception is that socio-economic barriers like poverty, 
illiteracy, poor awareness of technology has restrained the growth of 
digital literacy in rural India. Affordability of digital technology is a major 
challenge in rural India with low average incomes. India’s linguistic 
diversity and limited penetration of English language creates availability 
gridlock. Concurrently, Government of India has introduced many digital 
initiatives in Higher Education to educate the masses, thus breaking the 
barrier of cost and entry, especially to vulnerable groups, using the latest 
technology available. MOOCs developed by qualified and exceptional 
teachers on the SWAYAM platform is such an example in India. The 
study by Sampath shows that the Massive Open Online Courses 
(MOOCs) have emerged as one of the most promising methods of 
catering higher education in an open and online fashion that would 
ensure and enhance the quality education for all, thus showing the 
pathway to ubiquitous learning in India.19  Under these circumstances, 
the question is to ascertain the digital competence of the rural students 
to access these digital technologies. The objectives of this study were to 
examine (i) whether the rural students were ready to embrace 
technology in HEIs? (2) How did they perceive their readiness to receive 
ICT-based instruction? (3) What are their observed technological 
practices in enhancing themselves as being ICT-based students? 
The present study is an attempt to assess the digital competence of 
the rural students enrolled in higher education on their readiness 
towards accepting digital technology i.e. the ability to understand and 
appreciate digital technology in education. The assessment is done 
using the conceptual framework as described by the European 
Commission in the form of the Digcomp Framework described here in 
the following section. 
3.1. DIGCOMP: The conceptual reference model framework  
The DIGCOMP framework developed by European Commission is 
chosen to assess the digital competence of rural students. The 
 
19 Sampath (n 4). 
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framework has been based on extensive study of different frameworks 
globally. According to its guidelines, DigComp originated from the study 
of many ongoing initiatives for the development and assessment of ICT 
skills in Europe, and to encourage their evolution. The framework serves 
as a comprehensive literature on assessment of citizens’ digital 
competence. At the same time, DigComp aims to help citizens 
understand what digital competence can mean for them today, by 
providing an articulate and well-structured framework that describes this 
domain. The framework has divided the competence into five broad 
areas – Information; Communication; Content-creation; Safety and 
Problem-solving, which are further expanded to 21 competences. Each 
of the 21 competences is provided with eight levels of proficiency under 
foundation, intermediate and advanced level. The competences are also 
supported with examples of the related knowledge, skills and attitudinal 
changes and accomplishments that are desirable. It defines digital 
competence as a necessary element of life skills that are required for 
lifelong learning.
20
 In comparison to this framework, the ‘Digital India’ 
program lacks a sufficient framework for judging the digital capabilities 
of its citizens. The DIGCOMP framework competence areas and 
competences can be used as a guide to characterise the digital 
competence profiles of groups and individuals.21  The distinguishing 
feature of this framework is that it focuses more on the critical aspect of 
retrieving information and also on the risks of internet.  Academic 
Literature points to the relevance of these parameters in the Indian 
context. For instance, a study on e-governance initiatives in the Indian 
state of Maharashtra points to a huge lack of people with relevant 
qualifications and experience to implement and man e-governance 
projects in the state.
22
 
 
20 Khokhar (n 3). 
21 G. Evangelinos and D. Holley, ’A Qualitative Exploration of the EU Digital 
Competence (DIGCOMP) Framework: A Case Study Within Healthcare Education’ in G. 
Vincenti, A. Bucciero and C. Vaz de Carvalho (eds), E-Learning, E-Education, and Online 
Training (Springer 2014) (doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13293-8_11) 85-92. 
22 Laxman L. Kumarwad and Rajendra D. Kumbhar, ‘E-Governance Initiatives in 
Maharashtra (India): Problems and Challenges’ 2016 8 (5) International Journal of 
Information Engineering and Electronic Business (DOI: 10.5815/ijieeb.2016.05) 18-
25. 
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A short description of these competence areas and their descriptors 
under each area is enumerated below: 
i. Information and data Literacy: Identify, locate, retrieve, store, 
organize and analyse digital information, judging its relevance and 
purpose 
i a. Browsing, searching and filtering information  
i b. Evaluating information and data 
i c. Storing and retrieving information and data 
 
ii. Communication:- Communicate in digital environments, share 
resources through online tools, link with other and collaborate through 
digital tools, interact with and participate in communities and networks, 
cross-cultural awareness: 
ii a. Interacting through digital technologies 
ii b. Sharing information and content through digital technologies 
ii c. Engaging in citizenship through digital technologies 
ii d. Collaborating through digital technologies 
ii e. Netiquette 
ii f. Managing digital identity 
 
iii. Content creation:- Create and edit new content (from word 
processing to images and video); integrate and re-elaborate previous 
knowledge and content; produce creative expressions, media outputs 
and programming; deal with and apply intellectual property rights and 
licences: 
iii a. Developing content  
iii b. Integrating and re-elaborating 
iii c. Copyright and licences 
iii d. Programming 
 
iv. Safety:- Personal protection, data protection, digital identify 
protection, security measures, safe and sustainable use: 
iv a. Protecting devices 
iv b. Protecting personal data and privacy 
iv c. Protecting health and well-being 
iv d. Protecting the environment 
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v. Problem solving:-To understand where one’s own digital 
competence needs to be improved or updated. To be able to support 
others with their digital competence development. To seek opportunities 
for self-development and to keep up-to-date with the digital evolution: 
v a. Solving technical problems  
v b. Identifying needs and technological responses 
v c. Creatively using digital technologies   
v d. Identifying digital competence gaps   
4.  Methodology 
This paper documents a quantitative exploratory study of the 
readiness of rural students enrolled in Higher Education based on the 
questionnaire developed on the competence areas of DIGCOMP 
framework. The questionnaire is the main instrument of the study. 
Questionnaire is designed on the 21 themes of competence areas of the 
DIGICOMP framework. The questionnaire acts as a self-assessment tool 
to develop an understanding of digital competence, and its components 
(knowledge, skills and attitudes).  
The questionnaire has been administered to the students of rural 
universities/colleges set up in rural India and this constituted the 
participant group. Survey method has been used to conduct the study. 
4.1. Demographic information of respondents  
A structured questionnaire on the DIGCOMP themes was sent to the 
participants who were from the rural campuses of Maulana Azad 
National Urdu University, University of Burdwan, Visva Bharati and 
Rayalseema University.  
The number of graduate student responses was taken as 266. Out of 
these 266 students who responded to the questionnaire on digital 
competence, 62% were females and 38% were males. The girls were 
mostly pursuing B.Ed. Course and most of the students were from the 
undergraduate courses.  
4.2. Use of digital devices 
The survey reflects that the rural students have access to smart 
phones and that the digital divide has narrowed relating to access. This 
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development is an eye opener in the sense that the access to digital 
technologies in rural areas has been achieved wholly contrary to rhetoric 
of digital divide. Figure 2 depicts their proficiency level; students knew 
the basics (terminology, navigation, functionality) of digital devices and 
used it for elementary purposes. However, they use it in everyday life 
and use simple content. Most of the rural students were, however, not 
aware of the Massive Online Open Courses or Open Education 
Resources. Figure 2 also suggests there is a minority population of 
respondents who do not own a digital device; some students are 
completely disengaged from technologies and involving them in the use 
of technology might prove really difficult. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Extract of questionnaire 
5.  Data Analysis  
5.1. Information and data literacy 
Participants report knowledge of digital skills to retrieve information 
from various digital sources. Most of the rural students are comfortable 
using the mobile phones and use this as a medium; rather than laptops 
or computer. However, as per the data shown below, most of them are 
novice in retrieving information and majority lack skills to filter 
information according to their need. Many however, do not possess the 
skills to carry out information searches successfully and they seek the 
support of Library personnel for the required information. A few  of the 
students  have the ability to recognise the need for information and have 
the ability to locate the needed information but are beginners and do not 
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quite know how to evaluate, only 10% have the skills to interpret the 
gathered information with respect to its authority, usefulness and 
authenticity. Significant few participants are competent in developing 
search strategies and are able to classify and store the gathered 
information for future use. 
 
Figure 3: Levels of Proficiency 
5.2. Communication and Collaboration 
Communication is defined as communicating, sharing resources, 
linking and collaborating, interacting, facilitating cross-cultural 
awareness and participating in communities and networks by the 
utilisation of digital technologies. Participants in this competent area are 
questioned on these themes. The rural students use technologies that 
include voice calls, mobile texting, and instant messaging. The prevailing 
reasons are practicality, ease-of-use and cost. Only a few use skype or 
audio-video conferencing. The results reflected that the students are 
more comfortable on social networking sites. Of the total students 85% 
were active on social networking confirming the fact that the students 
used digital technologies for social purposes than academic purposes 
(Fig 4). Rural students are also not comfortable with mobile apps which 
provided services and thus do not engage in citizenship (Fig 5). They are 
sceptical to use the money transfer apps and preferred depositing fees 
in person. Majority of the respondents are not aware of the web portals 
and institutional repositories.  It is thus concluded that the rural 
students use the mobile to connect with friends and for entertainment in 
their day to day life. 
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Figure 4: Medium of digital communication used by rural students 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Use of apps for citizenship 
5.3. Digital Content Creation 
The ‘Content Creation’ definition includes the creating and editing of 
multimedia content, appropriating and remixing of existing content, 
producing creative expressions such as media artefacts and 
programming, dealing with and applying intellectual property rights and 
licencing.  
Digital Literacy has bought on a new type of reading. For example, Blogs, 
Wikipedia entries allow and encourage the reader to become an author. 
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According to Rainie many students become writers when they respond 
on e-mails, send SMS and participate in social networks.23 
In this study, the results of the survey show that although majority of 
the respondents could produce simple digital content, 27% of the 
respondents are familiar with wikis and blogs and can produce content 
on this platform. This result showed that learning to use technology has 
eased and rural students are adequately competent to grasp technology 
as depicted in figure 6. 
 
 
 
     
Figure 6: Knowledge about copyright and licencing 
5.4. Safety 
Safety has been defined as protecting personal information including 
digital identity and data, taking security measures in the digital 
environment and safety, and sustainability when using digital 
technologies (DIGCOMP). The questionnaire includes questions on the 
above themes of the safety competence. The respondents were 
generally aware of protecting their device and knew the use of 
passwords. The health aspects of using digital technology safely includes 
right posture, positioning, size of screen, keyboard layout, foot rest, use 
of light, document holder and hearing protection, just to name a few. 
 
23 Quoted by Ferrari, 2011. 
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Figure 7 depicts that 40% of the students were aware of the health risks 
associated with the use of digital technology (e.g. risk of addiction). 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Digital safety 
5.5. Problem –Solving 
The ‘Problem Solving’ competence area has been defined as the 
identification of digital needs and resources, making informed decisions 
on digital tools, solving problems by utilising digital technologies, 
creatively using technologies, solving technical problems and updating 
one’s own and other’s digital competences. The survey on this 
competence depicted a median range of proficiency among students. 
However, one has to keep in consideration the fact that this 
questionnaire is a self-assessment tool, and students could have 
misjudged their ability to use ICT and have over-estimated their true 
proficiency level. Evidence from other studies shows that student’s use 
of ICT is more a result of digital access than digital competence. 
Participants have also reported that they get to know about new 
technologies mainly from friends and family or word of mouth. Likewise 
when they are stuck in problem related to technology they take help 
from friends and overcome the challenges of technology.  It was also 
learnt through the student’s responses that they have knowledge about 
hardware and software in technology but admitted that they could not 
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describe the differences in functionality, troubleshoot or differentiate 
potential faults. 
6.  Findings 
 It has been learnt that the ICT tools that is best suited for rural 
India is the mobile. Mobiles are cheaper than PC, more portable 
with extended battery life suited to regions even where electricity 
supply is erratic. The infrastructure needed to connect wireless 
devices to the Internet is easier and less expensive to build. 
There are no costly and burdensome applications to load, 
maintain and update. Thus, mobile is best suited for rural India to 
inculcate ICT in education.  
 As regarding their digital competence level, reliance on mobile 
technology and its applications like e-mail, and social networking 
apps have made the students e-ready for technology in 
education. Internet access and their day to day engagement with 
mobile based apps can be harnessed for enhanced performance 
in academics too. 
 One of the important findings is that the digital divide between 
urban and rural students has narrowed. Digital devices are 
becoming embedded in lives of rural students as much as urban 
students.  
 The survey on digital competence of rural students has given an 
opportunity for HEIs to build upon the student’s social media 
experience. The usage of digital device for learning is minimal as 
depicted by the survey. Students could be encouraged to access 
OER and e-learning platforms to enhance their educational 
knowledge.  
 The results of the study also shows that the students’ perception 
of the level of their digital competence is higher than actual. 
Students are confusing their digital media skills with the skills 
required for accessing relevant information for education on all 
five competence areas of DIGCOMP. 
 To conclude, the overall general competency levels of rural 
students in the selected HEIs are somewhat low for successful 
adoption of ICT for teaching and learning. However, it is 
recommended that digital competency development of rural 
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students become an educational priority before launching ICT 
schemes like SWAYAM for education sector since it has a great 
potential even in rural areas. It would further assure 
inclusiveness in terms of access and achievement of quality 
higher education irrespective of the locational disparity. 
7.  Conclusion 
It is predicted that 26 billion devices will be connected to internet by 
2020 confirming the wide-spread diffusion of ICT. ICT has also 
revolutionized the delivery of education, allowing access to higher 
education for greater numbers of students at lower cost and with more 
flexibility. In this landscape there is a need for students (future citizens) 
to acquire digital competence for personal development, active 
citizenship, social inclusion and employment. It was presumed before 
the study that there was a restrained access to digital devices in the 
rural sector. However it was interesting to note that almost all rural 
students were using smart phones and had experimented it for social 
entertainment and connecting with friends. We can therefore conclude 
from the study that the digital divide on access has narrowed between 
urban and rural students. However, due to the lack of awareness, the 
right skills and attitudes have not been developed in rural students to 
garner benefits of technology in education. It is therefore recommended 
that digital competency be developed and assessed on all competence 
areas for optimal utilization of opportunities arising due to diffusion of 
ICTs in higher education. This will not only help in coping with 
advancement of technology but also help in ending the urban rural 
digital divide. 
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Abstract: Present paper explains the need and possible legal approach to the End User 
License Agreements regulating the transactions inside video games, particularly, 
focusing on the purchase of intangible items online for the “real life” money. This 
article answers two main question: why e-commerce rules should be applied to the in-
game transactions and why intellectual property law rules are not enough to protect 
interest of both developers and users. The research focuses on gaps in existing legal 
procedures regulating (or not regulating) virtual transactions, stresses on the necessity 
of new legal models’ application in gaming industry and underlines the importance of 
amendments to current European legislation with the focus on video games 
commoditization in order to protect consumer rights, free movement of digital goods 
and to secure Digital Single Market Strategy of the European Union.  
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1.  Introduction 
Since 1961, when MIT student Steven Russel created the first-ever 
video game “Spacewar”, which inspired the further appearance of such 
popular video games as “Asteroids” and “Pong”,1 gaming industry went 
much further. Nowadays almost every electronic device has access to 
the Internet and both online and offline video games.  
Together with the technological development and the new ways of 
concluding the contract being available, electronic commerce (e-
commerce) in gaming industry became more sophisticated involving 
 

  
* PhD student, University of Pécs, Faculty of Law, 
olenademchenkomail@gmail.com. 
1 A. Ramos, L. López et al., ‘The Legal Status of Video Games: Comparative Analysis 
in National Approaches’ (World Intellectual Property Organization, 2013) 
<http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/activities/pdf/comparative_anal
ysis_on_video_games.pdf> accessed 24 October 2018, 7. 
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digital assets and a purchase of intangible virtual items. At the same 
time, most of the European e-commerce regulations are focused only on 
traditional online shopping. It seems that European regulations in 
gaming industry stop being valid after the purchase of a gaming 
software, however, considering current situation on the market such 
limited approach is against the real need and leaves millions of 
consumers (only in 2016 in Europe were counted 338 millions of 
players2) unprotected. Therefore, the present paper will focus on legal 
challenges arising with the application of existing e-commerce legal 
frames to the gaming industry. 
Transactions in gaming industry can involve significant amounts of 
money, which does not end with the purchase of gaming software. 
Different types of video games are available on the market, including 
free-to-play (software is free, but the company gets revenue from in-
game micro-transactions3) and pay-to-play (where player pays for 
software in order to access the game4) video games. According to the 
statistics, only in 2016 the total revenue in Europe from free-to-play 
video games reached 2 900 millions of U.S. dollars and 642 millions of 
U.S. dollars from pay-to-play video games5.  
Free-to-play video games bring the majority of the annual revenue to 
the video game companies, as players are attracted with possibility of 
playing without paying for the software, but during the game players are 
seduced with purchases of virtual items with functional (for example, 
virtual weapon) and without functional assistance (for example, so-called 
“skin”) to the game. Usually such transactions require insignificant 
amount of money (micro-transactions)6 and, therefore, the player does 
not see or cannot estimate the total cost of a video game, which can 
raise a question from consumer protection perspective. 
 
2 ’2019 Video Game Industry Statistics, Trends & Data’ (WePC, June 2019) 
<https://www.wepc.com/news/video-game-statistics/#video-gaming-industry-
overview> accessed 20 June 2019. 
3 Myriam Davidovichi-Nora, ‘Paid and Free Digital Business Models. Innovations in 
the Video Game Industry’ (2014) Digiworld Economic Journal, no. 94 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2534022> accessed 20 June  
2019, 87. 
4 ibid 85. 
5 ’2019 Video Game Industry Statistics’ (n 2). 
6 Davidovichi-Nora (n 3) 88, 94. 
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Notwithstanding mentioned above, not all transactions inside free-to-
play video games bear insignificant character. In the Entropia Universe 
video game, an item, “Club Neverdie”, was sold for 635,000 U.S. dollars, 
in “Second life” game, a virtual city of Amsterdam was sold for 50,000 
U.S. dollars to the consumers7; in the Dota 2 video game, a player spent 
38,000 U.S. dollars for “Ethereal Flames Pink War Dog” item8. In 2010 
the most expensive video game item ever – virtual planet Calypso – was 
sold for 6 million U.S. dollars in Entropia Universe video game, which for 
now stipulates Guiness World Record9. 
Considering mentioned above, e-commerce in gaming industry shows 
significant turnover, however, there are no specific e-commerce rules, 
which can be adopted to the virtual items purchase in video games, as 
still nowadays all legal regulation considering video games end up on 
intellectual property law approach. At the same time, most of existing e-
commerce regulations cannot be applied due to the specific features of 
certain games. 
Considering significance of transactions in video game industry on 
the intangible items purchase, there is an urgent need to adopt existing 
rules in order to protect consumer rights in gaming industry and to 
secure Digital Single Market policy of the EU.  Present paper will analyze 
legal challenges arising in the connection with the application of 
intellectual property rules, contract or property law to in-game 
transactions and will show possible ways to amend the rules regulating 
e-commerce in connection to commoditized free-to-play video games. 
  
 
7 News Report, ‘Top 10 Most Expensive Virtual Items In Game Ever Sold’ 
(GadgetRoyal, 2018) <https://www.gadgetroyal.com/top-10-most-expensive-virtual-
items-in-game-ever-sold/> accessed 24 October 2018. 
8 ibid. 
9 ibid; Guiness World Record <https://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/world-
records/92207-most-valuable-virtual-object> accessed 24 October 2018. 
196 Olena Demchenko 
2.  Legal Approach to the Developer vs User Relationships 
2.1. Current Regulation on in-game Transactions 
Nowadays virtual property rights are managed within the framework 
of the intellectual property rights protection10. Video game providers 
bind their users with so-called “Terms of Service” or “End User License 
Agreement” (EULA), which regulates not only behavior of the user in the 
game, but in many cases as well grants transfer of intellectual property 
rights for items created by the user in the virtual environment and all 
property rights outside of the game for virtual objects purchased in the 
game by the user11. 
Therefore, virtual items, including virtual in-game currency, which 
were created by the video game company (the developer) are usually 
considered as intellectual property of this company. For example, 
according to EULA of the Rocket League video game company, the 
trader: 
 
”…hereby grants you the nonexclusive, non-transferable, non-sublicensable, 
limited and revocable right and license to use Virtual Currency and Virtual 
Goods obtained by you for your personal non-commercial gameplay 
exclusively within the Software. Except as otherwise prohibited by 
applicable law, Virtual Currency and Virtual Goods obtained by you are 
licensed to you, and you hereby acknowledge that no title or ownership in or 
to Virtual Currency and Virtual Goods is being transferred or assigned 
 
10 J. Fairfield, ‘Virtual Property’ (2005) 85 Boston University Law Review (Indiana 
Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 35) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=807966> 
accessed 2 November 2018, 1050; J. Z. Gong, ‘Defining and Addressing Virtual 
Property in International Treaties’ (2015) 17 Boston University J. SCI. & TECH. L. 
<https://www.bu.edu/jostl/files/2015/02/Gong_Web_171.pdf> accessed 02 
November 2018, 20; J.  Stein, ‘The Legal Nature of Video Games – Adapting Copyright 
Law to Multimedia’ (2015) 2 (1) Press Start <https://press-
start.gla.ac.uk/index.php/press-start/article/view/25/11> accessed 3 November 
2018, 44. 
11 N. Volanis, ‘Legal and policy issues of virtual property’ (2007) 3 (2) Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven, Int. J. Web Based 
Communities<https://www.law.kuleuven.be/citip/en/archive/copy_of_publications/91
206-volanis2f90.pdf> accessed 28 October 2018, 334. 
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hereunder. This Agreement should not be construed as a sale of any rights 
in Virtual Currency and Virtual Goods.”
12
 
 
The gaming company provides no property rights to virtual goods 
created, purchased or obtained on the video game platform by user. 
Moreover, on conditions usually prescribed in the EULA, the developers 
can on their own consideration delete purchased property or exclude 
player from the game13. When the player spends 6 million U.S. dollars 
for a virtual item (example discussed above), and such player is facing 
the risk of being deleted from the game, the risk of non-delivery of item 
and the risk of the destruction of such item due to event in the game or 
sole decision of the developer. Such situation can be considered as a 
violation of consumer rights and e-commerce regulations. 
In Eve Online video game, one virtual space battle, caused by the 
delay of the payment in “real life” money by one player needed to protect 
his spaceship, resulted an estimate loss of 300,000 U.S. dollars for 
different consumers14. As it can be seen, in free-to-play video games it 
can be not only possible to spend money, but also required to buy virtual 
items in order not to suffer loses in the game. 
Nowadays in-game virtual property relationships are limited not only 
to the developer vs player relationships. There are many new businesses 
operating on the gaming market – third parties, which are selling items 
on intermediary platforms for particular video games; or third parties, 
which connected by agreement with a gaming company in order to 
provide online platform for users to play particular game. In this cases 
player is limited by several EULAs from different trader, which can 
conflict one with another.  
Besides virtual items transactions leaded by video game companies, 
companies trading virtual assets were created following the demand. On 
 
12 EULA of the RocketLeague <https://www.rocketleague.com/eula/> accessed 21 
April 2019. 
13 News Report, ‘China's first 'virtual property' insurance launched’ (China Daily, 
2011) <https://kotaku.com/5818906/china-launches-virtual-property-insurance> 
accessed 2 November 2018. 
14 News Report ‘Eve Online virtual war 'costs $300,000' in damage’ (BBC News, 
2014) <https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-25944837> accessed 28 October 
2018. 
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Markee Dragon or G2G web-site it is possible to purchase so-called 
game-codes, which are virtual items (both functional and not) used in 
variety of different video games, including in-game tokens15, for 
example, on mentioned platforms it is possible to purchase:  
 
a) 750 gold crowns of the obsidians16 (in-game money from the 
Shroud of the Avatar video game) for 10 US dollars or 500 PLEX 
(in-game money from the EVE Online video game) for 19.99 US 
dollars17,  
b) A virtual horse from Crowfall video game for 30 US dollars18, 
c) A noble founder’s pack (skin for Legends of Aria video game) for 
39.99 US dollars 19, 
d) Defiant Vented Lightsaber (weapon for Star Wars: TOR video 
game) for 8.21 US dollars20. 
Most of the virtual items are created on virtual platforms by the 
developer and exist only on this virtual platforms, however, in some 
video games virtual items can be created by users (for example, skins) 
or third parties (market places for virtual items). When user spends 
significant amount of money for the licensing payment for the virtual 
item (intellectual property) and its functions or appearance is not as 
expected, or due to the error in the code or actions of the developer 
(planned event in the video game scenario) such property was 
destroyed, in this case regulating virtual property issues only by 
intellectual property law and EULA cannot be considered as a fair 
treatment. Therefore, different approach towards virtual property in 
gaming industry should be accepted by the European legislator in order 
to protect the rights of consumers. 
 
 
15 Information on MarkeeDragon items for purchase 
<https://store.markeedragon.com> accessed 21 June 2019, information on G2G 
items for purchase <https://www.g2g.com> accessed 21 June 2019. 
16 MarkeeDragon (n 15). 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid. 
19 ibid. 
20 G2G (n 15). 
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2.2. Doctrine View on in-game Transactions 
Standard EULA has mixed nature involving characteristics of different 
types of contracts. EULA can include instruments transferring property, 
license on intellectual property rights and characteristics of a purchase 
or service provision agreements, therefore, during the practical legal 
application different views on the governing law are possible21. Present 
chapter will provide an overview on possible approaches to EULAs of 
gaming industry. 
2.2.1. “No Legal Intervention” Approach 
Nowadays all in-game transactions are left out of the scope of the 
legal regulation. Such transactions are regulated by the terms of 
standard EULAs, which, basically, protect only interests of the developers 
and leave interests of players without proper attention. 
Notwithstanding, some authors argue, that the virtual reality issues 
should not be governed by the law at all, as players use video games in 
order to escape from reality22 and many actions, which are allowed in a 
video game, are forbidden by the law in the “real life” world, for example, 
robbery or destruction of virtual property23. 
However, such approach cannot be considered as sufficient one, as 
virtual property bears intangible character and cannot have the same 
treatment as tangible items. Obviously, for in-game actions, which are 
prescribed by the game properties or the scenario, no one can be 
punished by the law (players), however, the gaming company (the 
developer) should be liable for non-conformity of digital goods (specific 
 
21 Ch. Mulligan, ‘Licenses and the Property/Contract Interface’ (2017) Brooklyn 
Law School, Legal Studies Paper, No. 544 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2987325> 
accessed 29 June 2019, 3. 
22 J.W. Nelson, ‘The Virtual Property Problem: What Property Rights in Virtual 
Resources Might Look Like, How They Might Work, and Why They Are a Bad Idea’ 
(2010) 41 McGeorge Law Review 
<https://www.mcgeorge.edu/documents/publications/MLR4104_Nelson_ver_09_FIN
AL.pdf> accessed 2 November 2018, 309. 
23 C.J. Cifrino, ‘Virtual Property, Virtual Rights: Why Contract Law, Not Property Law, 
Must be the Governing Paradigm in the Law of Virtual Worlds’ (2014) 55 (1) Boston 
College Law Review 
<https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3354&context=bclr> 
accessed 28 October 2018, 264. 
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code, which is a virtual item purchased by the player), non-delivery of 
such virtual goods and for the destruction of property if it occurred due 
to the errors in the code. 
2.2.2. Contract Law Approach 
From the contract law perspective EULA is considered as mixed 
contract with characteristics of a license agreement and a consumer 
contract. EULA is a standard form contract, where the player has no 
power to change any of its provision and, in this case, relationships 
between the developer and a player bear “take it or leave it” character. 
When the gamer wants to play, for example, Diablo III, he has no market 
alternative, as every video game is a unique virtual world. The player has 
only one option in order to have the access to the content - to agree for 
standard terms EULA, which can be unfair in relation to the consumer 
rights for digital content. Therefore, the player has weaker position in 
described relationships and the player’s consumer rights should be 
protected on the regulatory level. 
Bragg vs Linden Research Inc. case, which was ruled in the U.S., can 
be an example of the bias character of the EULA, which includes 
characteristics of consumer contract and license agreement.. In 
mentioned case the court stated that mandatory arbitration agreement, 
which was included in EULA, was unfair and the user in this case should 
be treated as a consumer24. In present case the court aimed to protect 
the rights of the consumer while signing the standard form contract 
(contract of adhesion according to the US law25) in order to play a video 
game. 
Signing EULA in order to access free-to-play video game the player is 
not informed on the total price of the contract. Moreover, generally EULA 
neither includes provisions regarding the total price of the goods or 
services nor describes the manner in which the price is to be calculated, 
as required per Consumer Rights Directive26. 
 
24 Bragg v. Linden Research Inc [2007] 487, F. Supp. 2d 593 
<https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/cases/4435> accessed 29 June 2019. 
25 Cifrino (n 23) 26. 
26 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and 
Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing 
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Following the contract law approach, the legal regulations governing 
the contract law, including ones on unfair terms and consumer 
protection, should be applied both to the initial EULA and to agreements, 
where the virtual world interacts with “real life” world (virtual items 
purchase for “real life” money), which will be discussed in details further. 
Considering mentioned above, typical EULA used by gaming 
companies has characteristics both of license agreement regulating 
copies of specific software and of consumer contract on the digital 
content purchase (game specific codes or so-called virtual items). 
Therefore, European rules regulating unfair terms, standard terms, 
consumer protection and conformity of digital goods should be applied 
to in-game transactions in the same manner as it is applied to standard 
consumer contracts for tangible goods (online shopping). 
2.2.2. Property Law Approach 
From property law perspective, video game, which allows the 
purchase of intangible items online for “real life” money (commoditized 
video game) bears the character of the contract on the transfer of 
property and, therefore, relevant legal provisions protecting virtual 
property should be applied. 
Property law gives the right in rem to its holders to and such right is 
applicable both to tangible (for example, software on tangible media) 
and intangible items (for example, bank account); intellectual property 
law, on the other hand, gives personam rights to its holders27.  
Having a look at standard EULA, it becomes clear that the rights and 
obligations prescribed are neither purely in rem nor in personam28. 
Therefore, it is important to identify whether the property law elements 
are present in specific EULA in order to understand who has the right to 
protect the intangible goods in video game from third parties actions and 
to transfer such right. Particularly, it is important to identify so in 
relationships: 
 
 
Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council Text with EEA relevance [2011] OJ L304/64, Article 5. 
27 Mulligan (n 21) 4. 
28 ibid. 
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a) where the virtual item sold on third party platform as a “code” for 
a specific game,  
b) where the virtual item is sold by one user to another and it is 
allowed by the terms of particular EULA,  
c) where the online platform for a video game is an intermediate 
platform between the user and a gaming company. 
 
This mixed character of an EULA can be observed in the EULA for 
Second Life video game, which states, that the developer allows specific 
player to forbid to other players of the same video game to have access 
to his\her virtual real estate29, and to trade virtual tokens (Linden 
dollars), which purchased in advance for “real life” money, with other 
users30. Therefore, gaming company grants intellectual property rights to 
unlimited amount of users and the particular user can restrict such 
rights to other users. From this example both in rem and personam 
rights can be observed. In this case, “de jure” relationships are regulated 
by intellectual property rights, however, “de facto” it looks like the 
transfer of property rights for intangible item with the right to make a 
decision on the property (right to sell the virtual land to another users). 
Analyzing the legal doctrine on the property law it can be seen, that 
the property law elements are present in in-game transactions in video 
games. 
Following Locke’s view on the property rights and his labor theory, it 
can be concluded, that a player, who spend significant amount of time, 
labor, money and skills in order to achieve some fame and assets in the 
virtual world deserves to have the property rights for such virtual objects 
and avatar31. 
Following the Personhood theory, it can be observed, that in disputes 
over property the closest connection to the property should be 
prioritized32. Therefore, in disputes between a gaming company and a 
player over the avatar, the player should be favored. As example of such 
 
29 EULA of the Second Life <https://www.lindenlab.com/legal/second-life-terms-
and-conditions> accessed 29 June 2019, article 1.4. 
30 ibid article 3.1. 
31 Cifrino (n 23) 12. 
32 ibid 15. 
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strong connection can be taken Jon Jacobs, known under Neverdie 
avatar in Entropia Universe video game. Jon “Neverdie” Jacobs opened 
his own company named “Neverdie”33 selling Ethereum based Teleport 
tokens to be used in the virtual world34. 
Considering mentioned above, after entering the EULA in-game 
relationships on purchase of intangible items (game codes or so-called 
virtual items) between gaming company and a player bears property law 
character. Initial EULA grants license for intellectual property rights of 
some particular virtual world – right to access such virtual world and 
obligation not to make not licensed copies, however, in-game 
transaction can be considered as separate contracts on transfer of 
intangible goods (codes), which exist only on particular online platform, 
however, such codes can be traded on third party platforms or with other 
users. 
Therefore, respective rules regulating digital content purchase and 
conformity of digital goods should be applied to such transactions. On 
the other hand, following property law view, the player should have the 
possibility to claim remuneration for the damages to the player’s virtual 
property in cases, if such damages occurred not by the virtual events in 
the game, but by the “real life” events, for example, error in the code 
and breach in security of the video game. However, such legal 
mechanism allowing protection of virtual property is far from being 
available on the European market. 
In some countries video game players already can protect the rights 
on the virtual property in the “real life” courts. In China a player whose 
virtual property was stolen by the hacker got remedies from the video 
game company in an amount equal to 1 210 U.S. dollars as a result of a 
court decision35. Moreover, a Chinese insurance company launched an 
 
33 Information on Neverdie Company <https://neverdie.com/> accessed 29 June 
2019. 
34 Roger Aitken, ’'President Of Virtual Reality' Behind NEVERDIE Creates Teleport 
Crypto Token, Raises $3.5M’ (Forbes, 2017) 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/2017/08/02/president-of-virtual-reality-
behind-neverdie-creates-teleport-crypto-token-raises-3-5m/#20a4d056273b> 
accessed 29 June 2019. 
35 News Report, ‘Online gamer in China wins virtual theft suit’ (CNN, 2003) 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2003/TECH/fun.games/12/19/china.gamer.reut/> accessed 
2 November 2018. 
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insurance program in order to protect virtual property in video games36. 
In the Netherland in-game actions conducted in order to take away 
virtual items of other players were considered as a crime (Runescape 
case and Habbo Hotel case)37. 
Considering mentioned above, in-game transactions on the purchase 
of digital content (particular code, which allows the player to obtain 
virtual intangible item in specific video game) should be fall under 
European e-commerce regulations regarding consumer protection and 
conformity of digital goods. 
3.  Conclusions 
Video games, which do not allow commoditization of virtual items 
(pay-to-play video games) should be governed solely by the End User 
License Agreement, However, using the same legal approach to 
commoditized free-to-play video games can be considered as violation of 
consumer rights. 
Whereas EULAs (of free-to-play video games) have mixed character of 
license agreements and a consumer contract, therefore, such EULAs 
should be tested on the subject of the unfairness of the standard form 
contract. 
In video games, which allow the purchase of virtual intangible items 
(specific computer codes, which with its application to particular video 
game can be represented as virtual items) for the “real life” money, 
relevant e-commerce, consumer protection rules and rules on conformity 
of digital goods should be applied. 
Moreover, after the specific purchase contract was concluded, such 
code should be protected by property law regulations in order to allow 
the players sell such virtual items (codes) on intermediate platform or in-
game auctions and markets to another users, and to protect such virtual 
property from the destruction caused by “real life” events (hacking, for 
example).  
 
 
36 China Daily (n 13). 
37 Tycho Adriaans, ‘Owning the Virtual Fruit. Protecting User Interests in Virtual 
Goods under Dutch Law’ (Tilburg University, 2017) 
<http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=142260> accessed 29 June 2019, 3. 
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Abstract: The disruptive technologies like DLT (distributed ledger technology), 
blockchain, smart contracts and autonomous vehicles facing a common problem to 
solve: the collection of valid information from the “outside world”. The oracles are to 
help in the proper functioning of these complex peer-to-peer systems, just like the in 
the case of autonomous vehicles. This paper examines the place of oracles 
(information or data providers) in the blockchain and IoV (internet of vehicles) 
ecosystem with a focus on responsibility of the data provided, through the glance of 
trust in these technologies. 
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1.  Introduction 
Information and communication technology (ICT) is a key driver of 
innovation, especially in advanced economies where other sources of 
productivity gains has dried up or produce lower returns. As ICT helps 
improving access to basic services, enhancing connectivity and creating 
employment opportunities, ICT directly affect how people live, 
communicate and interact with each other.1  For now, not only the 
people can communicate with each other, but also machines – even 
without human interaction. 
 The term "peer-to-peer" has come to be applied to networks that 
expect end users to contribute their own files, computing time, or other 
resources to some shared project. Even more interesting than the 
systems' technical underpinnings are their socially disruptive potential: 
 
 
* Associate professor, head of department, Széchenyi István University, Faculty of 
Law and Political Sciences, Department of International and European Law. E-mail: 
gjudit@sze.hu or glavanitjudit@gmail.com. 
1 World Economic Forum, The Global Information Technology Report 2015 (2015) 
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in various ways they return content, choice, and control to ordinary 
users.2 It is a question however if ordinary users are capable of using 
this new power properly regarding to the fact that they do not necessarily 
understand the working method of the technology. One might say that 
an average user is also not in full knowledge of the technical 
background of the internet and still billions of us use it every day, but we 
should remember the first years of spreading of the net: how many 
failures should have happened until the regulators worldwide could 
create an efficient background. 
The situation from the side of regulators is somehow similar today: 
technologies like the distributed ledger, the new currencies, possible 
driver-less vehicles both on the road and in the air put the decision 
makers into a challenging situation. 
This lead us to the trust issue of the technology. Trust is not only an 
important basis of human interaction, but also for human-machine 
cooperation. The web shops and online hotel booking services are the 
best examples that people may rather choose a more expensive, but 
trusted service provider than taking the risk of trying something new. The 
trusted information is based on other customers’ valuation, so the 
consumer do not need to get in touch with everybody, as many others 
did that before. In the IoT world however we need to build trust between 
devices, or at least teach (program) them how to choose to rely only on 
trusted sources of information. 
2.  Basic concepts of IoT, IoV and blockchain 
Internet of Things (IoT) refers to a network of items – each 
embedded with sensors – which are connected to the Internet.3 In the 
early years of the technology the ITU (International Telecommunication 
Union – part of the UN) defined IoT as “from anytime, any place 
connectivity for anyone, we will now have connectivity for anything”. This 
definition is from year 2005, still the best summary of the matrix how IoT 
is basically working. 
 
 
2 Andy Oram (ed), Peer-to-peer: Harnessing the Power of Disruptive Technologies 
(1st edn, O’Reilley Media 2001) Definitions. s.p. 
3 Somayya Madakam et al., ’Internet of Things (IoT): A literature overview’ (2015) 3 
(5) Journal of Computer and Communications,168. 
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Figure 1. IoT – defined by ITU in 2005 (source: ITU) 
 
The term “Internet of Things” was introduced by Kevin Ashton in 
1999 linking the new idea to RFID (radio frequency identification). As he 
said 10 years later: “the problem is, people have limited time, attention 
and accuracy – all of which means they are not very good at capturing 
data about things in the real world”.4 He suggested that if we had 
computers that knew everything there was to know about things – using 
data they gathered without any help from human beings – we could be 
able to track and count everything, and greatly reduce waste, loss and 
cost. To reach this, we need to empower computers with their own 
means of gathering information, so they can “see, hear and smell” the 
world for themselves.5 
The network of tomorrow, built on an increasing number of sensors 
and thus, increasing data, will produce a hyperconnected environment 
 
4 Kevin Ashton, ’That ’Internet of Things’ Thing’ (RFID Journal, 22 June 2009) 1. 
5 ibid. 
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or ‘Internet of Things’, with estimates of over 50 billion things connected 
by 2020.6 
The IoT involves a huge number of connected devices via the 
Internet, and creates new social, political, economic and ethical 
landscape. Thus, many governments accepted the fact that they have to 
play an active role in establishing and supporting an environment in 
which new technologies such as blockchain and IoT can flourish, emerge 
and grow.7 In March 2015 the Alliance for Internet of Things Innovation 
was launched by the European Commission to support the creation of an 
innovative and industry driven European Internet of Things ecosystem. 
The European Union’s IoT vision is based on three pillars: (1) a thriving 
IoT ecosystem, (2) a human-centered IoT approach and (3) a single 
market for IoT. However, the vision is easier to declare than to succeed. 
According to Spyros G. Tzafestas, the IoT law and ethics framework 
should involve regulations for the devices connected, for the networks 
and for the data associated with the devices, but also should involve 
ethics principles rules and codes, and contractual guidelines.8 
There are so many objects (traffic lights, cars, thermostats, 
refridgertors, alarm clocks, mobile phones, smart watches, surveillance 
cameras and so on) that the concept of IoT has moved towards “Internet 
of Everything”. In this area, one of the most advanced business is 
undoubtedly the car/vehicle industry. The connecting spot leading us 
from IoT solutions to IoV networks is smart city. Smart cities add digital 
intelligence to existing urban systems creating a pervasive, integrated, 
and intelligent city environment where IoT solutions are used to 
seamlessly interconnect, interact, control, and provide insights about the 
various silos of fragmented systems within cities.9 Currently, 
conventional vehicles have devices, for example, GPS, radio handset, 
small-scale impact radars, cameras, on-board computers and various 
kinds of detection devices to warn the driver of a wide range of good 
conditions—being of the street and mechanical breakdowns. The 
 
6 UN-GGIM, Future Trends in geospatial information management: the five to ten 
year vision (2nd edn, August 2015). 
7 World Bank Group, ’Internet of Things. The New Government to Business 
Platform’ (Working Paper, 2017). 
8 Spyros G Tzafestas, ‘Ethics and Law in the Internet of Things World’ (2018) 1 
Smart Cities, 98-120. 
9 IOT Analytics, ‘Connected Streetlights 2018-2023’ (Market Report, June 2018). 
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vehicles are more refined due to their on-board storage capacity, on-
board computing capabilities, significant matching capabilities and fewer 
power hindrances, which are supported by sensors, actuators, radar 
hosts and GPS.10 The smart city of the future can be built on the system 
of IoV – discussed in the followings. 
The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) has basically two phases of 
development (at least so far). As a part of IoT world, the Vehicle Ad-hoc 
Network (VANET) turns every participating vehicle into a wireless router 
or mobile node, enabling vehicles to connect to each other and in turn, 
create a network with a wide range. Next, as vehicles fall out of the 
signal range and drop out of the network, other vehicles can join in, 
connecting the participants to one another to create a mobile Internet. 
Regarding to it’s limited possibilities of usage, a necessary development 
made it possible to turn to IoV (or what we call IoV today)11: an open and 
integrated network system with high manageability, controllability, 
operationalization and credibility and it is composed not only of vehicles, 
but of multiple users, multiple vehicles, multiple things and multiple 
networks.12 There are essentially three types of vehicle connection: 
(1) V2D: vehicle to device – communication between automated 
vehicles and different categories of devices (smart phones, 
watches, PC); 
(2) V2I: vehicle to infrastructure – more specific type of 
communication between vehicles and infrastructures like traffic 
lights or speed cameras; 
(3) V2V: vehicle to vehicle – this communication supposes fully 
autonomous driving or at least high level of automation.13 
 
10 Pradip Kumar Shama, Seo Yeon Moon and Jong Hyuk Park, ’BlockVN: A 
Distributed Blockchain Based Vehicular Network Architecture in Smart City’ (2017) 13 
(1) Journal of Information Processing Systems, 184-195. 
11 For self-driving machines and their liability issues see in details: István Ambrus, 
Gábor Kovács and Imre Németh, ’Az önvezető járművek kapcsán felvethető általános 
büntetőjogi problémák’ (2018) (2) JURA, 13-31 and István Ambrus, ’Az önvezető 
járművek várható hatása a közlekedési bűncselekményekre’ (2018) (6) Ügyészek 
Lapja, 5-14. 
12 Fangchun Yang, Shangguang Wang, Jinglin Li and Zhinan Liu and Qibo Sun, ’An 
Overview of Internet of Vehicles’ (2014) 11 (10) China Communications, 1-15. 
13 Maria Cristina Gaeta, ‘The issue of data protection in the Internet of Things with 
particular regard to self driving cars’ (2017) Diritto Mercato Technologia, 
<https://www.academia.edu/35993304/The_issue_of_data_protection_in_the_Intern
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In the scientific literature we can find several more types of 
interactions14 and examining important connection points of IoV and 
blockchain technology. Some authors point out that an important social 
challenge for IoV technology is the appropriate rewarding of vehicle 
objects to serve as data mules for data collection and transportation 
from smart sensors.15 A kind of extension of IoV is so-called Social 
Internet of Vehicles (SIoV), which can be described as a vehicular social 
network, as social interactions among cars, which communicate 
autonomously to look for services (automaker patches or updates) and 
exchange information relevant to traffic. Given that vehicles are 
becoming more and more autonomous, and that applications supporting 
social interactions among drivers and passengers are already on a 
higher level of development (see Waze for example), some authors 
strongly believe that SIoV will eventually be a network of both drivers, 
passengers and cars.16 
Blockchain technology is being explored in many innovative 
applications, such as cryptocurrencies, smart contracts, communication 
systems, health care, financial systems, electronic voting, and 
distributed provenance - among others.17 Using blockchain’s transparent 
and fully distributed peer-to-peer architecture, these applications benefit 
from an append-only model in which transactions accepted in the 
blockchain cannot be modified.18 
 
et_of_Things_with_particular_regard_to_self_diving_cars_2017_DIMT> accessed 09 
December 2019. 
14 Li Ang, Kah Seng, Gerald Ijemaru and Murtala Adamu, ’Deployment of IoV for 
Smart Cities: Applications, Architecture and Challenges’ (2018) 7 (1) IEEE Access, 
6473-6492. DOI: 10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2887076. 
15 You-Chiun Wang and Guan-Wei Chen, ’Efficient Data Gathering and Estimation 
for Metropolitan Air Quality Monitoring by Using Vehicular Sensor Networks’ (2017) 66 
(8) IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, 7234-7248. DOI: 
10.1109/TVT.2017.2655084. 
16 Leandros A. Maglaras, Ali H. Al-Bayatti, Ying He, Isabel Wagner and Helge Janick, 
’Social Internet of Vehicles for Smart Cities’ (2016) 5 (1) Journal of Sensor and 
Actuator Networks, doi: 10.3390/jsan5010003. 
17 See in details: Stephen P. Williams, Blockchain: The Next Everything (Scribner 
2019). 
18 See in details e.g.: Primavera De Filippi and Aaron Wright, Blockchain and the 
Law: The Rule of Code (Harvardy University Press 2018) and Daniel Drescher, 
Blockchain Basics: A Non-Technical Introduction in 25 Steps (Apress 2018) and Imran 
Bashir, Mastering Blockchain (Packt 2018). 
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Blockchain technology is based on distributed ledger technology 
(DLT), but the two are not the same: all blockchains and DLT, but not all 
DLTs are blockchains.
19
 There are several types of each “product”, but 
we can summarize some common differences that are true for most of 
the systems operated by blockchain or DLT technology: 
(1) Blockchains are basically permission-less and open, and 
DLTs are basically permissioned and closed. 
(2) Blockchains need miners, while there is no mining activity by 
DLTs. 
(3) Blockchains are made of blocks, while there are no blocks on 
DLTs. 
(4) Blockchains are fitting for cryptocurrencies, DLTs are not.  
(5) Many of the blockchains enable token creation, DLTs are not 
capable of this. 
 
19 Zsolt Bujtár: A kriptovaluták európai és máltai szabályozásának összehasonlítása 
Európai Jog (2018) (18), 12–13.  
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Common understanding of IoV and blockchain systems: 
 
Global interest IoT, IoV and blockchain technologies are defined 
only in an international manner, as the technology 
is only effective when there are no borders 
physically or financially 
Autonomous the systems basically do not require human 
interaction  
Trust-based The blockchain systems were created as an answer 
to the broken trust in the traditional banking 
system and IoV needs the human trust of taking the 
control over the driving experience.  
Interconnected Both technologies are based on the interconnected 
and globalized word built on the internet. 
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IP-sensitive The Intellectual Property issues arouse both fields 
that are not necessarily solved even on national 
level20, and the whole open innovation method 
needs more regulatory attention21 
Lack of regulation Unfortunatelly we can conclude that the time being 
both technologies need proper and future-driven 
regulation – hopefully – in the near future. 
 
Let’s jump into the future, and imagine a smart city, where the IoT, 
the IoV and the blockchain technology together enhancing the 
effectiveness of the everyday life: 
“Shanu gets into her car to drive to work; she is an active mother and 
senior director for a large corporate. The car consequently synchronizes 
with Shanu’s smart mobile phone’s SmartPay benefit, a framework that 
gives security and trust by “epitomizing” Shanu through smart contracts 
on its blockchain interface. That permits it to work as an autonomous 
payment device. SmartPay starts a few elements on Shanu’s in-car 
show; it connections to journey planner, and Shanu goes into SmartPay 
travel organizer her office as her goal. SmartPay travel organizer 
decides, by questioning vehicle information, that the auto is low on fuel, 
so it consequently plots a course using an advantageous petrol station 
that is promoting aggressive fuel costs. In the wake of topping off with 
fuel consequently paid for by SmartPay’s smart contact include, Shanu 
gets a message over the SmartPay interface that her work car stop is 
full and that SmartPay travel organizer has started a shrewd contract 
trade and paid for another car stop, a short separation from her office. 
While at work, Shanu gets a message that SmartShop has offered her 
everyday shopping rundown to neighborhood retailers, decided the one 
with the best costs, paid for it all, and has composed conveyance, which 
 
20 Péter Somkutas and Ákos Kőhidi, ’Az önvezető autó szoftvere magas szintű 
szellemi alkotás vagy kifinomult károkozó?’ (2017) (2) In Medias Res, 232-269. 
21 J. L. de la Rosa, D. Gibovic, V. Torres, L. Maicher, F. Miralles, A. El-Fakdi and A. 
Bikfalvi, ’On intellectual property in online open innovation for SME by means of 
blockchain and smart contracts’ (3rd Annual World Open Innovation Conference 
(WOIC), 2016) 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311581389_On_Intellectual_Property_in_
Online_Open_Innovation_for_SME_by_means_of_Blockchain_and_Smart_Contracts/li
nk/584ea7b208ae4bc899395b86/download> accessed 09 December 2019. 
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arrives not long after Shanu's returns home from work. Later that same 
night, Shanu’s daughter, Zimpy, makes a request to get the car. Zimpy’s 
smart contract with Shanu’s car gives her get to. However, it does not 
empower the vehicle to make self-ruling installments for everything; 
shrewd contracts are correctly that-keen; they are adaptable for every 
relative. In this way, Zimpy can refuel. However, she cannot treat her 
companions to a drive through KFC utilizing her mom’s SmartPay 
benefit. In addition, regardless of the possibility that Zimpy could pay for 
things she ought not, Shanu would rapidly discover because she would 
have the capacity to check the changeless exchange history on 
SmartPay’s interface to the car’s blockchain record.”22 
3.  Trust – a basis for the innovative technologies 
Trust plays a central role in many aspects of computing, especially 
those related to network use. Whether downloading and installing 
software, buying a product from a web site, or just surfing the Web, an 
individual is faced with trust issues. Trust in peer-to-peer, collaborative, 
or distributed systems presents its own challenges. Some systems 
deliberately disguise the source of data; all of the systems use 
computations or files provided by far-flung individuals who would be 
difficult to contact if something goes wrong - much less to hold 
responsible for any damage done.23 
According to McKinght24 the overall trust concept means secure 
willingness to depend on a trustee because of that trustee’s perceived 
characteristics. Three main types of applicable trust concepts are 
follows: 
1. Trusting beliefs means a secure conviction that the other party has 
favorable attributes (such as benevolence, integrity, and competence), 
strong enough to create trusting intentions. Trusting beliefs-IT means a 
secure conviction that the technology has desirable attributes. For 
example, one may believe the blockchain system is recording the 
transaction reliable, safe, and timely in completing its task. 
 
22 Shama, Moon and Park (n 10) 190-191. 
23 Mark Waldman, Lorrie Faith Cranor and Avi Rubin, ’Trust’ in Oram (n 2) 153-170. 
24 D. Harrison McKnight, ’Trust in Information Technology’ in G. B. Davis (ed), The 
Blackwell Encyclopedia of Management. Vol. 7 Management Information Systems 
(Blackwell 2005) 329-331. 
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2. Trusting intentions means a secure, committed willingness to 
depend upon, or to become vulnerable to, the other party in specific 
ways, strong enough to create trusting behaviors. Trusting intention-IT 
means one is securely willing to depend or be vulnerable to the 
information technology. This is the psychological state one possesses 
before hitting the “Download  now” button.  
3. Trusting behaviors means assured actions that demonstrate that 
one does in fact depend or rely upon the other party instead of on 
oneself or on controls. Trusting behavior is the action manifestation of 
willingness to depend. Trusting behavior-IT means that one securely 
depends or relies on the technology instead of trying to control the 
technology. For example, one is using the Ethereum blockchain for smart 
contracting without the need to control the Ethereium network as a 
whole. 
When the trustor has no prior interaction with a trustee, he/she 
cannot develop trust based on direct experience with or first-hand 
knowledge of the trustee. Instead, the trustor will depend on other 
sources, such as second-hand information, contextual factors, or 
personal intuition to make trust inferences. For example, before having 
direct interaction with an information system in a specific context, a 
trustor can build initial trust in this system based on their experiences 
with other systems, their knowledge about this system used in other 
contexts, and/or others’ opinions about the system.25 In case of IoT and 
IoV this is critical:  
a. Trust in the system 
Trust is a basic question of IoT and blockchain systems. DLT and 
blockchain technology itself arouse on the grounds of distrusted banking 
(and financial) system and on the need to build trust between unknown 
business partners. 
Overall, across all markets, trust in organizations’ use of personal 
data is eroding, both in terms of security and use. An important question 
is whether there is a tipping point, when benefits of signing on to a 
 
25 Xin LI, Traci J Hess and Joseph S Valaich,’Why do we trust new tecchnology? A 
study of initial trust formation with the organizational information systems’ (2008) 17 
(1) The Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 39-71. 
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service are outweighed by the risks and potential damage caused by the 
online presence.26  
b. Trust in the source  
Data are central to blockchain and IoT technology, but there is 
inconsistent understanding of data’s value and management in 
general.27 Data from IoT can be an economic asset for both government 
and businesses, and the data used by the IoT can be a question of 
trustworthiness for the service providers and consumers using the 
technology. 
4.  Oracles of the new technologies 
The new technologies like DLT, blockchain, smart contracts and 
autonomous vehicles are facing a common problem to solve: the 
collection of valid information from the “outside world”. On the field of 
blockchain systems the computations can only operate on data that is 
on the blockchain, that is, a prior computation initiated by a user on the 
chain wrote the relevant data into the virtual machine’s memory. The 
network does not natively support reaching consensus on the validity of 
such data, only the fact that it exists on the blockchain can be agreed 
upon.
28
 Smart contracts emerged with the rise of the blockchain 
technology: these agreements are encoded as a programming language 
code and deployed on a blockchain platform, where all participants 
execute them and maintain their state. To release the potential of smart 
contracts, it is necessary to connect the contracts with the outside world, 
such that they can understand and use information from other 
infrastructures.29 
Oracles were primarily centralized services, meaning any smart 
contract using such services has a single point of failure, which nullifies 
 
26 See more on this: ITU (International Telecommunication Union), ‘Powering the 
digital economy: Regulatory approaches to securing consumer privacy, trust and 
security’ (2018). 
27 World Bank Group (n 7) 27. 
28 John Adler et al., ‘ASTREA: A Decentralized Blockchain Oracle’ (2018 IEEE 
International Conference on Internet of Things (iThings) and IEEE Green Computing and 
Communications (GreenCom) and IEEE Cyber, Physical and Social Computing 
(CPSCom) and IEEE Smart Data (SmartData), 2018) 1145-1152. 
29 Juan Guarnizo and Pawel Szalachowski, ’PDFS: Practical Data Feed Service for 
Smart Contracts’ (ESORICS, 2018). DOI:10.1007/978-3-030-29959-0_37. 
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any benefits gained from the decentralized nature of smart contracts. 
However, several new developments made this possible failure less 
likely to happen: Chainlink for example is designed as a decentralized 
oracle that can provide external data to smart contracts. 
 
Working method of Chainlink30 
 
 
There are different types of oracles for blockchain systems, the 
following categorization is based on the work of Shermin Voshmgir:31 
(1) Software Oracles: handle information data that originates from 
online sources, like temperature, prices of commodities and 
goods, flight or train delays, etc. The so ware oracle extracts the 
needed information and pushes it into the smart contract. 
(2) Hardware Oracles: Some smart contracts need information 
directly from the physical world, for example, a car crossing a 
barrier where movement sensors must detect the vehicle and 
send the data to a smart contract, or RFID sensors in the supply 
chain industry. 
(3) Inbound and Outbound Oracles: inbound oracles provide data 
from the external world, while outbound oracles provide smart 
 
30 <https://docs.chain.link/docs/welcome-to-chainlink>. 
31 Shermin Voshmgir, Token Economy: How Blockchains and Smart Contracts 
Revolutionize the Economy (BlockchainHub 2019).   
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contracts with the ability to send data to the outside world. An 
example would be a smart lock in the physical world, which 
receives payment on its blockchain address and needs to unlock 
automatically. 
(4) Consensus-based Oracles: get their data from human consensus 
and prediction markets like Augur and Gnosis. Using only one 
source of information could be risky and unreliable. To avoid 
market manipulation, prediction markets implement a rating 
system for oracles. For further security, a combination of different 
oracles may be used, where, for example, three out of five oracles 
could determine the outcome of an event. 
 
IoV and oracles: from weather forecast to consumer’s info 
 
As discussed earlier IoV uses (among others) V2V (vehicle-to-vehicle), 
V2R (vehicle-to-road), V2H (vehicle-to-human) and V2S (vehicle-to-
sensor) interconnectivity, for creating a social network with intelligent 
objects as participants. An effective and efficient integration of existing 
and different network types standards are very important in the IoV 
ecosystem. Furthermore, the integration of cloud computing, fog 
computing, mobile edge computing, AI and big data analyses are all 
essential for an effective IoV development (Skulimowski et al. eds 
2018).32 Security in IoV becomes of paramount importance as any 
system failure directly affects user safety. 
 
Data sources and security risks for IoV 
 Security risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cloud: 
Service Platform 
Management 
platform 
traditional 
operating system 
risks; denial of 
service attacks 
Information Service 
Applications 
Call Center 
Application 
 
32 Andrzej M.J. Skulimowski, Zhengguo Sheng, Sondès Khemiri-Kallel, Christophe 
Cérin and Ching-Hsien Hsu (eds), Internet of Vehicles. Technologies and Services 
Towards Smart City: 5th International Conference, IOV 2018, Proceedings (Springer 
2018). 
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DATA 
FEED 
Data storage data is falsified or 
tampered, 
individual privacy 
threat 
 
Channel: 
V2X 
Communication 
V2V wireless 
communication 
hijacking; 
communication 
protocol cracking; 
malicious nodes 
invade 
V2I 
V2N 
IVN (In-Vehicle 
Network) 
Device: 
Intelligent devices 
 
Connected devices 
Mobile operating 
system 
APP 
APP crack: debug 
or decompile 
applications – 
obtain 
communication 
keys 
T-box, IVI internal 
information 
leakage, lack of 
security 
isolations, lack of 
encryption and 
access control 
mechanism 
OBD Interfaces, 
sensors and multi-
function key 
Accoustic 
interference, 
radar noise 
attack, cameras: 
blinding glare 
Source: based on Tian (2017)33 
 
 
 
 
 
33 Huirong Tian, ’Introduction of IOV Security’ Security Research Institute, CAICT, 
2017-11-02. 
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Blockchain for IoV: massage dissemination via blockchain 
 
For a proper use of IoV and VANET systems a mass of information is 
required – as discussed previously. However, the traditional VANET (or 
IoV) faces several security issues – as shown in the previous table. 
Shrestha and co-authors in 2018 proposed a new type of blockchain to 
resolve critical message dissemination issues in VANET. They created a 
local blockchain for real world event messages exchanged between the 
vehicles, for this they created a public blockchain that stores the node 
trustworthiness and message trustworthiness in a distributed ledger that 
is appropriate for secure message dissemination.34 This is a perfect 
example of how the new technologies can support the effectiveness of 
each other. 
5.  Malfunction and intentional threats, as common risks 
Just as the Internet aggravated the risks of cyberwarfare, spam, 
identity theft, and denial-of-service attacks, connected everyday objects 
become targets for malicious software that causes everyday devices to 
fail or spy. Sensor networks become channels for unauthorized 
surveillance by mischief makers or criminals (National Intelligence 
Council 2008).35 
Cyberattacks are increasing in terms of both scale and volume 
across all sectors of public and private life. A cyberattack is a malicious 
attempt made by an individual or organization to breach the information 
system of another individual or organization. Most commonly, 
cyberattacks target the business organization, military, government, or 
other financial institutions such as banking either for hacking secured 
information or for a ransom.36  
 
34 Rakesh Shrestha, Rojeena Bajracharya and Seung Yeob Nam, ’Blockchain-based 
Message Dissemination in VANET’ (2018 IEEE 3rd International Conference on 
Computing, Communication and Security (ICCCS), 2018) 161-166. 
35 National Intelligence Council, ’Disruptive Civil Technologies – Six Technologies 
with Potential Impacts on US Interests out to 2025’ (SRI Consulting Business 
Intelligence 2008) <https://fas.org/irp/nic/disruptive.pdf> accessed 9 December 
2019. 
36 A. Saravan and Sathya S. Bama, ’A Review on Cyber Security and the Fifth 
Generation Cyberattacks’ (2019) 12 (2) Oriental Journal of Computer Science and 
Technology 51.  
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In the world of IoT, population of devices are growing, and expected 
to grow further rapidly, as users embrace more connected devices, more 
sensors are deployed, and more objects are embedded with information. 
Each device, depending on its type, carries with it an associated set of 
channels, methods, and data items, each of which is subject to potential 
abuse. This increased population of devices has the effect of creating an 
explosion in the total number of potential target resources across the 
Internet, as well as within any specific environment.37 
Although blockchain technology prevents several types of malicious 
attacks and reduces many associated risks, it does not eliminate all 
attacks. Its preventative mechanisms (e.g., distributed consensus, 
cryptography, anonymity) may impair its resistance to other types of 
frauds and maliciousness- including the so called “51% attack”, account 
takeover, digital identity theft, money laundering, and hacking. 
A “51% attack” occurs when someone controls the majority of mining 
power on a Proof-of-Work blockchain network (like bitcoin). This means 
that the majority block verifier can prevent other users from mining and 
reverse transactions. In 2019 two major blockchains were attacked this 
way: (1) two miners have reportedly executed a 51% attack on the 
bitcoin cash (BCH) blockchain, published in May 24, however in this 
case happened with good intent, as the two mining pools attempted to 
prevent an unidentified party from taking some coins that — due to a 
code update — were essentially “up for grabs.”38 Earlier in January 7, the 
Ethereum blockchain was attacked: the incident occurred over a period 
of 4 hours between 0:40 and 4:20 Jan.7, 2019 UTC, during which the 
transactions were normally confirmed on the blockchain and then 
subsequently invalidated after the malign network rollback.39 Account 
takeover – also known as account compromise – happens when a 
fraudster gets access to a genuine customer’s account. Any online 
account could be taken over by fraudsters, including e-commerce 
accounts, subscriptions, banks, credit cards, emails.. etc. But the biggest 
problem with blockchain systems – as many of the financial supervisiory 
 
37 See in details: Michael J. Covington and Rush Carskadden, ’Threat Implications 
of the Internet of Things’ in Podins, Stinissen and Maybaum (eds): 5th International 
Conference on Cyber Conflict (NATO CCD COE Publications 2013) 1-12. 
38 <https://cointelegraph.com/news/two-miners-purportedly-execute-51-attack-on-
bitcoin-cash-blockchain> accessed 30 November 2019. 
39 <https://www.gate.io/article/16735> accessed 30 November 2019. 
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authorities believe – that they can be used for money laundering as well 
as for legal purposes. The advent of cryptocurrency has introduced an 
intriguing paradox: pseudonymity allows criminals to hide in plain sight, 
but open data gives more power to investigators and enables the 
crowdsourcing of forensic analysis.40  
6.  Regulation at crossroads 
The upper detailed new technologies’ – especially the blockchain/ 
DLT technology – future depend on the national regulations. In case of 
IoT and IoV the responsibility issues are on the table for a couple of 
years now. Blockchain technology however is still in the phase of 
understanding: the US Congress introduced a bill to the Senate to direct 
the Secretary of Commerce to establish a working group to recommend 
to Congress a definition of blockchain technology.41 The EU has already 
understood the phenomena, and on 10th of April 2018, 21 Member 
States and Norway agreed to sign a Declaration creating the European 
Blockchain Partnership (EBP) and cooperate in the establishment of a 
European Blockchain Services Infrastructure (EBSI) that will support the 
delivery of cross-border digital public services, with the highest 
standards of security and privacy. Since then, eight more countries have 
joined the Partnership, bringing the total number of signatories to 30 
(status at December 2019). 
Robert Ashley, Director of Defence Intelligence Agency declared in 
2018, that “The most important emerging cyberthreats to our national 
security will come from exploitation of our weakest technology 
components:  mobile devices and the Internet of Things (IoT).”42 
In the USA, the country's first IoT security law is California’s Senate 
Bill No. 327, which passed in September 2018, effective from 1st 
January 2020. California's law requires specific security measures that 
 
40 See in details: Mark Weber, Giacomo Domeniconi, Jie Chen, Daniel Karl I. 
Weidele, Claudio Bellei, Tom Robinson and Charles E. Leiserson, ’Anti-Money 
Laundering in Bitcoin: Experimenting with Graph Convolutional Networks for Financial 
Forensics’ in Proceedings of ACM Conference (KDD ’19 Workshop on Anomaly 
Detection in Finance) (ACM 2019). 
41 S.553 – 116th Congress (2019-2020) 
42 <https://www.dia.mil/News/Speeches-and-Testimonies/Article-
View/Article/1457815/statement-for-the-record-worldwide-threat-assessment/> 
accessed 9 December 2019. 
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device makers have to adhere to, like getting rid of default passwords 
and requiring users to generate their own passwords before allowing 
device access. 
According to the regulation:  
 
“1798.91.04. (a) A manufacturer of a connected device shall equip 
the device with a reasonable security feature or features that are all of 
the following: 
(1) Appropriate to the nature and function of the device. 
(2) Appropriate to the information it may collect, contain, or transmit. 
(3) Designed to protect the device and any information contained 
therein from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or 
disclosure. 
(b) Subject to all of the requirements of subdivision (a), if a 
connected device is equipped with a means for authentication outside a 
local area network, it shall be deemed a reasonable security feature 
under subdivision (a) if either of the following requirements are met: 
(1) The preprogrammed password is unique to each device 
manufactured. 
(2) The device contains a security feature that requires a user to 
generate a new means of authentication before access is granted to the 
device for the first time.” 
 
Going further, the Senate is proposed a Bill on 23rd September 2019 
called “Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2019” or 
“IoT Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2019” on the minimum security 
standards for IoT devices purchased by the Federal Government. Section 
5 of the proposed bill contains, that the Director of the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology should – not later than 1 year after the 
passing of the Bill – propose recommended guidelines for the use of IoT 
devices. This guidelines should contain detailed sections on:  
“(A) receiving information about a potential security or personal 
information vulnerability relating to agency information systems, and 
when relevant, Internet of Things devices; and 
(B) disseminating information about the resolution of a security or 
personal information vulnerability relating to agency information 
systems, and when relevant, Internet of Things devices.” 
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The European Commission stated in a working document that in case 
of IoT devices and systems consumers' trust and the uptake of these 
technologies will depend on whether they are perceived to be safe and 
on whether the legal framework is considered clear and effective to 
provide remedies to victims.43 According to the Commission, the 
potential of technologies, such as blockchains or deep-learning, in the 
field of IoT could be further explored in the Single Market Area. “Such 
distributed architectures could offer alternative and more efficient ways 
to meet the challenges of interoperability but also of trust and data 
ownership/usage”.44 
Institutions like NIST in the USA, the European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute and the China National Institute of Standardization 
and also the International Standards Organization are important players 
in the “constitutionalization” of the Internet and the regulation of IoT. 
Their possible incorporation of human rights discourse in the 
development of national and international standards appear to establish 
obligations and limitations on international, national, and private actors 
involved in Internet platforms.45 
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Abstract: Even though the scholarly literature on autonomous vehicles has placed less 
emphasis on the private international law aspects, in the recent years the scholarship 
is showing unquestionably growing interest in this area. This increasing attention is 
partly a consequence of the more active role the European Union is playing in shaping 
the policy and legal framework of the new technologies, including the future role of 
private international law concerning the new technological challenges. Contributing to 
this narrative, the main question of this paper is, whether the private international law 
is capable of responding adequately to the challenges posed by the future introduction 
and spreading of self-driving cars, in other terms, is its current set of rules and its legal 
dogmatics is able to accommodating and addressing the emerging issues of the 
technological revolution. The paper is focusing on the existing EU legislation, examines 
how the conflicts of laws could be resolved, how the current EU law might be working in 
future, hypothetical situations.. 
 
Keywords: Autonomous vehicles, artificial intelligence, private international law, EU law 
 
1.  Introduction 
It is most likely that the first prediction of fully autonomous and 
connected cars has been put into words by the celebrated writer of 
science-fiction literature, Isaac Asimov in ‘Sally’, a novel published in 
1953. 1 The main character of the story was an apple green “2045 
convertible with a Hennis-Carleton positronic motor and an Armat 
 
The underlining research of this paper has been conducted within the project 
‘’Legal issues of Autonomous Vehicles’’ (project No. GINOP-2.3.4-15-2016-00003 
Center for University-Industry Cooperation at Széchenyi University). 
* Research fellow (Centre for Social Sciences, Institute for Legal Studies); Associate 
professor (Széchenyi István University, Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political 
Sciences, Department of International and European Law). E-mail: horvb@ga.sze.hu. 
1 Isaac Asimov: Sally. Fantastic, Vol. 2. No. 3., May – June 1953, 36. Online 
available at https://archive.org/stream/Fantastic_v02n03_1953-05-
06#page/n33/mode/2up.  
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chassis”2 It is also clear from the very detailed technical description of 
the novel that in the period of the story, automated vehicles are 
significant and have already spread worldwide, but are extremely 
expensive playthings: the novel highlights that autonomous transport 
means are hundred times more expensive than traditional vehicles, 
therefore only few can afford to own autonomous cars. As a result, due 
to high level of expenses, the transport revolution has been taken place 
mostly in the public transport, and the industry was primarily specialized 
in the production of autonomous buses, which, as much as possible, 
have been operated as a kind of demand-based communal transport.3 4 
Moreover the vehicles featured in the novel were able to communicate 
with each other, so according to our today's concepts Asimov wrote 
about the ‘connected cars’. It is important from the perspective of this 
study, that one of the most important turning points of the short story 
has been a criminal offense committed by an autonomous bus, when it 
caused a road accident and run over a 'human' character killed him 
‘intentionally’. Moreover, Asimov explicitly referred to the law in his 
novel, when one of his ‘human’ character admitted: “[...] I remember 
when the first laws came out forcing the old machines off the highways 
and limiting travel to automatics. Lord, what a fuzz.”5  
Taken Asimov's prophecy out of context, these predictions can be 
easily associated with the current problems of autonomous vehicles and 
the revolutionary changes in the automotive industry and transport. In 
addition, the above examples arising from the science-fiction literature 
illustrate evidently that the broad social challenges comprise the legal 
narratives and the legal concerns have to be taken into account as well. 
The law must reflect on the likely challenges and social developments 
 
2 Asimov op. cit. 38.  
3 It is easily to see that the vision in this prediction is similar to the current forms of 
flexible transport services. The demand-responsive transport is already very common 
form of shared transport services, applied also in certain European countries, where 
the vehicles, busses, coaches, etc. are circulating not on fix routes, but enables the 
passengers to signalize in advance that they want to get on, and the vehicles will 
establish the final route based on these demands.  
4 See Asimov’s description: „You could always call a company and have one stop at 
your door in a matter of minutes and take you where you wanted to go. Usually, you 
had to drive with others who were going your way, but what’s wrong with that?” Asimov 
op. cit. 38.  
5 Asimov op. cit. 38.  
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still in time, it means prior to the technology's introduction which might 
help to avoid the fuzz – or “fuss” in this context – to which Asimov 
referred in his novel.6 
In the last few years, the legal scholarship is increasingly focusing on 
this area, the private law, 7 legal theory and ethics,8 criminal law,9 as well 
 
6 The vision of this “fuss” or “fuzz” could remember us to the descriptions of the 
technological revolution taken place nowadays, where this process is frequently called 
‘disruptive’. The new technologies are ‘disruptive’ in a sense that these are now 
building entirely new structures in a way that, at the same time, ‘disrupt’ or even 
demolish our traditional social structures, our traditional knowledge etc. See: James 
Manyika – Michael Chui – Jacques Bughin – Richard Dobbs – Peter Bisson – Alex 
Marrs: Disruptive technologies: Advances that will transform life, business, and the 
global economy. McKinsey Global Institute, New York, 2013. 
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-
insights/disruptive-technologies (2019.07.15.). 
7 See especially: Kyle Colonna: Autonomous Cars and Tort Liability. Case Western 
Reserve Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet, 2013/4. 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2325879 (2019.07.15.); Jan De Bruyne – Jochen Tanghe: 
Liability for Damage Caused by Autonomous Vehicles: A Belgian Perspective. Journal of 
European Tort Law, 2017/3. 324–371.; Kevin Funkhouser: Paving the Road Ahead: 
Autonomous Vehicles, Products Liability, and the Need for a New Approach. Utah Law 
Review, 2013/1., 437–462.; Jeffrey K. Gurney: Sue my car not me: products liability 
and accidents involving autonomous vehicles. University of Illinois Journal of Law, 
Technology & Policy, 2013/2. 247–277.; Maurice Schellekens: Self-driving cars and 
the chilling effect of liability law. Computer Law & Security Review, 2015/4., 506–517.  
8 See Alexander Hevelke – Julian Nida-Rümelin: Responsibility for crashes of 
autonomous vehicles: an ethical analysis.  Science and Engineering Ethics, 2015/3., 
619–630.; Heather Bradshaw-Martin – Catherine Easton: Autonomous or ‘driverless’ 
cars and disability: a legal and ethical analysis. European Journal of Current Legal 
Issues, 2014/3. http://webjcli.org/article/view/344 (2019.07.15.); Joshua Paul Davis: 
Law Without Mind: AI, Ethics and Jurisprudence. Univ. of San Francisco Law Research 
Paper, No. 2018-05. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3187513 
(2019.07.15.); Tom Michael Gasser: Grundlegende und spezielle Rechtsfragen für 
autonome Fahrzeuge. In: Autonomes Fahren (Hrsg.: Maurer, M. – Gerdes, J. – Lenz, B. 
– Winner H.), Springer, Berlin – Heidelberg, 2015., 543-574.; Benjamin Sobel: Artificial 
Intelligence’s Fair Use Crisis. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 2017/1.; Thomas E. 
Spahn: Is Your Artificial Intelligence Guilty of the Unauthorized Practice of Law? 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology, 2018/4.  
9 Sabine Gless – Emily Silverman – Thomas Weigend: If Robots cause harm, Who is 
to blame? Self-driving Cars and Criminal Liability. New Criminal Law Review: An 
International and Interdisciplinary Journal, 2016/3., 412–436; Clint W. Westbrook: 
The Google made me do it: The complexity of criminal liability in the age of autonomous 
vehicles. Michigan State Law Review, 2017/1., 97–147. 
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as traffic law10 are predominantly in centre of attention of the academia. 
This is not surprising, since the major legal challenges that are already 
foreseeable, e.g. questions of liability, can be adequately responded 
within these areas. In addition to these core legal areas, there are 
however further specific narratives have to be considered as well, 
including the private international law, the subject of this article. 11 The 
role of the EU private international law in the area of autonomous driving 
should not be neglected either, because from a practical point of view, 
perhaps not so far away, when the autonomous vehicles will start 
spreading in the roads of the European Union, legal problems related to 
transport will frequently go beyond the borders between the member 
states. 12 These cross-border legal problems, e.g. arising from road 
accidents, will require complex answers. The expected legal problems 
should be addressed not only by the static perspective of the 
substantive law (e.g. liability, liability forms, etc.), but also the dynamic 
aspects will be needed to take into consideration. Putting it differently, 
not merely the question who is liable is important, but it is also vital, how 
the substantive law can be made effective, namely, which court in which 
Member State may act, what is the applicable law or how this court's 
judgment can be enforced. Questions of this dynamic aspects are to be 
answered by the private international law. 
Even though the literature on autonomous vehicles has placed less 
emphasis on the private international law aspects, in the recent years 
 
10 Konrad Lachmayer: Verkehrsrecht: Rechtsstaatliche Defizite der Regelungen zu 
Testfahrten. In: Autonomes Fahren und Recht (Hrsg.: I. Eisenberger – Lachmayer – G. 
Eisenberger), Manz Verlag, Wien, 2017. 147–167. o.  
11 It is probable that after the autonomous cars having spread worldwide, more 
challenges and questions will arise, far beyond the core issues mentioned above, e.g. 
like data protection, technical standards, or some borderline questions might arise in 
traffic law.  
12 The predictions are based on different scenarios. For instance, a prophetic 
advertisement of Nissan promised in 2013 that the Nissan’s first fully autonomous car 
will be in production and available for customers within 5 years (see Jeffrey R. Zohn: 
When robots attack: How should the law handle self-driving cars that cause damages. 
University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy, 2015/2., 462. o.). Less 
progressive predictions suggest that fully autonomous vehicles will be on the roads in 
great strength not earlier than the 2040s. See: Dorothy J. Glancy: Autonomous and 
Automated and Connected Cars – Oh My! First generation autonomous cars in the legal 
ecosystem. Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, 2015/2. 622–629.  
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the scholarship is showing unquestionably growing interest in this area. 
This increasing attention is partly a consequence of the more active role 
the European Union is playing in shaping the policy and legal framework 
of the new technologies, including the future role of private international 
law concerning the new technological challenges. The European 
Parliament has also commissioned a research paper in order to see 
what problems might arise in this area due to technological changes 
taken place in the transportation. 13 As a consequence, although the 
private international law is still a secondary research area in light of 
autonomous driving, but the first results and publications are already at 
hand this time. 14  
Contributing to this narrative, the main question, the current paper is 
seeking for, is whether the private international law is capable of 
responding adequately to the challenges posed by the future 
introduction and spreading of self-driving cars, in other terms, is its 
current set of rules and its legal dogmatics is able to accommodating 
and addressing the emerging issues of the technological revolution. 
However, there are two limitations to the analysis. On the one hand, the 
following paper offers a "Europe-centric" analysis, i.e. it examines the 
above objectives from the perspective of private international law of the 
European Union and consequently considers the cross-border legal 
relationships within the European Union as a model. On the other hand, 
this study does not want to join the discussion of the ‘narratives’, i.e. the 
debate on how the new technologies could be handled and regarded 
analogically in our traditional terms. As we will see these debates are of 
fundamental importance primarily in the area of the substantive law and 
are therefore not specifically related to the interpretation of EU private 
international law rules.15 
 
13 Thomas Kadaner Graziano: Cross-border Traffic Accidents in the EU – the 
Potential Impact of Driverless Cars. European Parliament – Directorate-General for 
Internal Policies of the Union, Brussels, 2016. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/hu/document.html?reference=IPOL_STU%2
82016%29571362 (2019.07.15.). 
14 Jan De Bruynen – Cedric Vanleenhove: The Rise of Self-Driving Cars: Is the 
Private International Law Framework for non-contractual obligations posing a bump in 
the road? IALS Student Law Review, 2018/1., 14–26. o.  
15 This means that we are not attempting to determine whether autonomous 
vehicles, as objects of legislation, can be approached per analogiam within the current 
conceptual basis of the legislation governing other types automated vehicles (e.g. 
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Consequently, the present study is focusing on the existing EU 
legislation, examines how the conflicts of laws could be resolved, how 
the current EU law might be working in hypothetical situations. In the 
analysis we use a hypothetically constructed model case that helps us to 
demonstrate how particular provisions of the EU law could address 
questions that might arise in traffic road accidents in the (possibly not 
too far) future. The next chapter explains this model case and clarifies 
some basic concepts (2. Autonomous vehicles and private international 
law), then it examines the jurisdiction (3. The main problems of 
jurisdiction), the applicable law (4. Problems of the applicable law) and 
finally closes with a conclusion (5. Concluding remarks).  
 
2. Autonomous vehicles and private international law 
 
Although the study does not aim at giving a detailed analysis of the 
technological background of autonomous vehicles, it is essential to 
clarify the underlying basic concepts. The popular media uses for 
‘autonomous vehicles’ a couple of terms (self-driving cars, driverless 
vehicles, automated vehicles, etc.), which are often misplaced or used 
wrongly as synonyms, or are referring to technologies, where the term is 
inaccurate. The broadest category accepted in the literature is 
“automated vehicles”, which include certain kind of vehicles (cars, 
buses, trucks, etc.) equipped with special, computer controlled 
technological features that are able to assist the driver: developed forms 
of these technologies could take over some of the driving functions or 
even the entire driving process from the driver. Some of these 
technologies are already in serial production and are available in new 
cars (e.g. adaptive headlights, frontal collision warning; automatic 
emergency braking; adaptive cruise control; park assist systems; lane-
departure control; or lane-keep assist, etc.), but the broad term covers 
also the fully driverless cars, in which all driving functions are automated 
and operated by computers. Strictly speaking, however, only the latter 
could be considered as an ‘autonomous car.’ Consequently, the concept 
of ‘automated vehicles’ are the broader term that embraces several 
 
automated trains etc.), or we need completely unique law, as the autonomous cars 
might be sui generis phenomenon. 
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technological levels of automation, including the ‘autonomous vehicles’ 
as a form of the highest level of automation.  
The fully autonomous cars are still in test phase but are already 
operating in traffic in few places – mostly in the US – within a strict and 
exceptional legal environment. It is, however only a matter of time before 
driverless cars are allowed without any exception into traffic. It is 
expected, that after the introduction of autonomous vehicles, the full 
technological change will not take place immediately, and autonomous 
vehicles will co-exist with vehicles at different levels of automation.16 The 
law must be prepared also for this initial period, when different 
technologies will be in operation on the roads at the same time, 
specifically, private international law must also be able to deal with more 
complex problems arising from cross-border traffic disputes during this 
transitional period. This complexity can be easily seen in the below 
hypothetical, model case for a cross-border traffic accident. The analysis 
of this paper is fundamentally based on this model case, we will turn 
back frequently to this case with the intention of illustration and to show, 
how the EU law provisions could operate in complex, hypothetical 
situations. The merits of this model case are as follows:  
Two cars (Car-1 and Car-2) are involved in a road accident. Car-1 is a 
conventional vehicle registered in Austria, owned and operated by an 
Austrian resident and insured by an Austrian insurance company. Car-2 
is an autonomous vehicle, owned by a German company that put it into 
use for its Hungarian employee who operates the car. Car-2 is registered 
in Germany and insured by German insurance company. The 
unfortunate accident occurs in Slovakia due to a malfunction of the Li-
DAR system of Car-2. Car-2 is marketed by a French company and was 
manufactured at the site of a Belgian subsidiary of that company. The 
automaker buys the LiDAR system from a Finnish supplier and its 
software has been developed by an Irish company. 
Considering the facts of the case it is clear that private international 
law has to answer two fundamental questions. On the one hand, the 
question arises as to where the participants in the case can bring 
 
16 But this technological coexistence is not exceptional, as even today, ‘traditional’ 
cars are operating with cars partially equipped with automated functions. In the 
categorization of SAE (Society of Automotive Engineers), the fully autonomous cars are 
at the highest, fifth level of automation, see Glancy op. cit. 631. 
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proceedings to enforce their claim, in other words, which state will have 
jurisdiction in these proceedings and which forum will decide the 
dispute? Another important question is what law should be applied by 
the forum of the procedure. 17 
As the case is a complex of cross-border legal relationships, it is of 
great importance that which connecting factors, such as the place of 
residence, the place where the damage occurred, the place where the 
vehicle is registered, etc., are applied. Below, we examine these main 
issues from the perspective of EU private international law. 
 
3. The main problems of jurisdiction 
 
3.1. Unification of private international laws in the European Union 
 
The unification of provisions of jurisdictions in the European Union is 
not a recent process. Even at the very outset of the European 
integration, the common market made it necessary for the Member 
States to introduce and apply uniform rules in certain areas of private 
international law, rather than domestic, national rules based on different 
approaches and models. Unification eliminated conflicts arising from 
different national rules, thereby the major objective of this process was 
to increase the predictability of the application and enforcement of 
private international law provisions. This was also expected to 
strengthen the confidence of businesses and other entities operating 
within the Community in the single market, to generate and increase in 
the cross-border transactions and ultimately to deepen the common 
market. This resulted in conclusion of the Brussels Convention in 1968, 
which introduced uniform rules on jurisdiction and the enforcement of 
judgments. 18 Later, the amendments of Treaty of Amsterdam made it 
possible for Member States to replace the Brussels Convention with 
 
17 International civil procedural law issues may also arise, namely how these 
judgments can be enforced. This study focuses on the classic issues of private 
international law, so this aspect is not discussed here. 
18 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial mattersBrüsszelben. Consolidated version: OJ C 
27. (1998.1.26.), 1. o.  
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secondary EU law, and ss a consequence, the "Brussels I" regulation has 
been adopted in 2001 (Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001). 19   
In a 2009 report it was indicated the revision of the regulation has 
been needed, therefore, the Brussels I Regulation was replaced by the 
Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council ("Brussels I bis" Regulation). 20   
 
3.2. The jurisdiction according to the "Brussels I bis" Regulation  
 
The first major question regarding the "Brussels I bis" Regulation is 
whether the Regulation might apply to disputes relating to autonomous 
vehicles, namely, in a complex dispute as it has been indicated in the 
above model case. The scope of the Brussels I bis Regulation is broadly 
defined, according to which its rules shall apply in civil and commercial 
matters whatever the nature of the court or tribunal, 21 with only a few 
specific exceptions. 22 Therefore the scope of the regulation has been 
defined broadly and neutrally, which means that its applicability is not 
restricted by technological concern, not even if the subject of the 
underlying dispute would be road accident involving autonomous 
vehicles.  
The Brussels I bis Regulation lays down general and special rules on 
jurisdiction that all serve the predictability. Moreover, three other major 
 
19 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matter. OJ L 12. 
(2001.1.16.), 1. o.  
20 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters. 
21 Brussels I bis, Article 1 para. 1. 
22 See Brussels I bis, Article 1 para. 1–2 It shall not extend, in particular, to 
revenue, customs or administrative matters or to the liability of the State for acts and 
omissions in the exercise of State authority (acta iure imperii), and the the regulation 
shall not apply to 1. the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property 
arising out of a matrimonial relationship or out of a relationship deemed by the law 
applicable to such relationship to have comparable effects to marriage; 2. bankruptcy, 
proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, 
judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings; 3. social security; 4. 
arbitration; 5. maintenance obligations arising from a family relationship, parentage, 
marriage or affinity; 6. wills and succession, including maintenance obligations arising 
by reason of death..  
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concerns are also shaping the logic and characteristics of the 
Regulation.23 First, it designates the defendant's domicile (locus 
domicilii) as a general rule of jurisdiction, following the principle of actor 
sequitur forum rei, which prevents the defendant from being sued 
before a foreign court to which the party has not got any real 
connection.24 Second, derogating from the general rules of jurisdiction, 
the Regulation also establishes specific rules of jurisdiction for cases in 
which the except can be justified by the interests of the weaker, more 
vulnerable party (e.g. consumer, insured person, employee, etc.). Third, 
the regulation also respects the parties’ autonomy and allows for forum 
choice (prorogatio fori), provided that it does not violate the criteria 
indicated in specific jurisdiction cases. For the purpose of the model 
case, the following rules of jurisdiction are practically important:  
 
a) Under the general rule of jurisdiction, persons domiciled in a 
Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of 
that Member State. 25 It is also important, that persons who are not 
nationals of the Member State in which they are domiciled shall be 
governed by the rules of  jurisdiction applicable to nationals of that 
Member State. .26  This rule governs also the status of legal person: 
according to the specific provision of the Regulation, a company or other 
legal person or association of natural or legal persons is domiciled at the 
place where it has its statutory seat, central administration, or principal 
place of business. 27 Consequently, under the general rule of jurisdiction, 
the defendant may cover all possible persons involved in a traffic 
accident, as it was indicated in the above model case, i.e. the general 
rule, the locus domicilii may be relevant for a driver, operator, 
 
23 Xandra Kramer – Alina Ontanu – Michiel de Rooij – Erlis Themeli – Kyra 
Hanemaayer: The application of Brussels I (Recast) in the legal practice of EU Member 
States. Synthesis Report. Asser Institute, Den Haag, 2018. 5. o. 
https://www.asser.nl/media/5018/m-5797-ec-justice-the-application-of-brussels-1-09-
outputs-synthesis-report.pdf (2019.07.15.). 
24 Mádl Ferenc – Vékás Lajos: Nemzetközi magánjog és nemzetközi gazdasági 
kapcsolatok joga. Eötvös Kiadó, Budapest, 2014. 305. o. 
https://www.tankonyvtar.hu/hu/tartalom/tamop425/2011_0001_527_nemzetkozi_m
aganjog (2019.07.15.). 
25 See Brussels I bis Article 4 para. 1.  
26 Brussels I bis Article 4 para. 2. 
27 Brussels I bis Article 63 para. 1. 
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manufacturer, distributor, software developer, etc. of a car, when the 
court wants to determine its jurisdiction.  
 
b) The regulation lays down special provisions for jurisdiction, which 
covers also the delicts. As a consequence, a person domiciled in a 
Member State may be sued in another Member State in matters relating 
to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the 
harmful event occurred or may occur.28 
 
c) The special jurisdiction preserved for the so called ’adhesive 
procedures’ might have relevance also in disputes arising from road 
accidents, in which autonomous vehicles are involved, According to this 
special rule, a person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in 
another Member State as regards a civil claim for damages or restitution 
which is based on an act giving rise to criminal proceedings, in the court 
seised of those proceedings, to the extent that that court has jurisdiction 
under its own law to entertain civil proceedings.29  
 
d) The regulation lays down special rules for jurisdiction in matters 
relating to insurance. According to that, an insurer domiciled in a 
Member State may be sued in the courts of the Member State in which 
he is domiciled (locus domicilii). It is also possible to bring the case to an 
another Member State, if the actions brought by the policyholder, the 
insured or a beneficiary. In this case the jurisdiction of the courts is 
determined by the place where the claimant is domiciled (locus actoris). 
Even though the previous listing does not mention explicitly, according to 
the case law of the CJEU it includes the injured party as well. Special 
rules apply for cases where co-insurer has also interest: the co-insurer 
can bring the case to the courts of a Member State in which proceedings 
are brought against the leading insurer. 30 
In addition to the previous special jurisdictions, in respect of liability 
insurance or insurance of immovable property, the insurer may be sued 
in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred (locus 
damni). The same applies if movable and immovable property are 
 
28 Brussels I bis Article 7 para. 2. 
29 Brussels I bis Article 7 para. 3. 
30 Brussels I bis Article 11 para. 1. 
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covered by the same insurance policy and both are adversely affected by 
the same contingency. 31 In respect of liability insurance, the insurer may 
also, if the law of the court permits it, be joined in proceedings which the 
injured party has brought against the insured. 32  
The ‘protecting the weaker party’ principle is also represented in the 
special jurisdiction provisions of the regulation. Therefore an insurer may 
bring proceedings only in the courts of the Member State in which the 
defendant is domiciled, irrespective of whether he is the policyholder, 
the insured or a beneficiary. 33 Logically, this provisions does not imply 
the counter claims, i.e. a counter-claim can be brought in the court in 
which the original claim is pending. Moreover, the parties may depart 
from this principle by an agreement, but only within strict 
circumstances.34 
 
4.4. Problems of the applicable law 
 
4.1. EU and international unifications regarding the applicable law 
 
Similar considerations we have seen vis-a-vis the jurisdiction, 
Member States harmonized their national rules. In other terms the 
proper functioning of the common market, the predictability of the 
settlement of disputes and legal certainty required that the applicable 
 
31 Brussels I bis Article 12. 
32 Brussels I bis Article 13. The specific directive on civil liability allows explicitely to 
take action directly to the insurer, see Directive 2009/103/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil 
liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to 
insure against such liability, Article 18. OJ  L 263 11 (2009.7.10.).  
33 Brussels I bis Article 14 para. 1 
34 See Brussels I bis Article 15, agreements 1. which is entered into after the 
dispute has arisen; which allows the policyholder, the insured or a beneficiary to bring 
proceedings in courts other than those indicated in this Section; which is concluded 
between a policyholder and an insurer, both of whom are at the time of conclusion of 
the contract domiciled or habitually resident in the same Member State, and which has 
the effect of conferring jurisdiction on the courts of that Member State even if the 
harmful event were to occur abroad, provided that such an agreement is not contrary 
to the law of that Member State; which is concluded with a policyholder who is not 
domiciled in a Member State, except in so far as the insurance is compulsory or relates 
to immovable property in a Member State; or which relates to a contract of insurance in 
so far as it covers one or more of the risks set out in the regulation. 
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law should be determined in the same way, regardless of the fact, in 
which the Member State the action has been taken. In the absence of 
harmonized rules, however, the choice of forum could influence, which 
substantive law will decide the dispute, therefore it could even influence 
the outcome of the dispute (forum shopping). The unification at 
Community level, in comparison with the Brussels Convention, started 
later in this area. After a longer period of preparation, the Convention on 
the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome Convention) was 
adopted in 198035 and has been replaced by a regulation later (the 
"Rome I Regulation").36  
However, with regard to the non-contractual obligations directly 
related to our subject, the unification has arrived only in 2007 by the 
adoption of Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 
("Rome II").37 It is important however, that, there are also international 
agreements in this area, which are relevant, as certain EU Member 
States have concluded agreements prior to the adoption of the Rome II 
Regulation. The Regulation itself lays down its relationship to these 
international conventions, which may be a special norm and take 
precedence, 38 i.e. the applicable law should be determined not by the 
Rome II Regulation but by the international convention. Two Conventions 
are relevant to our analysis: Convention of 4 May 1971 on the Law 
Applicable to Traffic Accidents39 and the Hague Convention of 2 October 
 
35 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Relations, HL L 266 
(1980. 10.9.). 1. o.  
36 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations. 
37 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), OJ L 199, 
31.7.2007, p. 40–49. 
38 According to that, the regulation shall not prejudice the application of 
international conventions to which one or more Member States are parties at the time 
when the regulation has been adopted and which lay down conflict-of-law rules relating 
to non-contractual obligations. See Article 28. For the parallel regimes, see: Nagy 
Csongor Istvan: The Rome II Regulation and Traffic Accidents: Uniform Conflict Rules 
with Some Room for Forum Shopping – How So? Journal of Private International Law, 
2010/1. 93–108.; Thomas Kadner Graziano: The Rome II Regulation and the Hague 
Conventions on Traffic Accidents and Product Liability – Interaction, conflicts and 
future perspectives. Nederlands  Internationaal Privaatrecht, 2008, 425–429. 
39 Hague Convention of 4 May 1971 on the law applicable to traffic accidents. 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=81. (2019.07.15.). 
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1973 on the Law Applicable to Products Liability. 40 Many EU Member 
States are parties of both Conventions, but Hungary takes not part in 
these conventions. 41 It means that there is a parallel system in the 
European Union for the applicable law to non-contractual obligations, 42 
thus in addition to the rules of the Rome II Convention, the Hague 
Conventions are discussed below.  
 
4.2. The Rome II regulation 
 
The first substantive question in the context of the Rome II 
Regulation is whether it applies to damage caused by autonomous 
vehicles in road accidents. It sets out the scope of the Regulation in a 
neutral and universal manner. Aside from certain exceptions, 43 the 
 
40 Hague Convention of 1 October 1973 on the Law Applicable to Products Liability. 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=84. (2019.07.15.). 
41 The 1971 Hague Convention has actually 21 contracting parties, which include 
13 EU member states (Ausztria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Netherlands, Croatia, 
Poland, Latvia, Lituania, Luxemburg, Spain, Slovakia and Slovenia (Portugalia signed, 
but not ratified the convention), see: 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=81). The parties 
of the 1973 Hague Convention are 11, in which there are 7 EU member states: 
Finnland, France, Netherlands, Croatia, Luxemburg, Spain, Slovenia (Belgium, Italy and 
Portugal have been signed, but not ratified the convention), see:  
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=84).  
42 See: Nagy Csongor Istvan: The Rome II Regulation and Traffic Accidents: Uniform 
Conflict Rules with Some Room for Forum Shopping – How So? Journal of Private 
International Law, 2010/1. 93–108.  
43 From the scope of the regulation are excluded: non-contractual obligations 
arising out of family relationships and relationships deemed by the law applicable  to 
such relationships to have comparable effects including maintenance obligations; non-
contractual obligations arising out of matrimonial property regimes, property regimes of 
relationships deemed by the law applicable to such relationships to have comparable 
effects to marriage, and wills and succession; non-contractual obligations arising under 
bills of exchange, cheques and promissory notes and other negotiable instruments to 
the extent that the obligations under such other negotiable instruments arise out of 
their negotiable character; non-contractual obligations arising out of the law of 
companies and other bodies corporate or unincorporated regarding matters such as 
the creation, by registration or otherwise, legal capacity, internal organisation or 
winding-up of companies and other bodies corporate or unincorporated, the personal 
liability of officers and members as such for the obligations of the company or body and 
the personal liability of auditors to a company or to its members in the statutory audits 
of accounting documents; non-contractual obligations arising out of the relations 
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scope of the Regulation is to apply to non-contractual obligations in the 
field of civil and commercial matters. The nature of non-contractual 
obligations is also broadly interpreted in the Regulation, so that 
damages include all consequences of wrongful harm, unjust enrichment, 
unlicensed administration or culpa in contrahendo, as well as all types 
of damage that is likely to occur. 44 Similarly to the Brussels I bis 
Regulation, the scope is defined in a neutral manner, i.e. it does not 
require any special prerequisites, e.g. technological, technical 
requirements related to damages, therefore the Rome II Regulation also 
seems to be applicable in disputes arising from road accidents. In 
addition, it is important that the approach of the Rome II Regulation is 
universal, it menas that it applies even if the connecting factor refers to 
the law of a third country, outside the European Union. 45 
The connecting factors determining the applicable law are defined in 
several ways in private international law. The most common approach 
that the connecting factors are determined by the characteristics, 
specificities of the case (e.g. lex loci delicti commissi, lex loci damni, 
etc.). Moreover, the connecting factors can be defined on the basis of 
abstract, generic concepts (e.g. closest relation principle). The Rome II 
Regulation combines these methods and provides a flexible framework 
for conflict-of-law rules. In doing so, the regulation ensures that the 
applicable law is determined in the most appropriate way and it is not 
only legally but also predictably fair to the parties of the dispute. For the 
non-contractual obligations, it is particularly important that the 
determination of the applicable law should reflect on a balance between 
the interests of the injured party and those who caused the damage. 
Considering these aspects, the Rome II Regulation designates the 
applicable law in the areas relevant to our subject matter in the following 
manner: 
 
a) Respecting the autonomy of the parties, the Rome II Regulation 
allows the parties themselves to choose the applicable law to a non-
 
between the settlors, trustees and beneficiaries of a trust created voluntarily; non-
contractual obligations arising out of nuclear damage; non-contractual obligations 
arising out of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including 
defamation. See Rome II regulation Article 1. 
44 Rome II regulation Article 1 Para. 1–3.  
45 Cf. Rome II regulation Article 3.  
248 Balázs Horváthy 
contractual obligation (freedom of choice).46 The choice of law must be 
expressly formulated, and must not prejudice the rights of third parties. 
The choice of law may take the form of an agreement following the 
occurrence of the event giving rise to the injury or, if all parties are 
engaged in commercial activities, of an agreement freely negotiated 
prior to the occurrence of the event giving rise to the damage. Obviously, 
the choice of law cannot be derogated from the cogent or imperative 
rules of the applicable law. 47 
 
b) In the absence of choice of law, the regulation applies the lex loci 
damni as a general rule, irrespective of the country or countries in which 
the indirect consequences of the harmful act may occur. 48  For this 
reason, e.g. in the case of personal injury or damage in the event of a 
traffic accident, the State of the lex loci damni shall be the place where 
the injury was sustained or the place where the material damage 
occurred.49 Therefore, when applying the main connecting factor, it is 
irrelevant, where the act was giving rise. In traditional traffic accidents, 
the lex loci damni and the lex loci commissi delicti are usually identical, 
but in more complex legal disputes, the wrongful act (e.g. software 
update that have been wrongly installed etc.) may differ from the lex loci 
damni, but even in these cases the law of the place where the damage 
occurred shall apply.  
 
c) If the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining 
damage both have their habitual residence in the same country at the 
time when the damage occurs, the law of that country shall apply; 50  
 
 
46 Rome II regulation Article 14. 
47 Rome II regulation Article 14 para. 3–4. Burián László – Ziegler Dezső Tamás – 
Kecskés László – Vörös Imre: Európai és magyar nemzetközi kollíziós magánjog. Krim, 
Budapest, 2010. 244–245. o.  
48 Rome II regulation Article 4 . cikk para. 1. Ld. Burián – Ziegler – Kecskés – 
Vörös: op. cit. 247. o.  
49 Therefore the Rome II regulation does not use the traditional lex loci delicti 
commissi connecting factor. See:  Mádl – Vékás: op. cit. 234. Lex loci damnihoz ld. 
Burián – Ziegler – Kecskés – Vörös: op. cit. uo.  
50 Rome II regulation Article 4. para. 2. 
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d) The Rome II Regulation applies the principle of closer relationship 
as an additional rule (the so-called "escape clause").51 Where it is clear 
from all the circumstances of the case that the tort/delict is manifestly 
more closely connected with a country other than that indicated above, 
the law of that other country shall apply. A manifestly closer connection 
with another country might be based in particular on a pre-existing 
relationship between the parties, such as a contract, that is closely 
connected with the tort/delict in question.  
 
e) Unlike the general rules, the Rome II Regulation lays down specific 
conflict-of-law rules for product liability. This may be of particular 
importance, when the damage arise from use of high technology. In 
these case the court should determine the applicable law according to 
these specific rules in the following order:  
- first, the law of the country in which the injured party had his 
habitual residence at the time when the damage occurred, if the product 
was marketed in that country; 
- if no such marketing has taken place, the law of the country in 
which the product was purchased will apply (provided that the product 
was marketed in that country); 
- or, failing that, the law of the country in which the damage occurred, 
if the product was marketed in that country. 
The above exceptional rules can be applied if the person liable could 
reasonably foreseeable that the product was marketed in the country of 
applicable law. Otherwise, the applicable law is the law of the country 
where the person responsible is habitually resident. The regulation also 
derogates from these three layers of rules, referring to the closer 
connection principle, as a partial exception in the area of product 
liability. 
 
f) The Rome II Regulation also enables the member states to refer to 
the public order (ordre public). On that basis, the judge may refuse to 
apply the law indicated in the regulation, if it is manifestly incompatible 
with the public policy of the forum. 52 This provides an exceptional 
opportunity for the forum, which is in principle free to determine the 
 
51 Rome II regulation Article 4  para. 3. 
52 Rome II regulation Article 26.  
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scope of public order in the Member States, without being subject to any 
substantive limitation in the Regulation. Such public order/public policy 
grounds could, for example, might be important, if the applicable law 
would require, e.g. the application of punitive damages, 53 which would 
be incompatible with the forum's legal system. 54 In these cases, the 
forum's own law (lex fori) will prevail over the law as defined above. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
The above analysis has shown that the framework of current EU 
private international law rules might address the problems of cross-
border disputes arising from traffic accidents caused by autonomous 
vehicles. However, it would be an exaggeration to say that the under the 
current legislation would be entirely appropriate and needs neither far-
reaching reform nor small correction. Actually neither the Brussels I bis 
nor the Rome II Regulations contain specific provisions for road 
accidents. Both EU regulations aim to strike a balance between the 
interests of the litigants – plaintiff and defendant, injured and injured, 
etc. –, so that both rules of jurisdiction and the applicable law are 
incorporated in a balanced system. The ‘equilibrium’ can still be 
maintained on the basis of the current EU law provisions of non-
contractual liability, however, when the autonomous vehicles started 
spreading across Europe, the nature of road accidents will change, and 
the period when conventional vehicles and fully autonomous vehicles 
are involved in transport will be a particular challenge for the EU 
legislator. Consequently, while in a typical road accident today, the 
negligence or intentional act of the persons concerned (e.g. not keeping 
the speed limits, etc.) plays a much larger role than objective factors 
such as technical reasons, technical problems, etc., this situation  will 
change significantly with the arrival of autonomous vehicles. Just as the 
"human" drivers bound to their own decisions will be replaced by the 
"robot drivers" based on artificial intelligence, the causes of road 
accidents will change. As a result, the current balance between the 
interests of those involved in a road accident is also shifting, which 
means that victims (passengers, pedestrians, etc.) must receive 
 
53 See Burián – Ziegler – Kecskés – Vörös o p. cit.  op. cit. 259. o. 
54 The preamble of the regulation refers to some example, e.g. non-compensatory 
exemplary or punitive damages, Rome II regulation, preamble 32.  
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considerably more attention. Changes in the nature of road accidents 
and the objective liability indicated above may also lead to an increase 
in the proportion of product liability claims and related litigation. 
Compared to the concept of non-contractual damages, the rules of 
jurisdiction and conflict of laws regarding product liability are already 
closer to the model that focuses on the injured party, however, the 
specificities of possible product liability claims related to autonomous 
vehicles and artificial intelligence should also be investigated. As we 
have also seen, the applicable law is determined currently by two 
coexisting, parallel regimes, i.e. the Rome II Regulation and the Hague 
Conventions. The coexistence of these regimes is already giving rise to 
the forum shopping, which obviously poses the risk that the parties 
could not enforce their claims effectively. For this reason, this ‘double-
regime’ also endangers the predictability, which is fundamental concern 
in the EU private international law. As a result, it is suggested to review 
de lege ferenda the relation of the Rome II Regulation to other 
international agreements, specifically to the Hague Conventions.  
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The Jean Monnet Programme 
In 1989, the European Commission launched the Jean Monnet 
Action to support academic research in European integration. The 
programme originally addressed academics in the Member States, but 
came to include those in accession countries soon after. Today, it has a 
global scope and offers worldwide support to European integration 
studies.  
The most important modes of support have been grants for the 
development of teaching modules in European integration studies, the 
designation of Jean Monnet Chairs and financial support for Jean 
Monnet Centres of Excellence for teaching and research. Networking 
activities and other research activities are supported too. Cooperation 
across different institutions and with partners outside higher educations 
is encouraged. 
Grants are a trigger for the development of initiatives, in spite of their 
modest value and dependency on co-funding. Strong support from the 
university management is a must because grantees are required to 
continue activities for a number of years after support has ceased. 
Over the years, interdisciplinary has come to grow in importance and 
is now actively promoted. Indeed, a solid understanding of European 
integration requires insight from history, politics, economics, law and 
other disciplines. 
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The current and former Jean Monnet Chairs form a very strong 
professional network. Being awarded a Jean Monnet Chair is seen by 
many as a valuable entry ticket into the international community of 
European integration researchers.  
European Study Centres in Hungary 
In 1998 the Hungarian Representation of the European Commission 
(DG 10) and the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded an 
agreement on establishing 14 European Study Centres with the support 
of PHARE  aid. The European Study Centres were established as parts of 
14 Hungarian state accredited universities. Today there are 17 
European Study Centres in Hungary. In 2000 the European Study 
Centres were coordinated by the TEMPUS Public Foundation which 
elaborated a programme with remarkable results: more than 30.000 
undergraduate students, 3.500 graduate students, and 7.000 experts 
from target group institutions (teachers, entrepreneurs, lawyers, 
journalists and civil servants) had been trained by more than 600 
lecturers. 
 
The main tasks of ESC: 
 Teaching of EU modules (EU Law, economic and political 
integration, history of the European Institutions, etc.) at the 
faculties on different levels. 
 Teaching of European studies in the postgraduate education. 
 Training and further educations to experts, businesspersons, 
officers, attorneys, media specialists and high school 
teachers. 
 Research programs (PhD and other research activities). 
 Network building activities (ESC, regional, sectorial and 
partnership  cooperation). 
Centre for European Studies at the Széchenyi István University 
The European Study Centre of Széchenyi University was established 
in 1998 too. It focused on the teaching modules which covered the most 
important knowledge about European integration. The study centre 
became a real regional centre. Our study centre cooperated very close 
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with the local authorities organizing lectures for civil servants, business 
professionals and secondary school teachers in the region. 
The teaching activities of our centre covered the following subject: 
case law of the EU, European internal policies, IT law and legislation of 
the EU, regional politics of the EU, EU project planning, developing the 
rural regions in the European Union, European security and defense 
policy, European transportation infrastructure, EU traffic, tariffs and 
customs, and development of small regions in the EU. We published a 
newsletter monthly on European Law. 
Since 1998 we have a Jean Monnet Chair at our Faculty of Law. Wee 
participate actively in the Jean Monnet and ERASMUS+ programmes. 
Our study centre cooperated and cooperate with the following foreign 
partner institution: University Vienna Juridicum, University Strasbourg, 
University Sapientia, University Brno, University Krems, University Jules 
Verne France, University Passau Germany, University Saarbrücken, etc.  
EUBLAW - Jean Monnet Module on EU Business Law (2016-2019) 
In 2016 the Centre for European Studies obtained funding for the 
“Jean Monnet Module on EU Business Law” (EUBLAW) project within the 
framework of the Erasmus+ programme of the European Union. The 
main objective of the project concerns comprehensive curriculum 
development in the field of EU Business Law at the Deák Ferenc Faculty 
of Law of Széchenyi István University. The project aims at elaborating the 
scope and content of complex course structure, establishing the 
methodology of the courses, composing of 2 elective courses announced 
in English. The new courses will be announced for students attending 
MA law, for incoming Erasmus-students of the Faculty and also 
interested students in international administration and economics will 
have the opportunity to participate. The team members will elaborate up-
to-date course materials, including systematised course presentations 
and a concise course book in English in order to foster the publication 
and dissemination of the results of academic research conducted within 
the three years long project. The main aim of the project is to deliver 
tailor-made courses for the participants and for that reason, the teaching 
methodology will also apply innovative approaches. The Jean Monnet 
Module will be predominantly based on the ‘law in context’ approach 
and will offer a perspective behind the text of law in order to equip 
students with the ability to understand the real function of the legal 
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instruments governing the business relations within the EU internal 
market. In this way, the project is expected to improve teaching 
capacities in the field of EU Business law in English at the Faculty, as 
well as to provide quality course materials. The Jean Monnet Module will 
be carried out within the infrastructure of the Centre for European 
Studies, therefore the project might give also new impetus to this 
research institution of the Faculty established within a former PHARE 
project in 1998. Moreover, as an expected post-grant impact, the project 
outcome might contribute to the accreditation of a post-graduate course 
(LL.M.) for legal professionals as well.  
